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Same same but different

Power in Partnerships

An Analysis of Origins, Effects and Governance

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Same same but different

Power in Partnerships

An Analysis of Origins, Effects and Governance

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Tilburg, op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. Ph. Eijlander, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie in de aula van de Universiteit

op vrijdag 18 februari 2011 om 10.15 uur door

Annekathrin Ellersiek

geboren op 19 maart 1979 te Herford, Duitsland.

Promotor: Prof. dr. Patrick Kenis

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Rotterdam, 2011

Annekathrin Ellersiek

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Glossary and Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund: The main source and instrument for European Union Development Aid. Each EDF cycle is concluded for a period of about five years. The 9 th and 10 th EDF were passed for the periods from 2000-2007 and 2008-2013, respectively.
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
EUEI	European Union Energy Initiative
EUWI	European Union Water Initiative
EUEF	European Union Energy Facility
EUWF	European Union Water Facility
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NAO	Network Administrative Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Setting the Stage

When asked about the major challenge faced by the partnership, one respondent¹ stated that “[B]alancing power was most challenging. Over years, conflict rose over anything related to [Name of location]. Water waste and pollution were massive. [Name of partners] bore upon the consequences, but they were simply ignored [...] there was not much latitude in the dealings between them anymore. We had to build credits first and get them all involved, from the villagers to [Name of partner].” Another respondent described: “Needless to say, their [Partners] appetite for risks is low. Yet, they have committed themselves to a set of goals, which involve risks. Pricing and scope certainly are examples. It has to pay off for them but we also have to meet priority needs. It has to pay off for [Name of partners] too. There is no use in it if they cannot afford it. We have to work on both sides. That is what taxes their patience. It’s a gamble but the bottom-line is to keep them at it.”

One partner argued: “if a project becomes a success depends on mutuality. If our partners need us as much as we need them, fine, then it is a give and take. If that is not clear then it becomes tricky [...]. When they lose interest, they drop out or push their interest through, regardless of what that means to us or the project.” Another one argues: “it depends on whom you partner with and how you get started. Normally, our chances for success are low in projects of this magnitude. [Name of a partner] and us may be invited later to politically somehow legitimise the whole process [...] In the [Name of the partnership] our role was clear and our input requested at all stages. That put us in a rather commanding position with all of them. When it worked out, our role was expanded which gave a clear signal to [their stakeholders] [...] that is what makes it a success.”

Partnerships among a range of diverse organisations, from different societal sectors, with various resources, diverse interests, perspectives and attitudes, often render conflict and power struggles rather than effective collaboration. Power relations between partners and the questions if and how these are effectively governed in partnership are of great

¹ This and the following quotes on this page are derived from interviews with respondents. Names of partners and locations are deleted for reasons of confidentiality.

importance for partnership success. Be it the meaningful participation of individual partners or the overall success of the collective endeavour.

The next sections of this introduction will elaborate upon these issues and take them to a more abstract level resulting in the overarching research question that guided this research. Subsequently, the contributions obtained from the study of power in the empirical context of partnerships will be discussed followed by a description of the research approach adopted and the data collection procedure. Finally, the layout of the book will explain how the main research question was broken down into related sub-questions, which are addressed in each chapter respectively.

1.2 Research problem

Partnerships have been labelled “the new orthodoxy” (Russel, 2002: 45) to attain sustainable development. Involving all kinds of organisations such as national and international donor agencies, civil society organisations (e.g., non-governmental, non-profit and community organisations), businesses, contractors and service providers, as much as one third of total Official Development Aid (ODA) (co-) finances globally and regionally operating partnerships today (Lele, Sadik, & Simmons, 2006). The popularity of partnerships and other joint approaches to development financing, implementation, coordination and governance (e.g., Desai, 1998; Mavrotas, 2005; Pessoa, 2008; Quartey, 2005; Raffer & Singer, 1996) is often argued to have arisen against the backdrop of several inadequacies (Börzel & Risse, 2005: 196) of previous bi-lateral and country-focused aid systems (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1998; Rowan, 2009). Examples are resource scarcity and in particular governance-related issues such as a lack of inclusiveness, ownership, transparency and effectiveness (Bornstein, 2003; Burnside & Dollar, 2004; Lewis, 1998; Maurizio, 2008).

However, participation in partnerships is not always a success for the individual partners, nor do all partnerships deliver on their goals. In fact, after an initial phase of enthusiasm about partnership without much reflection (Buse & Harmer, 2004), critical voices raised and pointed out several challenges to effective partnering. The present study has been inspired by two seemingly contradictory empirical observations, both of which are reflected in the current partnership literature and the quotes of the respondents presented in the above. First, the challenges posed by differences in power between partners, identified as a cross-cutting theme in the respondents’ accounts, are equally centre-stage in a controversial debate in the literature. Controversial is this debate because though partnerships suggest a “cooperative alternative to the traditional characterization of relationships among the actors involved as competitive, adversarial or hierarchical” (Tomlinson, 2005: 1196), “critical problems surround the deployment of power amongst members” (Newell, 2005: 288). In this way, some see in partnerships a mere replication of prior inadequacies in the management and provision of aid and have

abandoned the idea that the mutuality necessary for effective collaboration can possibly be attained by partnerships and they remain to be “*dialogue[s] of the unequal*” (Elliott, 1987: 65).

This and similar diagnoses and prognoses, however, seemingly contradict a second observation. Just as well illustrated by the respondents’ quotes, the partnership literature covers numerous examples of effective collaboration, viz. cases of successful participation of partners and/or effective collective endeavours. Even in face of diverse constituent bases and seemingly considerable power differences (i.e. Ashman, 2001b; Holcombe & Anderson, 2009; Ingle & Shpresa, 2007; Jütting, 1999; Livesey, Hartman, Stafford, & Shearer, 2009; von Malmborg, 2003). The fact that both phenomena presented in the above describe parts of the reality of partnership raises an interesting question. The question lies in the fact that while effective partnership is assumed to require collaboration at least to some degree at eye-level (cf. Alter & Hage, 1993; Ashman, 2000; Brown & Ashman, 1996; Bryson, Crosby, & Middleton Stone, 2006; Lewis, 1998), diverse organisations may not only hold different parts of the solution to the problems a partnership seeks to address (Waddell, 2000, 2005), but also different degrees of power (Dolan & Opondo, 2005: 8). On that account, the over-arching question that arises in the presence of this tension is: why are some partners and partnerships effective in the face of power differences whereas others are not?

The micro-foundations of power and effective partnership participation

Over the past decades, there has been a burgeoning literature unpacking the belief that the power of an organisation is a somewhat given phenomenon. That is power or a lack of it can be ‘read off’ from the resources or status of an organization, unaffected by context (cf. Derkzen, Franklin & Bock, 2008). Today, power is commonly regarded a relational concept, derived from and defined by the specific context of, for example a partnership (cf. Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Burgess & Nielsen, 1974; Crozier, 1964; Dahl, 1957, 1961; Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971; Molm, 1990; Pfeffer, 1981 ; Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980). In the contexts of partnerships, most of the thinking about power has been informed by inquiries into episodes of agency in partnerships, via the analysis of partnership discourse, contestation, negotiations, and exchange. Power arises when partners effectively partake in partnership processes and this way influence each other in terms of ideas, language, attitudes, behaviours and decisions (Cardini, 2006; Gray & Putnam, 2005; Hanke, Gray, & Putnam, 2002; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Hastings, 1999; Poncelet, 2001). Yet, the respondents’ quotes cited at the beginning of this introduction illustrate that this equation does not eventuate for all partners and all partnerships. Little empirical evidence however, is available that further specifies the underlying structural factors that reflect upon and make agency and effective interaction in partnerships possible.

Introduction

Different theories of action that seek to explain inter-organisational agency and effective collaboration in partnerships predicate on different structural conditions, which ensure constraint and enablement (Alter & Hage, 1993). Going back to the debate about “faces of power” in organised decision-making contexts (Clegg, 1989a; Clegg & Haugaard, 2009; McPhee, 2004; Phillips, 1997) many of the political organisation theories² explain power by the interaction between two factors or bases of power. Partners have access to and/or control resources which are perceived as critical to the other partners and/or to the partnership; and/or partners hold the position, meaning they are involved in interactions and partnership processes to be able to enact their resources, which again are subject to approval by others (Jacobson & Cohen, 1986). Partners will tend to get involved with and be influenced by those who access or control valuable resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 44). Reflexivity, that is a recursive relationship between resources, positions, agency and effective participation develops and gradually leads the collectivity of partners to structurally embed their interactions and enable reciprocal control and effective collaboration (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997: 911).

Contrasting structural perspectives (Astley & Ven, 1983) have to a lesser extent been applied to the study of inter-organisational power relations *in* development partnerships to date (Ashman, 2000). Instead, primary attention has been given to the broader context of larger systemic inequalities, e.g. to the relationship between donors and recipient communities (Staudt, 1991), or between Northern NGOs (NNGOs) and other intermediary organisations and their local ‘implementing’ partners (e.g. Ebrahim, 2003); or to what is more generally referred to as ‘the North/South divide’ (i.e., Raffer & Singer, 2002). In comparison, systemic commonalities (e.g. in hierarchies, public sectors and service spheres, markets and industries) have mostly been taken for granted in the predominantly Northern/Western literature on inter-organisational relations (Hastings, 1999) and interest has moved toward the structural determinants which develop from and underlie these systems and the organizational interactions therein. The need for a synthesis of the limits and potentials of theories of inter-organisational power applied in and outside of the development context, however, appears indicated. Parallel to an ever increasing use of partnerships in all kinds of service spheres and issue areas, the problems they seek to address and the organisational actors they involve become ever more complex. The particular challenges that arise from this complexity are firmly demonstrated by the great deal of attention placed on the issue of power by the multi-disciplinary literature on cross-sector partnerships for sustainable development (Armistead, Pettigrew, & Aves, 2007; Bäckstrand, 2006; Battisti, 2009; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2001; Bryson & Crosby, 2006; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Murphy & Bendell, 1999; Rodriguez, Langley, Beland, & Denis, 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005; Waddell, 2005).

² Vic. Resource dependency and exchange theory

The macro-foundations of power and effective partnerships

In the context of partnerships in which common frameworks for mutual assessments cannot be taken for granted (e.g. Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2000; Granados, 2005; Westphal & Milton, 2000), yet impact upon the recursive functioning of bases of inter-organisational power and effective participation, two “extreme” scenarios can be hypothesised:

First, the guiding principle of partnerships, stating that not one single partner alone but each partner holds part of the solution to the issues addressed (Selsky & Parker, 2005), may result in a situation in which “assets” (valuable resources) are perceived as dispersed over “owners” (partners) (cf. Homburg, 1999: 102-111). Second, perceptions of resources as valuable to oneself and to others and/or to the success of the collective endeavour are concentrated. Both scenarios in their pronounced form harbour challenges, which have been contrasted by hierarchical and economic models of inter-organisational coordination³. Partnerships as inter-organisational settings are often posited distinct to markets and hierarchies (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Yet, the extent to which partnerships reflect upon one scenario rather than the other may inform strategies to systematically address the necessary structural conditions for effective partnership. Since, “[t]he reason why partnerships are (in theory) such potent vehicles for sustainable development is not that different players each *happen* to hold a different part of the solution to complex problems, but that the systems of governance which hold them accountable make it so” (Rochlin, Zadek, & Forstater, 2008: 5).

Though largely omitted in the initial promotion of partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2002b) questions about their governance have regained attention lately (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Brinkerhoff, 2002a; Rochlin, Zadek & Forstater, 2008). Two interventionist approaches to altering the development of inter-organisational power relations in partnerships can be distinguished. On the one hand, there are governance interventions aiming at relationship building, changing perceptions and strengthening trust and clarifying goals, e.g. through joint learning, trainings and workshops, conflict resolution and brokerage (e.g. Brown & Ashman, 1996; Lewis, 1998; Mohr et al., 1994; James, 2001). That is, governance interventions building upon the occurrence of inter-organisational agency and exchange (Ashman, 2000). On the other hand, there are governance interventions addressing the design and implementation of partnerships and herewith setting the foundations for inter-organisational agency to occur. For example, through the design of the administrative, coordinative, financial and control structures of partnerships (Agranoff, 2006; Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Ashman, 2000; DeBruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1997; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Rochlin, Zadek & Forstater, 2008). That is by altering the so-called “power infrastructure” of partnerships (Huxham & Beech, 2003).

³ Notably, one often finds partnerships contrasted with markets and hierarchies as a distinct, ‘network’ type of inter-organisational coordination (see for example: Entwistle, Bristow, Hines, Donaldson & Martin, 2007).

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Although both approaches carry the potential to impact upon the way power relations develop in partnerships, they take different perspectives on and address different aspects of the issue. Development scholars have long acknowledged the need to tackle the challenges posed by power inequalities between partners through enabling governance interventions (Thomas, 1998). Together with the institutionalization of the partnership rhetoric, participative and empowering approaches have been advocated in contrast to prior top-down and donor-induced interventions (Chambers, 1983; Chambers, 1995). For that matter, the first of the two interventionist approaches mentioned in the above, dominates discussions about the governance of inter-organisational relations in development partnerships to date (Ashman, 2000), whereas the latter approach is discussed primarily with regard to the governance of 'external' power relations, e.g. to donors and investors (Fowler, 2000; Rochlin et al., 2008). On that account, scholars as well as practitioners have pointed out several technical and theoretical shortcomings of the present 'participatory orthodoxy' (Dar & Cooke, 2008). Central are the questions of whether broader participation through partnerships is an ends rather than a means (Nelson & Wright, 1995), and whether enabling interventions aiming at relationship building through learning and exchange alone are sufficient in bringing about effectiveness. These questions become more pressing in the face of a persistence of "significant gaps in perceptions of the value and impacts of partnerships" (Ashman, 2000: 1) among partners, as well as of budget constraints (Robinson, Hewitt, & Harriss, 2000; Smillie, Helmich, German, & Randel, 1999) that limit the room to manoeuvre and invest in cost-intensive trainings and capacity-building (Patel, 2001).

For a recursive relationship between the bases of organisational power and effective participation to come about in partnerships, critics point out two issues that need to be addressed. First, chances for effective partnerships are small when individual contributions are not acknowledged to the extent that they 'automatically' translate into inter-organisational agency, influence and effective participation (Derkzen & Bock, 2007). Second, governance interventions aiming at changing perceptions alone frequently do not translate into such, when at the same time differences in the positions and/or in the level of influence between partners persist (Ashman, 2000).

In contrast, the public administration and management literature provides a different take on partnership governance, mainly in terms of accountability and control (Entwistle et al., 2007) rather than of enablement. Related interventions primarily comprise the latter of the two approaches described in the above, due to a perspective tailored to the needs and possibilities of public and donor agencies. A growing literature in this field builds on a network analytic approach to partnerships (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). Early work explained variance in the performance of partnerships by the degree of integration and centralisation of (resource-exchange-related) activities and control among partners (Milward & Provan, 1995; Provan & Sebastian, 1998). Yet, recent theory developments call for the overcoming of prior structural determinism (Kilduff &

Tsai, 2003) by incorporating non-structural partnership-level properties, such as governance interventions in order to capture the partnership as a whole (Provan, Huang, & Milward, 2009). On that account, Provan and Kenis (2008) propose a contingency framework for partnership effectiveness based on three, in a Weberian⁴ sense, 'ideal types' of partnership governance forms: shared governance, and governance by either a NAO (network administrative organisation) or a lead organisation.

Based on this distinction, advantages and disadvantages are proposed to derive from 'governance fit'. Governance fit suggests that different governance forms are more or less suitable for the effective governance of a partnership, depending on whether a partnership is characterised by the presence or absence of certain partnership-level conditions, e.g. size or the level and dispersion of trust and/or goal agreement among partners. Provan and Kenis (*Ibid.*) draw a more general distinction between the shared and the two brokered governance forms with regard to their fit to certain partnership-level conditions. Lead organisations, which are at the centre of a partnership's resource control and coordination, can direct partnerships even under difficult conditions, such as a lack of shared goals and low and centralised trust. Instead, under favourable conditions, shared governed partnerships are more effective, i.e. because horizontal relations keep the costs for transactions low. Yet, as proposed by Provan and Kenis (*Ibid.*), both models circumvent addressing the issue of power. For shared governance to be effective the presence of favourable partnership-level conditions (e.g. balanced power) is precedent and in the lead-organisation model the governance of power relations is left entirely at the discretion of a single or a few partners.

The twofold theoretical argument on the basis of which Provan and Kenis (*Ibid.*) propose a superior performance of the third, the NAO governance form however, can be applied to address the issue of power. The NAO governance form predicates upon interventions in the design of partnerships that enable the sovereignty of the governing entity (an organisation or partnership administrative staff) and reciprocal control between this entity and partners. The latter aspect is assumed likely to be implemented and maintained if governance tasks are assigned to an entity or staff distinct from the direct partners involved that is provided with the necessary means to effectively moderate between individual partners' and between partners' and partnership-level interests. Notably, such structural interventions that effectively link participation to mutual influence and control are core to the thinking about partnership governance in many disciplines. For example, Elinor Ostrom (1990) regards collective choice and reciprocal monitoring and control arrangements as key 'design-principles' of 'common pool resource' governance systems, and in the development literature such ideas are

⁴ Cf. Weber (1997)

discussed by scholars and practitioners under the heading of a so-called ‘rights-based’⁵ approaches (e.g. Elbers & Schulten, 2010).

From different perspectives, the interventionist models proposed in the literature on development and public service partnerships address similar problems associated with the challenges posed by power differences between partners. In essence, this study sets out to analyse how inter-organisational power relations link to and build the micro-foundations for effective collective development efforts in partnerships; and how, through governance interventions the two seemingly contradictory, empirical observations described in the above can be reconciled.




Figure 1: Conceptual model⁶

1.3 Research question

In line with the title of this dissertation, “*Same same but different*”⁷, the fact that partnerships involve a range of diverse organisations from different sectors, geographical regions and socio-economic backgrounds, with different resources, diverse interests and perspectives does not automatically enable them and put them in the position to contribute their ‘part of the solution’. Nor do differences between partners by definition

⁵ For example, Marks (2005) identifies seven approaches through which a rights-based thinking is applied to development.

⁶ Adapted from the Weberian ‘Sociological Explanation Model’ as presented by Esser (1996: 94).

⁷ The expression “same same but different” for the English word “similar” is said to have originated from the Thai parlance of total reduplication but became popular in other languages to emphasise its ambiguity, as in “seems similar but different in some ways”.

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result in ineffective participation and/or partnership failure. In fact, the power of partners and consequently any similarities or differences between them are subject to various partnership-level influences and may even effectively be transformed when combined with the adequate partnership governance form.

The preliminary question, *why are some partners and partnerships effective in the face of power differences whereas others are not* translates into the following over-arching research question:

“What are the origins and effects of power and differences in power in partnerships on the effective participation in and the effectiveness of partnerships? And what is the role of ‘governance-fit’ in this context?”

In the present analysis of the phenomenon of power in partnerships within the context of international development cooperation, value is seen to derive from combining insights and theories from both fields, the study of partnerships in the development and public service domain. The research question is answered by constructing and testing models of the relationships between the abovementioned concepts.

1.4 Research contributions

Besides the specific contributions of each particular chapter, which will be attended to in each chapter separately, the present study adds to the existing scientific literature in several distinct ways.

Firstly, the study addresses a general Northern/Western bias in the public-administration and management literature (Brinkerhoff, 2002a) for which the study of inter-organisational partnerships is of no exception. Largely derived from a relative uniform empirical base (Raab & Kenis, 2009), in particular the emerging field of partnership-level theory building can benefit from an “external” validation in the area of international development cooperation. The long and fruitful tradition in development studies of placing the issue of power centre-stage to partnership research (Hastings, 1999) can inform attempts to address similar challenges, for example, faced by cross- or multi-sector partnerships in solely Northern/Western contexts (Bryson & Crosby, 2006). Research on development partnerships, on the other hand, has been informed to an only limited degree by theoretical frameworks (Brinkerhoff, 2002). Applying theories and insights from research on public-service networks and organisation studies can contribute to the development of more coherent and systematic frameworks and analyses.

This study seeks to demonstrate the benefit and potential of such synthesis and integration, in finding answers to comprehensive questions that arise in both fields, i.e. by incorporating power differentials into a contingency framework on partnership

effectiveness. Improving partnerships to be more equitable *and* effective has been a guiding principle and concern of most development practice (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2001). Yet, both issues have been treated in the literature, apart from a few exceptions (Brown & Ashman, 1996; Bryson & Crosby, 2005, 2006; Lewis, 1998), rather mutually exclusively to date. While the primary intent by some scholars has been upon the exposure of persisting inequalities in seemingly participative partnerships (e.g. Ashman, 2000; Battisti, 2009; Bell & Park, 2006; Buse & Harmer, 2004; Cardini, 2006; Castro, 2008b; Dedeurwaerdere, 2005; Derkzen & Bock, 2007; Tomlinson, 2005) rather than upon their effectiveness, others have neglected the first and focused on the latter (e.g. Provan & Milward, 2001).

A second main contribution of the present study is its comparative empirical base, which consists of the complete partnership data of 38 development partnerships. It has been pointed out by several recent reviews (e.g. Berry et al., 2004; Blockson, 2003; Provan et al., 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005; Van Huijstee, Francken, & Leroy, 2007) and confirmed by own inquiry (Chapter Two of this volume) that such comparative data is extremely rare, yet urgently needed. On the one hand, data across a number of partnerships is required to verify claims about how organisational bases of power and outcomes relate across different partnership settings (Provan, Sydow & Fish, 2007). A rather small number of existing studies across partnerships (Selsky & Parker, 2005) to date have focused on the perspectives of single or specific groups of participants, for example on the antecedents and consequences of partnering for environmental (e.g. Milne, Iyer, & Gooding-Williams, 1996) or development NGOs (Elbers, 2004), businesses (e.g. LaFrance & Lehmann, 2005), or public agencies (e.g. Andrews & Entwistle, 2010). The present study contributes to this literature, by following early advice on the study of inter-organisational power (Provan, 1980; Jacobson & Cohen, 1986) and utilises the concept of resources to transcend sector-related or other group-specific distinctions (Gray & Wood, 1991). Herewith, not only specific actors or predefined groups but *all* partners involved in a partnership are dealt with. Their bases of power are analysed in relation to effective participation. This way, building the basis on which power differentials in partnerships enfold (see Chapter Two and Three of this volume).

On the other hand, data across a number of cases is required to substantiate theoretical endeavours of establishing the partnership as the unit of analysis (see Chapters Four and Five of this volume and Provan, Sydow & Fish, 2007). The few existing, often longitudinal (e.g. Cho & Gillespie, 2006; Morse & McNamara, 2006) partnership-level analyses are often of only one or a very few cases (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Larger data sets are extremely rare (Provan et al., 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005) and are mostly based on secondary data obtained from donor, government or foundation databases (e.g. Altenburg & Chahoud, 2001; Andonova & Levy, 2003; Bäckstrand, 2006; Eweje, 2007; Hale & Mauzerall, 2004; Ziemba, 2005). The present study contributes to the partnership

literature by empirically verifying partner- and partnership-level theoretical concerns across partners and partnership cases.

Finally, the present study represents a first attempt of conceptualising power, in terms of power differentials between partners, as an aspect not only important for the success of individual organisational participation, but as a partnership-level condition that requires adequate partnership-level governance response, in order for the collaborative endeavour to become effective. The study develops a multi-level framework for the study of power in partnerships, by developing the concept of power differentials as a partnership-level condition and analysing its impact on effective participation and partnership, in combination with different governance forms. This way, the multi-level design allows for conclusions to be drawn for individual organisations and for the provision of insights into partnership-level phenomena that can inform the design and implementation of partnerships (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

1.5 Research approach and data collection

Power in partnerships, its causes, consequences, and governance in partnerships, can be studied at different levels of analysis. Data sets obtained from donors, government, companies or foundation databases can be utilised to assess, e.g., the inclusiveness of partnerships, by the extent to which certain groups are represented among the constituent bases of larger partnership initiatives (e.g. Altenburg & Chahoud, 2001; Andonova & Levy, 2003; Baeckstrand, 2006; Eweje, 2007; Hale & Mauzerall, 2004; Ziemba, 2005). At the partnership-level, governance interventions can be analysed, for example leadership styles (Derkzen, Franklin, et al., 2008; Rodriguez, 2008) or partnership design and implementation schemes (Ashman, 2000; Brown & Ashman, 1996). Finally, at the micro-level, the causes and consequences of partnership involvement for single organisations or the relative power and outcomes of certain groups of partners can be evaluated (e.g. Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003; Offenheiser, Holcombe, & Hopkins, 1999). Valuable insights can be obtained from analyses at each analytical level. However, research on partnerships generally addresses phenomena that reside at those two levels of analysis (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1994; Provan et al., 2007⁸) that are considered in this research. By combining the individual partner and partnership-level of analysis, both are looked at, the relationship between combinations of a presence or absence of power differentials and governance forms and partnership effectiveness and the micro-foundations, defined by the relationship between individual organisational bases of power and effective participation.

⁸ The present study addresses the two outcome levels of the lower column of Provan et al.'s (2007: 483) typology of partnership research.

Introduction

A large scale, network analytic survey has been adopted as the data collection procedure. One of the biggest challenges of studying inter-organisational power relations across a number of comparable partnerships, is the availability of complete partnership data (Provan, Sydow & Fish, 2008), meaning first-hand data of the relational structures that originate from the interactions between all partners. Although partnerships in international development cooperation stretch over a range of geographically widespread constituent bases and sites, diversity of partnership approaches are often less indicative of the various country contexts than of the actors involved and the donor initiatives promoted (Brinkerhoff, 2002b: 13). On that account, a main donor design is chosen. This choice is the European Union (EU), collectively the world's largest provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Two large-scale financing facilities, which built part of the EU's commitment to the Millennium Development Goals, were approached for this study. Via the two facilities, the EU Water (EUWF) and the EU Energy Facility (EUEF), a total amount of € 640 million has been allocated to co-finance in total 250 partnerships operating in the ACP (African-Caribbean-Pacific) region, via two competitive tendering calls for proposals. The two calls were launched in 2005 and 2006 for the EUWF and the first⁹ call in 2005 for the EUEF. All 250 applicant organisations who had successfully applied for partnership funding were contacted and asked for participation and explained the purpose and procedure of the study. Forty-nine of those 'so-called' intermediary organisations or direct implementing partners¹⁰ indicated their interest, resulting in an initial response rate of 20%. These organisations were asked to provide the contacts of all their local and foreign partner organisations involved in the specific project. As a result, the total number of 249 participant organisations was asked for participation. If interested, the respondents were requested to choose between three ways of taking part in the study: to complete an online questionnaire, which was provided in English and French; to receive a printed version of the questionnaire; or to indicate time and date, and preferred language for a telephone interview, for example in case of an unstable or no internet access.

Questionnaire and interview guidelines were provided for each organisation and each partnership individually since the collection of relational data required individualising most of the items to obtain the perspective of each respondent organisation and about all its partners. In addition, two of the indicators operationalised in this study, were designed especially for the present inquiry (their development is described in Appendix I). The survey instrument is displayed in Appendix II. Another implication of this approach was that only those partnerships were included in the study, for which

⁹ For the Energy Facility, a new call for proposals was launched on the 30th of November 2009.

¹⁰ Distinctive from operational partners with no direct funding obligations to the main donor (Mommers, & Van Wessel, 2009).

complete data were obtained, viz. all partners completed the questionnaire or participated in the interviews.

Ultimately, such complete data sets were obtained for 38 partnerships, involving in total 175 organisations. This number can be considered sufficient for a first step towards a generalisation of findings across partnerships (Provan et al., 2007). Albeit though, this way merely 15,2% of the original population of 250 partnerships were included in this study, such a conservative approach was required, since no direct observations were obtained (Provan & Kenis, 2008). However, initial expectations were met, because quantitative studies in a development context generally report on low response rates (Brunetti, Kisunko, & Weder, 1998; Bulmer & Warwick, 2001; Devereux & Hoddinott, 1992; Warren et al., 2000) not least because public funds bring along extensive reporting requirements, which understandably limit the willingness of participants to get involved in just another inquiry. Nevertheless, the fact that a large part of the applicant organisations did not respond, raises questions whether or not the data might suffer from a sample bias. Therefore non-response analysis was conducted on the basis of the data published by the main donor, which showed no significant selection effects with regard to the region of operations of the partnerships, their budget size, or the regional affiliation and the type of the intermediary organisation (for an overview of the results of this analysis see Appendix III).

After the first round of the data collection, the data was analysed and complemented by a document study on the basis of publications and project reports, resulting in a detailed case description for each partnership. As further questions arose, follow-up telephone interviews were conducted, which happened with six of the intermediary and four of the partner organisations. Multiple sources were employed to gather case information (Yin, 2008), yet the vast majority of data originated from the questionnaire and telephone interviews. Originally formulated in English, items were translated into French for the survey. On request, telephone interviews were conducted in four additional languages (Italian, Spanish, Arabic and Amharic). Since the research process was somewhat complex but necessary to achieve the desired results, a more elaborate description of the concepts utilised for the analysis of each relationship is presented in each chapter separately.

1.6 Layout of the book

In order to answer the general research question formulated in section 1.3., the research question was broken down into several sub-questions, of which each is addressed in a different chapter. Because this dissertation consists of a collection of articles, each chapter has its own individual goal and contribution. As a result, the relevance and implications of each chapter for the overarching research question are addressed in this section.

Introduction

In Chapter 2, the general question, “What are the theoretical conceptualisations and related empirical operationalisations of power put forward in the partnership literature?” is answered. The main purpose of this chapter is to identify the most pervasive approaches to power in the specific context of partnerships, their overlaps and gaps and methodological issues to be addressed for future attempts towards synthesis and integration. The most basic finding of this inquiry is that insights on power in partnerships to date rest on a rather fragmented theoretical and meagre empirical basis, which poses several challenges to an integrative conceptualisation. A main distinction is drawn between two relatively independently developing directions, distinct in the way scholars treat the latency of the concept of power in partnerships and understand power as either a dispositional (“having power”) or an episodic (“exercising power”) concept (cf. Wrong, 1995, for a theoretical discussion and comparison of both approaches). Scholars sharing a dispositional understanding posit power as the *explanans* for partnering outcomes, mostly of single or groups of partners. Although this understanding can provide a substantial argument for or against partnering, since its impact can be measured by the benefits obtained, this approach tends to treat power as a one-way process and the partnership as a black-box (Derkzen, Franklin, & Bock, 2008). Partnership-level influences are either underspecified or neglected. Operationalisations of organisational dispositions and outcomes remain rather one-sided and tailored to single or groups of partners. Partnership-level specific influences on the relationship between the two concepts remain underspecified. Following an episodic understanding instead, power is the *explarandum*, defined by the interactions between partners in specific partnering processes which are mainly studied via discourse and network analyses. An episodic understanding of power provides rich insights into how power occurs, for example in discourses, and manifests, for example by favourable positions in the relational structures of partnerships. Yet, this perspective lacks a grounding of situation-specific phenomena and episodes of agency in partnerships in the broader picture of organisational dispositions and outcomes (e.g. Morse & McNamara, 2006). The arguments for and against both understandings and the resulting methodological strengths and limitations are identified and illustrated by examples taken from the literature. Finally, the complementary potential of both understandings to capture their recursive relationship in partnerships suggests a number of directions that the study of power in partnerships might proceed and of which some are addressed in the following empirical chapters of this dissertation.

In Chapter 3, the question “How do organisational bases of power relate to effective participation in partnerships?” will be answered. This relationship, building on the micro-foundations of power in partnerships, addresses the individual organisational level of analysis for all 175 partner organisations involved in this study. Partnership-level influences on this relationship are introduced into the analysis to the extent to which the effectiveness of resources as individual organisational bases of power is subject to the

recognition and mutual assessments. The first part of the analysis examines how, via such assessments, individual organisational resources translate into advantageous positions and/or effective participation in partnerships. Positions are conceptualised as centrality in the interactions between partners and involvement in partnership-level decision-making. Effective participation is defined as a partner's level of individual organisational goal attainment and/or the influence gained on partnership-related decisions. Inter-organisational resource dependence and/or the utility of resources for the success of a partnership are proposed as the translating principles. Thus, beyond a mere demarcation of powerful and powerless groups, the chapter explains how these differences develop and why a translation of bases of power into effective participation cannot be taken for granted. The second part of the analysis inquires into the effects of each base of power on effective participation separately, controlling for the other one respectively. This way, in anticipation of the governance argument that is developed and tested in the following chapters, several possibilities for interventions are pointed out that hold the potential to significantly alter the effectiveness of bases of power in partnerships and thus the way inter-organisational power relations unfold.

Chapter 4 will address the question, "What are the partnership-level conditions that explain the adoption of a particular governance form by development partnerships?" This chapter explicitly addresses the partnership-level of analysis and further develops the contingency framework of Provan & Kenis (2008) described in the above but incorporating the additional partnership-level conditions of power differentials between partners and uncertainty of the operational partnering environment. The chapter explores via a qualitative comparative analyses (qca) the partnership-level conditions or drivers for adopting one governance form over another by development practitioners. Indicators for the governance forms combine relational structures and interventions. Governance structures are determined based on the aggregated network data for each partnership on two dimensions: the extent, to which the interactions among partners are centralised or decentralised, and whether decision-making power and influence are concentrated or shared among partners (Milward & Provan, 1995). Governance interventions encompass enabling interventions, such as assistance, support, conflict mediation and brokerage, and following Provan & Kenis' (2008) interventions addressing the design of partnerships, such as the set-up of governing entities and reciprocal control structures. Structures and interventions are assessed in combination, resulting in the identification of four different types of governance forms. Partnership-level conditions are established from the in parts aggregated data sets obtained for each partnership and subsequently "calibrated" and translated into a qca truth table. The solutions, in terms of combinations of partnership-level conditions, which explain the choice for each governance form by are identified. Reasons for the adoption of one form over another in face of the absence and presence of certain partnership-level conditions, power differentials in particular, are discussed with regard to divergences of effectiveness considerations in international

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development cooperation compared to those identified by Provan & Kenis (*Ibid.*) from the literature on public-service partnerships.

Chapter 5 will bring together the pieces of the puzzle and answer the question “How does ‘governance-fit’ relate to partnership effectiveness?” Having defined the different governance forms and partnership-level conditions in the Chapters, 3 and 4, governance fit conceptually builds upon the contingency assumptions of Provan & Kenis (*Ibid.*) and those defined by development practitioners in Chapter 4. Again, qca is chosen as the analytic approach to verify the relationship between governance fit that is the fit between governance forms and partnership-level conditions, and effectiveness. Effectiveness is evaluated at the individual organisational and partnership-level of analysis and herewith links the micro- to the macro-foundations of power in partnerships. Variety in the effectiveness of governance fit will be discussed in the light of existing work, primarily by contrasting the findings of the present study (Chapter 4) with the propositions formulated by Provan & Kenis’ (*Ibid.*) contingency framework.

Based on the empirical findings presented in the Chapters 3, 4 and 5, an answer to the overarching research question proposed in section 1.3 of this chapter will be formulated in Chapter 6. Moreover, the implications of the findings are discussed in a broader context.

Chapter 2

Power in Partnerships: Literature Review and Integration¹¹

Abstract

The issue of power in partnerships has provoked a great deal of often polarised discussion but generated considerably less theoretically and empirically informed research. This review argues that partially, this is due to research to date has rather separately proceeded from two seemingly incompatible understandings of power with respect to its latency in partnerships, as either dispositional or episodic. The strengths and limitations of research following these understandings are presented in two steps: first, for each direction separately by means of examples taken from the literature, and subsequently, by highlighting their complementary potential. Future directions are identified for the study of power in partnerships to proceed.

¹¹ Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the *Academy of Management Annual Conference* 2007 in Philadelphia, (PA), US, and at the Third International *Colloquium on Corporate Political Activity* and *Business & Society* Special Issue, 2008, at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Science Po, in Paris, France.

2.1. Introduction

A wide range of definitions of partnerships exists. For the purpose of this review we broadly define partnerships as inter-organisational settings in which, through “[...] the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities [...]” (Bryson et al., 2006: 44), organisations strive to jointly achieve some common or complementary goals (Powell, 1990). Involving different organisations as businesses, governments, civil society organisations (non-governmental, non-profit and community organisations), contractors and service providers, donors and recipients, partnerships have been labelled “the new orthodoxy” (Russel, 2002: 45) to address many of today’s most difficult challenges. Partnerships are operating in a broad variety of issue areas and service spheres, ranging from small-scale dyadic collaborations to large-scale infra-structure projects, involving large numbers of partners in cross-border and nation-wide programmes, global policy development and implementation (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997a; Mandell & Steelman, 2003).

Despite the promises, partnerships have evoked controversial discussions about many of their aspects (Selsky & Parker, 2005). In particular, “critical problems surround the deployment of power amongst members” (Newell, 2005: 288). While partnerships suggest “a cooperative alternative to the traditional characterization of relationships among organisations as competitive, adversarial or hierarchical” (Tomlinson, 2005: 1196) in which no party can solely rely neither “on market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control to gain cooperation from each other” (Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005: 58); very little is known about how power relations in partnerships unfold.

The seemingly insuperable ambivalence of the Weberian and the Parsonian understandings of the concept of power¹² resurface in a strong polarisation of the present partnership literature today. Which Johnson and Wilson (2006) juxtapose as on the one hand, power is treated as a non-issue, partnerships are considered a ‘win-win’ solution (Brinkerhoff, 2002a) and differences between partners are seen as drivers for creativity, mutuality, innovation and change. On the other hand, power differences between partners are posited to rule out any form of “real partnership” upfront (Fowler, 1998; Miraftab, 2004), since “[...] different degrees of power, [which] determine what issues will be negotiated, whose interests count, and how the process is likely to unfold” (Dolan & Opondo, 2005: 8).

Yet, such heuristics¹³ can only serve as starting points for looking at power in partnerships, in terms of what Brinkerhoff calls a “relative practice” (2002:14) to be explored by and become the subject of systematic empirical research. Notwithstanding the considerable scholarly interest (Bryson et al., 2006; Vangen & Huxham, 2003)

¹² For a recent comparison between Parson’s collective “power-to” and Weber’s distributive “power-over”, see: Heiskala (2001).

¹³ Similar heuristics are used by Tomlinson (2005) in his analyses of “Idealistic and Pragmatic Versions of the Discourse of Partnership”.

however, very little empirical research has been generated and no comparable data sets and cumulative results have been yielded yet (Parker & Selsky, 2005) by the ever increasing number of partnership initiatives in recent years (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Ostrower, 2005). In part, this might be due to some general difficulties in the collection of partnership data (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005). On the other hand, any inquiry into power in partnerships is predicated upon a clarification of the concept of power in this context. By the means of examples taken from the studies included in this review, it will be demonstrated that the present literature in this respect is beset with some basic problems of conceptualisation and operationalisation. Specifically, the analysis will identify two largely separately pursued developments distinct by the way the latency of the concept of power is treated in the context of partnerships, that is proceeding from either a dispositional or an episodic understanding. The question to guide this literature review has been formulated: *“What are the theoretical conceptualisations and related empirical operationalisations of power put forward in the partnership literature?”*

The literature on power in partnerships is reviewed and suggestions are offered for what can be learned from the modest number of empirical studies that have been conducted and what are the gaps that might be worth exploring in the future.

2.2. Literature search

To gain insights into the different conceptualisations of power and their operationalisations in partnerships a systematic literature search was undertaken, using the ISI and the ABI Inform databases. Separately and in combination, the following key words were used: 1) Partnership, alliance, collaboration, network; 2) tri-sector, cross-sector, inter-sector, multi-sector, public-private, profit, non-profit; 3) and power. These key words correspond to the terms predominantly used among the various bodies of literature that study partnerships (Mandell, 2003: 128).

This first step revealed three areas in which the issue of power has been discussed from an inter-organisational perspective and the results were verified by applying the same search again for the leading journals in these fields: organisation studies and management¹⁴, public administration¹⁵, and non-profit and development studies¹⁶. This

¹⁴ Journals: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Strategic Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management Studies, Organization Studies, Organization Science, Organization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, Journal of Corporate Citizenship, Business & Society.

¹⁵ Journals: Administration & Society, American Review of Public Administration, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, International Review of Administrative Sciences, Public Administration and Development, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Policy & Politics, Public Administration, Public Administration Review.

measure was taken to ensure a balanced coverage of all different sectors, related academic disciplines (Selsky & Parker, 2005) and to adjust for the Northern/Western bias in the management literature (Brinkerhoff, 2002a). After checking for double entries, these searches together yielded in total 834 articles. Their abstracts were analysed and those conforming to the following two characteristics were selected: The empirical phenomenon of study is (1) an inter-organisational partnership¹², and (2) the term “power” refers to inter-organisational power *in* partnerships¹⁷. As such, we arrived at a sample of 94 articles.

The articles were categorised with respect to the conceptual approach they used and the theoretical and empirical mechanism, specifying the origin, function and outcomes of power. The papers were discussed and aggregated and further criteria were included, such as the type and goal of the partnership(s), the area of operation (e.g. health, education, infra-structure), the sectors involved, the underlying research question, the level(s) of analyses addressed, and (if not power) the main topic of the study (governance, CSR, participation, aid effectiveness, etc.).

Notably, this method of searching the partnership literature only considers articles, leading to the omission of books and book chapters from the search. Furthermore, the ISI and the ABI/Inform databases include only articles from the periods between 1988-2010 and 1975-2010, respectively. Nevertheless, this period encompasses the time in which most of the empirical works on inter-organisational partnerships have been conducted (Provan, Sydow & Fish, 2007) and is hoped to give a reliable overview of the content of the leading journals with regard to the issue of power in this empirical context.

2.3 Search findings

The selected articles consist of 14 theoretical and 80 empirical articles. Power is the main topic in only four of the theoretical works (Buse & Harmer, 2004; Hastings, 1999; Huxham & Beech, 2003; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000)¹⁸ that give insight into the approaches most prominently applied to the phenomenon. Buse and Harmer (2004) compare elite, pluralist, and neo-pluralist governance theories in their discussion of power in partnerships. Huxham (2003) inductively theorises about behavioural accounts of power in partnerships, which she together with Beech (Huxham & Beech, 2003)

¹⁶ Journals: Development and Change, Development in Practise, Journal of International Development, Non-Profit Management & Leadership, Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Progress in Development Studies, Public Administration and Development, World Development, Voluntas.

¹⁷ Thus excluding articles that discuss the power *of* partnerships, e.g. as policy instruments (Abrahamsen, 2004).

¹⁸ In the other articles power was only a side-issue and the authors focused on, e.g. CSR (Newell, 2005) or more generally on the issue of collaboration (Bryson, Crosby & Middleton, 2006; Gray, 1985; Gray & Wood, 1991).

conceptually collates in an analytical framework of a “power infra-structure” of partnerships. Previously, Gray et al (1985) and Hastings (1999) had pioneered a constructivist perspective on partnerships and the use of discourse analysis in this context. Phillips and colleagues (2000) use institutional theory to explain the effects of power by the moderating role of collaboration in the transformation of institutional fields.

In addition, focussing on the reasons and motives of various parties for partnering but without an explicit focus on power, scholars have employed a multitude of theoretical arguments to the study of partnerships. These include, policy-process and contingency models (Porter & Ronit, 2006), international (Andonova & Levy, 2003) and urban regime theory (Yang & Chang, 2007), social identity (Phillips & Hardy, 1997) and constructivist theories (Gray & Putnam, 2005), exchange and resource-dependency (Cho & Gillespie, 2006; Gazley & Brudney, 2007) and transaction-cost theory (Sanyal, 2006).

Likewise, only a very few of the empirical studies have developed a sound theoretical argument for their empirical inquiry into the issue of power in partnerships upfront (e.g. Barnes, MacLean, & Cousens, 2010; Derkzen & Bock, 2007; Derkzen et al., 2008; Huxham & Beech, 2003; Lister, 2000; Porter & Ronit, 2006; Rhodri, 2007). In their design and methodological approach, the majority of works applied a combination of explorative single or multiple case studies. Thereof four studies were longitudinal (Cho & Gillespie, 2006; Morse & McNamara, 2006; Poncelet, 2001; Provan, Isett, & Milward, 2004a; Rodriguez et al., 2007). The analysis of partnership discourse was the methodological approach most frequently chosen (e.g. Cardini, 2006; Gray & Putnam, 2005; Hanke et al., 2002; Poncelet, 2001; Selsky & Parker, 2005; Van Huijstee et al., 2007). Only very few (18) large-N studies across partnership cases were found, and none of the studies directly focused on power. First-hand partnership-level data was obtained for the largest set of fifteen development partnerships by Brown and Ashman (1996). Seven of the comparative studies across a number of partnerships were based on secondary data (e.g., reviews of published case-studies: (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Gillies, 1998) and five of them utilised data gained from one and the same set of partnerships¹⁹ (Andonova & Levy, 2003; Bäckstrand, 2006; Eweje, 2007; Hale & Mauzerall, 2004; Mert & Sander, 2006). The remaining large-N studies addressed not the partnership but single partners as the unit of analysis, mostly through their perceptions of and benefits gained from different cases of partnership-involvement (Thomson, Perry & Miller, 2007; Hardy, 2003; Hasnain-Wynia, Sofaer, Bazzoli, Alexander, Shortell, Conrad, Chan, Zukoski & Sweney, 2003). Yet, others addressed a particular sector or group of partners, such as alone or in combination, for example NNGOs or SNGOs, non-profits, businesses, or public agencies (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Elbers, 2004; Gazley &

¹⁹ Cf. <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/partnerships.htm>

Brudney, 2007; Milne et al., 1996). Finally, 28 of the 94 reviewed articles discuss power in North-South partnerships compared to 58 in a solely Northern/Western context.

2.4 Two perspectives on power in partnerships

The preceding brief overview of the present state of research on power in partnerships shows that only a very few studies directly focus on power and/or developed a theoretical argument for their study of power in this context upfront. Most of the empirical studies analyse single or only a narrow number of partnerships and almost all comparative studies across a larger number of cases take the perspective of only single or specific groups of partners. This rather meagre basis poses several challenges to an integrative conceptualisation of power in partnerships. A main distinction can be drawn in that research to date has relatively independently developed into two directions, depending on the way scholars treat the latency of the concept of power. In the theories they use as well as in the design, sampling and methodologies they apply, different approaches are chosen contingent on whether power is understood as a dispositional (“having power”) and/or an episodic (“exercising power”) concept (Wrong, 1995).

In the tradition of research on mostly for-profit dyadic alliances (Barringer & Harrison, 2000), scholars sharing a dispositional understanding of power in partnerships look at, mostly, the analytical level of single but also of groups of partners, their various organisational power dispositions and how those relate to differences in partnering outcomes. Following an episodic understanding instead, power is understood to derive from and be defined through the interaction between partners in specific partnering processes. The arguments for and against both understanding are as follows:

Consistent with a dispositional understanding, power and differences in power between partners are treated as an *explanans* for partnering outcomes. This approach can provide a substantial argument for or against partnering for individual partners or groups, since benefit can be traced back to the individual organisational level. Yet, this approach tends to treat power as a one-way process and thus the partnership as a black-box (Derkzen et al., 2008). The episodic approach instead defines power as the *explarandum* and provides rich insights, into how power occurs in inter-organisational processes and how power is constructed and contested by multiple constituents. This perspective however, lacks an integration of situation-specific phenomena and episodes of agency into the broader picture of individual organisational dispositions (Morse & McNamara, 2006) and partnership-level characteristics that enable or constrain and ultimately define the outcomes of organisational agency.

Yet, if not both understandings are integrated, meaning “[...] actual influence attempts are not observed, or the capacity to exert influence [...] is not considered, the researcher lacks the basis for assuming that power actually caused the observed

outcome” (Provan, 1980: 553). Currently, such integration is needed in this rather fragmented state of the field, in which power is situated at different analytical levels, following different assumptions of latency, and consequently causalities. This need will be demonstrated in the following section.

A dispositional understanding of power in partnerships

An understanding of power as deriving from dispositions, predicates upon the assumption that differences in power dispositions between partners result in differences in outcomes. Via the antecedents and outcomes of the involvement of individual organisations or of groups of organisations in single or across a number of cases, studies following this understanding, primarily address the individual organisational or group-level of analysis. For example, Ashman (2001) looks across ten cases operating in Brazil, India, and South Africa, at the extent to which Southern NGO (SNGO) partners achieve to advance their individual organisational goals in partnerships with businesses. In a similar way, Milne and colleagues (1996) employ a large-scale survey to inquire into the outcomes acquired from partnership for environmental organisations, comparing those across partnerships with other non-profits, governments or businesses. In a similar vein, Andrews and Entwistle (2010) compare the benefits obtained for public agencies from partnerships with other public agencies against collaborations across sectors, with businesses and non-profits.

Since the vast majority of studies are based on single or a few partnership cases and/or pre-sampled on individual or specific groups of partners, frequently an a-priori (mostly sector-related) difference perspective on organisational power dispositions is taken (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010; Parker & Selsky, 2004). In this manner, scholars for the most part obviate the issue of operationalising differences in the dispositions and outcomes of partners and ultimately in the operationalisation of partnership-level influences on the relation between both concepts.

Power dispositions

In organisation studies, conceptualising and operationalising the individual power dispositions of organisations traditionally directly relates to the concept of resources. The resource-based approach to the analysis of organisational power is as some argue most direct (Phillips, 1997) and also the approach to power most frequently referred to by the reviewed studies. Though resources are a potentially rich concept for the analysis of power dispositions (Korpi, 1985), several inadequacies in the present state of its use in the partnership literature are identified.

First, resource-dispositions were rarely found to be fully operationalised to an extent that they effectively discriminate between partners. On the one hand, further resource specifications seem to appear unnecessary with regard to the generally rather narrow scope of the studies, since in-depth knowledge about single or a few cases enables

scholars to estimate resource access and/or control, and differences therein between partners. On the other hand, a lack of specification of resources may result in the assumption that individual organisational power rests within an organisation, that is power can be 'read off' from the resources that partners are assumed to have or have not available (Derkzen et al., 2008: 459). The word assumed is used here because frequently references to resources are not assessed on the merits of individual partners but linked to certain sectors or groups of partners. Most clearly, this tendency is demonstrated by studies on diversely resourced partnerships e.g. North-South and/or cross- or multi-sector partnerships. Along a donor-recipient continuum (e.g. Fowler, 1998) and/or according to sectors or groups of partners and without empirical scrutiny, resources are attributed to some rather than other partners and by the same token linked to different degrees of power and influence in partnerships.

As a prominent example in multi-sector partnerships, scholars have adopted Phillips and colleagues' (2000) heuristic, which contrasts authority and the access to and control of scarce and critical resources to discursive resources. Supplemented is this heuristic by the notion that the latter ones are of particular importance to partners who cannot exert authority and/or access or control scarce and critical resources (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000). There appears to be evidence that different partners bring different resources to a partnership and that these resources vary in the degree to which they are perceived as legitimate, accepted and institutionalised in a partnership (Alexander, 1996; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Ganz, 2000; Rogers, 1974). Yet, analysed from different perspectives, a specific partner or group of partners neither exhibited the same resources always and to the same degree as proposed by such heuristics (Waddell, 2000, 2005), nor were they powerful or powerless in all cases. In fact, the kind of resources and the extent to which they can potentially be accessed and controlled by partners vary considerably among individual representatives of such groups and lack generalisability, e.g. to *all* Southern or Northern partners, businesses, NGOs or governments. In the same manner are resource-related attributes, such as their scarcity, criticality, and legitimacy, subject to and derive from partnership specific assessments. A partner's resources are evaluated by and have to be seen relative to its environment that is the partnership, consisting of multiple organisations and relationships between them. These relationships and the position an actor holds in them are important indicators of the extent to which resources function as bases of power and to which partners can control their own actions and influence those of their partners, meanwhile this may only partially be known to the individual partners themselves (Barley et al., 1992:313).

Therefore, notwithstanding the heuristic use of distinctions and resource typologies, such as the one proposed by Phillips and colleagues (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000) for operationalising the potential diversity and scope of resources that partners may possibly access and/or control, they cannot substitute thorough empirical analyses (Waddell, 2000). Alone fully operationalising the scope of potential resources, in this

sense, has rarely been done in partnership studies so far. Illustrated in the above, variations of resource heuristics have mostly led to the drawing of distinctions between financial capital and (governmental) authority and discursive resources or resource- or powerlessness. In the face of such narrow conceptualisation of resources, Derkzen et al conclude, “an analysis of power based on resources alone is limited“ since partnerships with diverse constituencies of which not all partners access and control either financial resources or authority are bound to be seen as “unjust spaces of inequality” (Derkzen et al., 2008: 459). Yet, it has been demonstrated by earlier studies on power in diverse resource environments before that such narrow conceptualisations do not have to be the case (Jacobson & Cohen, 1986). Proceeding from a careful analysis of the kind of resources that can come into play in collective processes between the different representatives of a specific domain in partnerships, mutual assessments among partners can be conducted and individual resource-related power can systematically be assessed in their relationship to partnering outcomes (*Ibid.*).

To the extent that such resource-assessments and the impact of partnership-level influences on individual power dispositions and outcomes vary across partnerships, exceptions to such heuristics will be found. Their systematic analysis must receive primary empirical attention, since it is not the fact that partners exhibit different resources per-se that builds a valid argument for dispositional power differences in partnerships, but rather the question of how such differences relate to differences in power in and across various partnership contexts.

For example, one may derive the converse argument that if some resources are discursive, others will rather implicitly function as bases of power, with less or no need for enactment. To support such a dispositional argument, however, partnership-level influences in the perceptions of resources and their enactment require analytically separate consideration in their relation to influence and other outcomes. In particular, consideration is required should variation exist in the degree to which resources are recognised and acknowledged as legitimate and thus potentially effective (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000). There is necessity to analytically discriminate potential (resources and positions) against enacted power and influence (Provan, 1980). Though such systematic analytic distinctions have to date not consistently been applied to the study of power in partnerships, this seems required, if the aim is to move beyond repetitive descriptive accounts of exceptions from actor or group-specific heuristics when at the same time giving yet another ad-hoc explanation to their support (Esser, 1996: 101).

Outcomes

Similar to dispositions, the outcomes of power in partnerships have mostly been conceptualised and examined at the organisational level. This is done through the benefits obtained by individual partners and, as illustrated for dispositions, through the

limits and promises of partnering expected for certain sectors and groups (Ashman, 2001; Elbers & Schulp, 2010; Elbers, 2004; Kock & Van Tulder, 2008; Milne, 1996; Dorado & Vaz, 2003). Most likely, this interest derived from the initial promotion of partnerships, as demonstrated by the extensive body of literature elaborating upon the “strategic” grounds for partnering for ‘non-traditional’ partners, for example for business to get involved in development (Austin, 2000a). Evaluations of outcomes, based upon criteria derived from and valid in the respective domains of single organisations or specific groups (Phillips et al., 2000) however, have received critique (Ashman, 2001a; Ashman, 2004) for being one-sided in the first place and thus supporting the impression of gains of one partner or group at the expense of others (Jørgensen, 2006). This knowledge gap arising from a lack of operationalisation of outcomes in a way suitable to capture the effective participation of all partners, allows for the conclusion that current research on partnering outcomes seems to be largely driven by dogmatism and ideology rather than based on empirical evidence (Dowling, Powell, & Glendinning, 2004).

Since different backgrounds of partners bring along very specific criteria for the evaluation of effective participation and partnership success, many of the in fact multiple dimensions and/or partnership-process-related outcomes have been neglected by scholars who follow a dispositional understanding. Together with the inadequacies in the conceptualisation of power dispositions, power tends to appear as a zero-sum equation. Yet, exceptions give a different picture. For example, Hardy et al (2003) rather comprehensively evaluate an NGO’s benefits gained from a number of collaborations over a period of four years, based on three criteria: resources, knowledge and influence. Morse and McNamara (2006) further illustrate the trade-offs that occur for a field implementing agency in its partnership with a donor over the time-period of 36 years. Both studies illustrate the fact that the complex development of power relationships in partnerships cannot be broken down to a simple zero-sum equation but rather to display losses of partners in one aspect and wins in another and at different stages of the partnering process (Cobb, 1984).

Theoretically, a temporal as well as a substantial distinction is drawn between what Huxham and Beech (2003) call “points of power” upon which partners can exert their influence at different stages of the partnering process, whether related to the design or the implementation of a partnership. Hale and Mauzerall found in this respect only very few genuinely and autonomously evolving partnerships and concluded that: “[M]uch more common are partnership arrangements in which partners are drawn after a lead agency decided about the vision and strategic objectives before partners can have a say” (2004: 861). Outcome indicators, e.g., for the influence gained in partnerships hence ought to be operationalised in a way capturing different stages of the process and differences in the quality of the contested issues. The initial decision about membership and the chance to exert influence on this issue may be more momentous for some than for others. Not only in the case where partners are influential but especially in case they

do not have a say in these constitutive decisions though they are directly affected. In this respect, Rogers (1974: 112), distinguishes instrumental from infra-decisions. Influence on the decisions about instrumental issues serves as the direct realisation of individual organisational goals. Infra-decisions instead encompass questions about the “power infrastructure” (Huxham & Beech, 2003) of partnerships. This is those decisions define the rules of the game and the room for manoeuvre for partners in subsequent encounters, for example, by defining the theme, membership, practices (Phillips et al., 2000) control, accountability (Ashman, 2001b; Ashman, 2004) and administrative positions and structures (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001a; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Brown and Ashman (1996) found that balanced involvement in and influence on such constitutive decisions were important criteria, in particular for the evaluation of successful partnership participation for grassroots organisations, whereas NNGOs’ were primarily concerned with lowering the administrative burden for their organisations and placed lesser significance on full involvement of their organisation in and influence on all partnership-level decisions. Hence, influence on different points of power may have differential significance for partners for different reasons. Empirically, comparative analyses of the outcomes of all partners, incorporating a range of different gains and losses at different stages of the partnering process have received only scant scholarly attention to date.

An episodic understanding of power in partnerships

An episodic understanding locates power at the partnership-level of analysis. Power is constructed through and derives from episodes of interaction in which partners implicitly or explicitly (Provan, 1980) exercise their power and construe partnerships as arenas of social construction (Clegg, 1989b; Gray, 1989; Hanke et al., 2002) political contestation (Stewart & Gray, 2006) and immediate resource environments (Hudock, 1995; Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980). Two analytic approaches that base upon this understanding of power in partnerships can be identified from the literature: the discourse and the network analytic approach.

Discourse analytic approach

Discourse analysis is the preferred methodological approach (Cardini, 2006; Gray & Putnam, 2005; Hanke et al., 2002; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Hastings, 1999; Poncelet, 2001) when scholars refer to power in partnerships as symbolic²⁰. This is apart from the rhetoric of partnerships part-taking in the normative debate about what partnerships should or should not be (Miraftab, 2004; Tomlinson, 2005; Wettenhall, 2003), for example, in bringing about citizen participation (Newell, 2005) or in meeting the

²⁰ Similar to the concept of ‘communicative power’ (i.e. Dryzek, 1990, Habermas, 1986).

capacity needs of Southern partners (Pieterse, 1991). A comparably fewer number of studies analyse power *in* partnerships (Buse & Harmer, 2004) giving accounts of the ways partners manage meaning (Gray, 1989; Hardy, 1994) by shaping other partners' perception, cognitions, and as some argue even their preferences (Lukes, 2005). Scholars have interpreted language use in partnership and analysed how collaborative issues are contested and become the focus of discursive struggles, when partners "work to realise their goals and interests within the collaborative activity" (Lawrence, Phillips, & Hardy, 1999: 490).

Since symbolic power is created in and through partnering processes, constructivist approaches tend to refrain from the use of heuristics or presumptions about dispositions and "given" differences in power between partners. Instead one proceeds from the assumption that symbolic power can potentially be employed by *all* actors in order to shape collaborative discourse in favour of their interests and causes (Phillips, 1997). For example, discursive legitimacy as a source of power for partners may derive from their ability to successfully link their own efforts to larger societal values by legitimately speaking for an issue or representing the interests of others (Hardy, 1998; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2007). From an episodic understanding then, resource-based analyses of power are subject to partnership-level influences, since resource use and effects are "modified, displaced or disrupted depending upon the relationships that come into play" (Allen, 2003:97), which can hardly be identified upfront.

Still implicitly, almost all studies assume actor-related differences in power dispositions to cause variations in the enactment of power in partnerships. For example, Hanke and colleagues (2002) found that "weaker" groups use more conflictive and disruptive frames than "powerful" ones in partnership negotiations. Phillips et al (2000) more generally ascribe stronger influence and potential to diffuse and catalyse change through collaboration, to "powerful" partners. Gray and Putnam (2005) likewise explain the use of different narratives as constructions of identity in partnerships by differences in power between partners distinguishing "privileged" from "low power" discourse. Poncolet argues that "[...] diverse and evolving conceptualizations and understandings are not neutral but infused with power as they are utilized by individuals, who themselves, have different amounts of influence and prestige [...]" (Poncolet, 2001: 15). Rarely, however, has it been further specified by the authors how those differences between "weaker" and "stronger", or "powerful" and "less powerful" partners were defined in the first place.

By the same token, are changes and outcomes of power in partnerships mostly evaluated through dialectic discursive gains (Hastings, 1999), for example, by the extent to which partners control and influence a partnership's discourse (Hardy & Phillips, 1998), affect each other's ideas and perceptions of contested issues (Lawrence et al., 1999) or influence aspects of each others' organisational culture (Parker & Selsky, 2004). "Hard measures" of individual organisational outcomes, as addressed by studies

based on a dispositional understanding are less frequently incorporated. In a way that through discourse alone, episodes of agency in partnerships appear somehow detached from other structuration processes, for example, in terms of resources and dispositions.

Since a discourse analytical approach is commonly used to explain agency and influence by weaker partners (e.g. Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000), one has to be careful not to interpret the comparatively few empirical cases and the kind of data that inform these studies, to support a general assumption of equal opportunities in partnerships. Morse and McNamara (2006) give an example of how the interpretation of the same case can differ when looking at it from an episodic or a dispositional lens. Comparing Lister's (2000) resource- and control-related to Hasting's (1999) discourse analytic approach, Morse and McNamara examine how the power relations in a partnership between a donor and a recipient NGO developed over a time period of 35 years. Their first conclusion is that trust was created and power mutually exercised by both sides: "[b]y exploring the evolution of changes in assumptions, values and practice that has taken place since the partnership was founded" (Morse & McNamara, 2006: 325). Yet, even after the period of time of 35 years, the unequal foundation on which the collaboration was built persisted: "[T]he climax to this exercise of power was when the donor unilaterally decided on the sudden removal of most of its funding for DDA [the NGO]. DDA had no input into the process other than discussions with the evaluation team. Dialogue was conspicuously absent." (*Ibid*: 322).

This and other examples demonstrate that one needs to be careful when placing too much emphasis on discourse (Deetz, Newton, & Reed, 2007) in the analysis of power in partnerships. On the one hand, due to the dominance of a "pro-partnership rhetoric, whether sincere or not, that one is likely to encounter from all partners in the relationship for different reasons" (Morse & McNamara, 2006: 325). As well as the opposite, since "[...] there will always be a perception of unequal power relations even if these do not actually exist." (Hemphill, McGreal, Berry & Watson, 2006: 73). Yet, next to the difficulties that arise from the specific nature of discourse analytical data on methodological grounds, scholars increasingly call into question the practical implications of these findings, e.g. whether repeated interactions, changing perceptions and partnership values alone are sufficient to guarantee effective participation and partnership (Ashman, 2000; Ashman, 2001a; Bryson & Crosby, 2005). Since, as long as partnerships base on unilateral resource dependencies and control, effective participation cannot be guaranteed. Instead, an adjustment of the structural conditions for organisational agency to occur in partnerships may be required, for example, by firmly entrenching safeguards and formal decision-making and/or veto-rights into their design and implementation (Elbers, 2010; Elbers & Schulpen, 2010). Even following an episodic understanding of power, at some point partnerships need to "walk the talk" (Austin, 2008:51) and ultimately become not only discursive spaces and episodes of

interactions but provide the organisational context for agency to translate into changes reflected in the underlying structures and power dispositions of partners.

Network analytic approach

Contrary to the constructivist interpretative stance of discourse analyses, network analytic approaches to the study of power in partnerships represent an attempt to objectify and visualise inter-organisational processes (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). This entails viewing partnerships as consisting of (multiple layers of) relational structures (Laumann & Pappi, 1976) that emerge from and affect the ongoing interactions between partners (Alter & Hage, 1993). Partners can exert influence on others from central positions in these structures, which are utilised as indicators for power in partnerships (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001a; Barnes et al., 2010). Through a variety of theories, scholars seek to explain, i.e. the emergence of organisational agency as a result of and derived from these positions of partners (Raab & Kenis, 2009). Notwithstanding the long history of the use of network analysis as an analytical tool, corresponding theory is only emerging (Provan et al., 2007). Network analyses are not informed by one unitary theoretical approach that specifies distinctive propositions, yet. Critiques have pointed out the ‘structural determinism’ that dominates network studies and the inadequate conceptualization of inter-organisational agency (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Galaskiewicz, 1985), which provides no coherent theoretical argument for the recursive relationship between agency, its outcomes and the structural pre-conditions that facilitate its occurrence (Raab & Kenis, 2009). To date, understanding differences in the structural positions of partners is to understand power.

The emergence of relational structures and the positions therein as well as their translation into influence and effective participation, are explained as proceeding from an instrumental view on partnerships. Related assumptions are of either naturally occurring horizontal relational structures, through functionally induced dependences between partners (Adler & Kwon, 2002), or, even though less frequently, (Boje & Whetten, 1981; Hills & Mahoney, 1978; Neumann, 1979; Huang & Provan, 2006) of hierarchical dependences that develop under the administrative control of some kind of lead organisation (O'Toole, 1997). In both scenarios, resource dependence and exchange theoretic perspectives (Galaskiewicz, 1985) posit that power is the inverse of dependence (Emerson, 1962). Since organizations need resources to achieve their individual and/or a partnership's goal, it follows that partners will automatically interact with those others who control and/or access these resources. Thus, centrally located partners are potentially more powerful, since they have more exchange alternatives (Boje & Whetten, 1981) and/or are positioned closer to core-decision-makers and resource-holders and therefore are more likely to get involved and are less constrained in their actions (Cook, 1977; Pfeffer & Leong, 1977). Though it has been acknowledged that central positions also pose constraints by confining the possibilities for agency (Gargiulo

& Benassi, 2000; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Kenis & Knoke, 2002; Uzzi, 1996, 1997a, b), resources and structural positions of partners alike are for the most parts equated with power and influence.

This equation however, bases on the assumption that partners share an understanding about what are critical or necessary resources and/or the common drivers or goals for collaboration; be it the individual organisational resources and goals of partners, or the overall needs, objectives, and agendas of a partnership (Boje & Whetten, 1981). To some extent, this assumption may derive from and hold for the rather uniform empirical basis of network analytic studies to date (Raab & Kenis, 2009). This consists of studies involving single or a very few cases of uni-sector partnerships, mainly business alliances (Provan et al., 2004a), and partnerships operating in specific issue areas, e.g. certain industries or public-sectors i.e health, education and other human services (Agranoff, 1991; Barnes et al., 2010; Boje & Whetten, 1981; Huang & Provan, 2006; Huang & Provan, 2007; Milward & Provan, 1995; Provan, Beyer, & Kruytbosch, 1980; Provan et al., 2009; Provan et al., 2004a) and within the European and North-American regions (Raab & Kenis, 2009).

Such contexts and constituent bases suggest that potential resource needs, drivers and goals for partnering predicate upon somewhat common understandings, for example, in a market environment, where partners come together to seek gains in productivity from one another, or in the provision of human services in countries in which these service spheres are relatively well institutionalized (Selsky & Parker, 2005). Yet, it has been argued that even in those settings common understandings are dependent on the presence of several individual and partnership-level conditions (for a review of potential partnership-level influences see Provan & Kenis, 2008), viz. knowledge about the kind of resources accessed or controlled by partners, which may derive from previous shared collaborative experience (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997a, b). For example, Huang and Provan (2006) explain differences in the centralisation and density of relational structures of a publicly funded health partnership by the nature of the resources involved. Defined on a continuum from tangible resources, such as contracts and budget, to intangible resources, such as information and reputation, it was found that tangible resources together with influence are centrally controlled by the for-profit lead organisation, whereas intangible resources are dispersed among the non-profit service providers, who are not permanently involved in all partnership-level decisions. The authors posit such segmentation of a professional and an administrative control domain as beneficial for partnership effectiveness (Huang & Provan, 2006: 450) under the favourable conditions of long-standing previous shared collaborative experience within the professional and goal consensus between the two control domains, respectively. It remains unclear, though, how mutual control and influence are exerted and how the partnership copes with, particularly should there be conflict between the two control domains. When different views of appropriate ends and means between the non-for-profit and the for-profit

control domains collide (Provan et al., 2004a) and differences in the possibilities of partners to exert influence undermine the abilities to interact effectively.

Brown and Ashman's (1996) study of 15 development partnerships, with no shared collaborative past and initially strong contention among highly diversely resourced partners, suggests the need to facilitate the development of mutual control and effective partnership-level integration. Their findings show that balanced involvement and control developed only in those partnerships in which governance mechanisms were implemented that overlay the development of power relations and assist in the functioning of individual organisational resources as bases for involvement and effective participation. In contrast, partnerships with equally critical conditions but no such mechanisms in place developed relational structures that excluded partners with less tangible resources from partnership-level decision-making processes and often resulted in conflict, withdrawal, and partnership ineffectiveness. In a similar vein but proceeding from a situation in which diversely resourced partners were equally strongly involved in decision-making processes, Derkzen and Bock (2007) demonstrate how such favourable positions alone are no guarantee for effective enactment of resources and/or effective participation, either. This came about as consequence of constructing professionalism in a regional partnership by some partners over the resources of others, in this case the local knowledge of the affected communities. The latter resource was effectively devaluated, resulting in only the marginal impact of the groups that accessed them on core decisions. Several comparable cases (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Barnes et al., 2010; Gray & Putnam, 2005; Marfo, 2006; Peuhkuri, 2002) document how perceptions about resources fail in translating into effective participation. Hence, favourable structural positions cannot by implication be equated with power and influence in partnerships if perceptions and beliefs about mutually valuable potential contributions and gains are not shared. In this event, when partners hold favourable positions, communication, mutual influence and joint learning (e.g. Brown & Ashman, 1996; Lewis, 1998) may aid partners in making use of their positions.

The need for partnership-level governance and guidance mechanisms to address differences in power and assist partners in making partnerships productive, are of much discussion. This is particularly so by literature dealing with highly diverse-resourced partnerships that spill over traditional boundaries of sectors, groups and nations, and address multifaceted issues (see for reviews: Bryson et al, 2006; Selsky & Parker, 2005; Van Huijstee et al, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2002a). Scholars employing network analysis, e.g., in the study of public-service networks, have only very recently started to pay attention to such mechanisms and primarily to those facilitating effective administration and control rather than enabling interventions. First promising theory developments in this direction (see for a review and conceptual framework: Provan & Kenis, 2008) propose different governance modes to effectively govern partnerships in the presence or absence of various partnership-level conditions. Such preliminary theoretical claims

however, have not yet received much empirical back-up from systematic analyses of complete partnership data and across cases (Provan et al., 2007). Specifically, power differences as a partnership-level condition that requires specific interventions in the design and the implementation of partnerships have not been incorporated into such frameworks yet.

2.5 Future directions

The first conclusion one can draw from the review of the present literature is that there are not many empirical findings on power in partnerships to date. Secondly, existing findings and theoretical approaches seem divided into two seemingly exclusive understandings of power in partnerships, these being either dispositional or episodic and applying related various conceptualisations of power at different levels of analysis. The preceding sections presented and discussed the strengths and weaknesses of both understandings and it seems premature at this point to analyse the extensive theoretical literature beyond what has been presented. Rather, it seems advisable to build on what is known and discuss a possible integration of both understandings in those areas where gaps can be identified and future research can most fruitfully proceed from. Consistent with the structure of the review so far, this section will summarise the most pervasive arguments, preliminary findings and shortcomings of both perspectives. Followed by a discussion of what are seen as the primary methodological issues that must be overcome if progress is to be made on developing greater understanding of this topic.

Power dispositions and partnership outcomes

The relationship between power dispositions and partnering outcomes is the most extensively researched aspect of power in partnerships (e.g. Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; LaFrance & Lehmann, 2005; Millar, Choi, & Chen, 2004; Warhurst, 2001). Despite all we know to date about seemingly powerless or powerful individual partners, there are many questions that have not been adequately addressed, especially with regard to the generalisability of findings across specific actors and groups and across specific partnership settings incorporating variation in partnership-level influences on the relationship between dispositions and outcomes.

The underlying assumption of a dispositional understanding in partnerships is that differences in power dispositions between partners relate to variation in partnering outcomes. Moving beyond descriptive accounts of powerless versus powerful partners or groups, the question that needs to be answered is: *Why are some partners more powerful than others?* A systematic analysis may encompass, based on the preceding review of the literature, the following sub-questions:

- *Are certain resources and/or positions, more effective bases of power in partnerships than others?*
- *If so, what precisely are the effects of differences in dispositions in partnerships? For example, are so-called 'discursive' resources perceived as less valuable, are less likely to translate into favourable positions in the interactions between partners, and/or into effective participation and goal attainment of partners?*

The primary methodological issue that has to be addressed to answer these questions is the operationalisation of resources and related partnership-level outcomes. This is required to be undertaken in a way capturing these relationships for all partners and truly operationalising inter-organisational power as a relational concept, beyond in this sense static power proxies that may exist between sectors or groups, 'outside' of the context of a partnership (Phillips et al., 2000). In addition to being suitable to examine the resources and outcomes of all partners, such operationalisation needs to analytically distinguish between potential power and its outcomes in partnerships (Provan, 1980). Only through such a distinction can the question, why some partners are more powerful than others, be explained, for example by the relationships that may or may not be empirically established between resource perceptions and process-related gains, such as a favourable position in the relational structures of a partnership and influence and effective partnership participation. Ultimately, the relationships between these instances of power in partnerships require validation, e.g. through comparative analyses across different constituency bases and partnership settings and in their development over time.

(Episodes of) power in partnerships

The preceding review of the literature revealed two major analytic approaches to the analysis of episodes of power in partnerships, a discourse and a network analytic approach. Despite the rich insights into partnership-level interactions and processes obtained, both approaches build upon similarly under-researched preconditions for organisational agency and episodes of power in partnerships to occur, not least with respect to power dispositions and outcomes. Discourse analysis predicates upon the assumption of a relatively balanced involvement of partners in partnering processes and remains vague about partnering outcomes other than discursive gains and perceptual changes. Network analytical studies predicate upon the assumption that relational structures and reciprocal control evolve relatively autonomously from shared understandings, viz. of resources, resource needs and dependencies and partnering goals.

Despite all that is known, at this point, about processes of social construction and contestation, as well as about the evolution of relational structures in partnerships, there are many questions that have not been adequately addressed yet. These questions in particular address the generalisability of findings across partnerships under consideration of differences in power dispositions and outcomes between partners on partnership-level

processes and outcomes. The underlying assumption of an episodic understanding is that power is inherently relational and derives from the ongoing interactions between partners. Moving beyond descriptive accounts of partnership processes, the question that needs to be answered is: *Why are some partnerships and processes more effective than others?* A systematic analysis based on the preceding review of the literature encompasses the following sub-questions:

- *Are certain partnerships and processes more effective than others?*
- *If so, what precisely are the effects of differences in power dispositions between partners on partnership processes and outcomes? For example, are partnership processes more effective when mutual resources are known and perceived as potentially valuable or when involvement and/or influence and control are balanced?*

The primary methodological issue that has to be addressed to answer these questions is the operationalisation of power and other partnership-level conditions, in a way allowing for the assessment of differences in power dispositions among partners that is comparable across cases and this way build the nexus between the individual partner and partnership-level of analysis. Different to other partnership-level properties, for example the overall budget or size of a partnership, power differences between partners may be extrapolated and aggregated as a partnership-level condition but still require the analysis of the partners and the interactions and relationships between them. Whole partnership data, meaning data including the mutual assessments of all partners involved in a partnership can be extremely costly to gather depending on the size of the partnership, let alone cross-case comparisons by the means of a number of cases. As Provan et al (2007) propose generalisability would require a number of around 30 comparable partnership cases. Such quantities are most likely to be obtained from large-scale governmental or donor-led partnering initiatives and databases (Van Huijstee et al., 2007). These partnerships however, to most parts operate beneath the radar of scholarly attention (Selsky & Parker, 2005). This may be due to the difficulties one faces when trying to access and process such data and at the same time demonstrate independence from the institutional interests of funding parties and obtain useful data.

Cross-cutting questions and themes

Following seemingly contradictory understandings of power in partnerships, the precedent analysis of the literature and the subsequent discussion of remaining theoretical and methodological gaps demonstrates that dispositional and episodic perspectives can not only usefully complement each other, but in fact that theoretical claims put forward in one, needs to be verified by the other perspective to hold. We will demonstrate this mutual dependence by the exercise of a theoretical testing of the most

fundamental arguments of both understandings. A subsequent presentation of cross-cutting themes and questions will conclude this section.

Firstly, one can argue that differences in power outcomes are attached to differences in the power resources between partners. If supported by the data, this would confirm the null hypothesis in favour of the traditional dispositional understanding of power. Yet, only when partnership-level resource assessments remain stable, meaning across partnerships the assumption holds that significant differences exist between resources in their translation into favourable perceptions and thus positions and/or effective participation. In this case, one would find no reason to assume that, for example, a participative design of a partnership enabled partners to nonetheless gain a favourable position and/or a stake in partnership processes and pursue their goals. Further, only when objective (e.g. kinds of resources and favourable position) and perceived measures (e.g. resource value and influence gained) alike point into this direction, can we conclude that resource differentials might have caused the outcome. Should this positive relation between objective and perceived resource measures and influence differentials remain stable across a number of partnerships, then and only then can we argue for a systemic resource (dis-)advantage in partnerships that may be further extrapolated to certain partners or groups.

Secondly, differentials in outcomes can derive from partnership-level perceptions and structural positions regardless of differences in the kind of resources of partners. Yet, this claim can only be substantiated when no significant differences in the relations between resources in their translation into several of the instances of power in partnerships, as stated in the above, can be found. Furthermore, as has been discussed for the discourse and network analytic approach, both the potential power indicators of resource perceptions and positions in the relational structures of partnerships are necessary to adequately operationalise the possibility for a recursive relationship between structure and agency to occur. In an episodic manner, agency in partnerships must be assessed in its relationship to structural pre-conditions and outcomes.

Both, the dispositional and the episodic arguments are equally essential and neither one alone is comprehensive enough for an understanding of power in partnerships. When combined, concepts derived from both can inform strategies to address the issue of power at the partner/partnership interface (Provan et al., 2007). From the perspectives of partners or groups, there have been a few studies taking a comparative angle (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Ashman, 2001a; Hardy et al., 2003) by looking at the impact of differences in partnership-level structures and processes on effective participation and over time (Cho & Gillespie, 2006; Huang & Provan, 2007; Morse & McNamara, 2006; Poncelet, 2001; Rodriguez et al., 2007). They have suggested a number of directions that the study of power in partnerships might proceed:

- *Are partnership-level power differentials in one or more of the above stated instances more likely to influence individual organisational chances for and effective participation? For example, are perceptual differences in resource-related potential power more likely encountered when partners engage in collaboration with 'non-traditional' or partners with no shared collaborative past, where it is less likely for their resources to be acknowledged?*
- *How effective are various strategies of engagement (Hanke et al., 2002; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005) employed by individual or groups of organisations across partnerships displaying different partnership-level conditions of power differentials, in one or more of the above stated instances? For example, is it more effective for unacquainted partners to push for and invest in creating the necessary pre-conditions and safeguards for trustful interactions before taking the risk to engage in a partnership? In particular, if not directly involved in the design of partnerships themselves, how effective are less powerful partners to strengthen their position in partnerships through alternative strategies (e.g. by bringing in like-minded allies, Ashman, 2001a)?*

At the partnership-level of analysis, very few studies have systematically operationalised differences in actor attributes and outcomes and inquired into their relationship to other partnership-level structures, properties, processes and outcomes (see for overviews of studies following a discourse or network analytic approach: Provan et al, 2007 and Hastings, 1999 or Gray, 1991, respectively}. In particular, opinions about effective measures that moderate the impact of power differentials on partnership effectiveness vary tremendously, dependent on the respective operationalisation of the latter two concepts. While the prevailing argument is made in favour of broad participation, mutual influence and shared power (Alter & Hage, 1993; Bryson & Crosby, 2005; Huxham, 2003; Huxham & Vangen, 1996; Lewis, 1998). The reviewed studies demonstrate that such partnership-level conditions cannot be taken for granted or assumed to automatically emerge and persist in partnerships but that instead partnership-level governance interventions and mechanism to address these issues may be required. Yet, such interventions may vary in the degree to which they effectively tackle power differentials and can be costly to bring about and maintain in partnerships and conflict with dominant interests or efficiency concerns (Brown & Ashman, 1996; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Rochlin et al., 2008). The following issues are proposed for which a study of power in partnerships might proceed:

- *Do power differentials in one or more of the above stated instances interact with partnership-level governance interventions in bringing about effective collective action? For example, can governance interventions absorb the potentially detrimental effects of power differentials on partnership effectiveness?*

- *If so, how effective are various partnership-level governance interventions in balancing power differences? For example, are interventions targeting the structural design of a partnership more or less effective than those efforts aiming at relationship building and changing perceptions? Or, are combinations of these and other interventions most effective?*

2.6 Conclusion and discussion

This review set out to give a comprehensive overview of research on power in partnerships. In sharp contrast to the abundant theoretical debate about the issue, the review stresses the meagre empirical base on which the present debate on power in this empirical context builds. The study outlines the existent theoretical fragmentation and methodological inadequacies in terms of the operation and related interpretation of power in this context. Connecting theoretical understandings, the analytical levels addressed and methodological strengths and weaknesses of the reviewed articles, a distinction between studies following a dispositional and an episodic understanding of power in partnerships is identified as the main source of fragmentation. Proceeding from a summary of questions raised but left unanswered by the most pervasive approaches to power following these two understandings, the review concludes by arguing that both are not mutually exclusive but dependent on each other.

The findings of the present study suggest that rather than trying to address questions independently, future research on power in partnerships should draw upon many of the theoretical and methodological advances and insights gained from both understandings. For instance, the issues associated with effective management and governance of power relations in partnerships with very diverse membership and operating in less institutionalised but contested issue areas, should provoke efforts validating preliminary theory developments, as it has been suggested for the emerging field of network theory (Raab & Kenis, 2009). For this, it is equally important for the study of partnerships to emancipate itself from previous constraints regarding incomparableness and novelty of the subject and start engaging in theory development and empirical advances towards cumulative knowledge building across individual partners or groups and partnership settings.

Although this review has focused on theoretical and empirical issues relevant to the study of power in partnerships, partnerships are increasingly utilised in all kinds of issue areas and service spheres and future research should be guided by the practical implications derived from the findings of this review. One of the most daunting but also promising issues in this respect seems to be the governance of power in and across diverse partnership settings. The impact of several governance aspects may be analysed. Insights gained with regard to interventions aiming at relationship and capacity building

may be contrasted with structural ones that target the design and control infra-structure of partnerships. Notwithstanding the practical relevance of such research the present review also shows that different theoretical claims and practical implications are informed and confined by actors' perspectives. For example, tailored to the needs of public agencies, donors and other initiating parties, the emerging field of network theory focuses on questions about how partnerships can best be governed. In contrast, many of the studies reviewed here argue from the perspective of 'partners' and focused on balancing power via relationship building, making the most of their potential within the straightjacket of the donor-recipient relationships. At present, scholars from various disciplines have only a marginal understanding of power and its governance in the context of partnerships, despite the eminent role of this issue in these literatures. Enhancing this knowledge is clearly a challenge. Yet, addressing power at the nexus between the partner- and the partnership-level of analysis, this way integrating dispositional and episodic understandings of power provides a promising starting point.

On a cautionary note, despite the attempt to present a comprehensive review of the literature on power in partnerships, the present work has clear limitations. Admittedly, the search procedure used narrowly focused on publications in academic journals, excluding an extant body of practitioners' literature, field and evaluation reports and not at least edited volumes and books chapters on this topic. Still, the methodology of this review serves as a means to contrast the relative dearth and descriptive nature of empirical literature with the considerable and fierce but fragmented conceptual discussion of this topic. The findings presented should provide useful insights for future research choosing either to deliberately focus on one or to tackle the challenges of more complex multi-dimensional approaches to the study of power in partnerships.

Chapter 3

Bases of Power and effective Participation in Development Partnerships. The Need for Governance?

Abstract

Differences in organisational bases of power are commonly argued to lead to a tacit and, at times, explicit distinction between the powerful and powerless partners with respect to their effective participation in partnerships. Yet, this argument is often build upon an understanding of power as ‘centred’ within individual organisations or groups to be read off from the resources they ‘have available’, that is resources these organizations access or control ‘outside’ of a specific partnership. Bases of power rarely are operationalised potentially diverse and yet ultimately defined by the context of a partnership; and analysed in their functioning across partnership cases. Applying exchange theoretic and public-administrative understandings of how inter-organisational power relations in partnerships unfold, this cross-sectional study of 175 organisations involved in development partnerships explores the effects of organisational bases of power on effective participation. The findings show that while some resources are effective relatively invariantly to partnership-level perceptions, others are perceived as valuable yet do not translate into power. Beyond a mere demarcation of powerful and powerless partners, the findings attempt to explain why these differences occur and make a case for the need of governance interventions to enable effective participation and thus significantly alter the way inter-organisational power relations in development partnerships unfold.

3.1 Introduction

Inter-organisational partnerships increasingly gained importance in international development cooperation as the institutional imperatives of bilateral inter-governmental aid changed (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2006; Robinson et al., 2000). Development agendas carried partnership as a managerial imperative to all parts of the world, where all kinds of organisations nowadays find themselves in the positions of managers of and participants in such inter-organisational relations (Rochlin et al., 2008). With their extremely diverse constituent bases, however, development partnerships in particular (Hastings, 1999), face grand challenges in governing inter-organisational power relations in order to enable effective participation and partnering processes (e.g. Brown & Ashman, 1996; Fowler, 1998).

Yet, this course of events has gone rather unnoticed outside of the development domain (Brinkerhoff, 2002b), by scholars of inter-organisational relations and networks (Raab & Kenis, 2009). Despite the valuable insights that have been generated by this research (Huang & Provan, 2007; Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Provan & Gassenheimer, 1994; Provan, 1980; Provan et al., 1980), they almost solely derive from partnerships operating in relatively uniform contexts, such as markets, industries, or the public service sectors of European and North-American countries (Hasnain-Wynia et al., 2003; Huang & Provan, 2007; O'Toole Jr & Meier, 2004; Provan et al., 1980; Zakus, 1998). Consequently, Raab and Kenis (2009), in a recent review of the literature, emphasise the need for an “external” validation of findings in other domains of partnership operation.

Development scholars have paid attention to the specific challenges associated with effective partnerships in the specific context of (international) development cooperation. In particular, they have pointed out the difficulties and needs for governing seemingly inherently unequal power relations and provided in-depth insights into their complex nature in development partnerships (Lister, 2000; Morse & McNamara, 2006). Notwithstanding the valuable insights gained from this research, its majority to date has only little been informed by theory (Brinkerhoff, 2002b) and based on the study of only single or a small number of cases which hardly allow for any generalisations and cumulative knowledge building beyond specific cases (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Research on one of the rare existing comprehensive data sets²¹ has found differences in the proportion to which groups of actors, e.g. from the global South/North, governments, business, and civil society organisations (Andonova & Levy, 2003; Hale & Mauzerall, 2004) are represented among the partners. Yet, certain partners or groups of partners are not powerful or powerless in all partnerships and politics of inclusion or exclusion represent only one mechanism of power *through* partnerships (cf. Derkzen, Franklin & Bock, 2008). Lacking a level of specification applicable to the organisational level and

²¹ See: <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/partnerships.htm>

comparable across partnership cases, previous work cannot explain or generalise if and how those power proxies impact upon the functioning of power *in* partnerships.

The operations, the processes, relational dimensions and bases on which power enfold once a partnership commences its operations, are core to the study of inter-organisational relations and the sociologically oriented management disciplines (Galaskiewicz, 1985). This study tests a conceptual framework that builds upon an understanding of the functioning of bases of organisational power within inter-organisational coordinative systems (Entwistle et al., 2007) and tests their applicability in the context of development partnerships. The question that guides this inquiry is formulated as follows: *How do organisational bases of power relate to effective participation in development partnerships?*

The contributions of this paper are twofold: First, it adds an inter-organisational perspective to the literature on power in development partnerships, which so far has largely been neglected (Ashman, 2000; Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Secondly, by analysing the relationship between bases of power and effective participation the study explores starting points for practical interventions and partnership governance.

3.2 Theoretical background

There is not one specific theoretical framework, which focuses on inter-organisational power in internationally operating partnerships but there are two bodies of literature relevant for such an inquiry. The first is on the study of inter-organisational power (Cook, 1977; Cook, 1978; Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 1998; Huxham & Beech, 2003; Medcof, 2001; Provan, 1980) and the governance of collaborations, partnerships and networks (Gray, 1989; Gray & Wood, 1991; Huang & Provan, 2007; Jones et al., 1997; Kickert et al., 1997a; Provan et al., 1980; Raab & Kenis, 2009). The second is on international development management (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2006; Cooke, 2003; Cooke, 2004; Thomas, 2007) and partnerships therein (Ashman, 2001a, b; Awortwi, 2004; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 1999; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002a, b; Dolan & Opondo, 2005; Johnson & Wilson, 2006; Morse & McNamara, 2006; Patel, 2001).

To pave the way for a theoretical integration of the literature, first the main assumptions about bases of inter-organisational power and their functioning in partnerships will be outlined. The main rationale for partnership stated in the literature can be summarised as that of bringing together a diversity of organisations with a wide array of resources and capabilities (Blockson, 2003; Gray, 1989; Gray & Wood, 1991; Waddell, 2000, 2005) that provide the base for making the achievements of goal-oriented processes possible. This “instrumental” perspective (Stewart & Gray, 2006) relates to an understanding of partnerships as merely “facilitating” interaction,

collaboration as well as conflict (Gray & Putnam, 2005) in a way that “partners can best leverage their resources and capabilities so that goal-oriented processes can take place” (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1997; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997b).

This understanding of partnerships received critique because it seems to hypothesise several aspects, in particular, a preliminary acceptance of effective exchange, joint decision-making and interactions between equals. Those assumptions are cast into doubt when considering how partners come to the table with all kinds of power inequalities (Stewart & Gray, 2006). Ignoring this essential part of the reality of in particular development partnerships (Thomas, 2007) is argued to lead to ineffective processes. This is because it produces conflict, power struggle and partnership failure when partners end up “clashing” (Crane, 2000) and bargaining about power and basic rights instead of exploring mutual interests (Eweje, 2007: 21). By the same token, imposed partnership goals and processes often result in a lack of ownership and ineffective processes (Fowler, 1998).

Acknowledging this reality of development partnerships, i.e., Thomas (1996) argues for partnership governance to go beyond facilitating but “creating” the conditions under which effective collaboration can take place. At this point, however, one is left with the question about how the power inequalities that suggest avowing an enabling and empowering governance approach can be defined and how these conditions can be “created”. In the literature on inter-organisational relations, the conditions for effective partnering build upon some tenets about the functioning of organisational bases of power, largely derived from two distinct perspectives (O'Toole, 1997):

Firstly, research on partnerships in the for-profit world, and a related exchange theoretical understanding of inter-organisational power relations (Emerson, 1972) posits that one organisation's power resides in another's dependence (Emerson, 1962). Dependencies arise when organisations control or access resources which are needed by others (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Knowledge of resource needs and dependencies is assumed to lead organisations towards partnering in the first place (Oliver, 1990) and to subsequently drive the development of functionally induced dependencies (Huang & Provan, 2006) and relational structures that coordinate and sustain effective participation and collaboration (Jones et al., 1997).

Public-administrative models instead emphasise the need for coordination and control of inter-organisational activities (Agranoff, 2006; Provan & Milward, 2001) and utilisation of a diversity of potentially valuable organisational resources, services, products and capabilities for the achievement of the development task (Thomas, 1996). In such administrative decision making (Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; Provan et al., 1980), power derives from vertical dependencies and the extent to which a partner's services, resources and capabilities potentially benefit and are effectively coordinated and employed for the achievement of the development task.

The first model describes the development of horizontal and the latter one the structuring of vertical inter-organisational power relations (Entwistle et al., 2007). Both models specify different functions of power but none of them seems to imply a need for “enabling” governance interventions as is proposed by development scholars (Thomas, 1996). The underlying mechanism on which both models build, however, require empirical validation in the context of development partnerships. The assumption that common goals and joint decision-making are no prerequisites for effective exchange (Galaskiewicz, 1985) or that power is contingent on a partner’s potential to benefit the achievement of the partnership task (Provan & Milward, 2001) are the theoretical linkages that will be explored in the first part of this study. If such a link cannot be established this would give the indication of a need to “create” the conditions for effective collaboration (Thomas, 1996).

The reminder of this paper is structured as follows: After presenting a conceptual model for the analysis of inter-organisational power in partnerships, the conceptual framework, the hypotheses, independent and dependent variables of this study are defined. Thirdly, the data collection, measurements and methodology are described. Finally, the empirical findings are presented and discussed in light of their implications for possible interventions to create the conditions for and “enable” effective participation.

3.3 Conceptual framework

Core to a definition of inter-organisational power in partnerships is the premise that the potential power of partners is not always enacted (Provan, 1980) and that agency and upward influence are part and parcel of organisational life (Phillips, 1997). These ideas derive from the assumption of certain bases of power which can be accessed, utilised and enacted by an organisation (Benson, 1975) or work indirectly (Provan, 1980). As summarised by Emerson (1962: 32): “power will not be of necessity observable in every interactive episode between A and B, yet we suggest that it exists nonetheless as a potential to be explored, tested and occasionally employed by the participants”. The bases of the potential power of organisations that can be utilised in such efforts or function implicitly have been studied extensively (Clegg, 1989a; Cobb, 1984; Cook, 1977; Cook, 1978; Dahl, 1961; Hardy, 1994) and can be summarised as resources and positions.

Resources as bases of power

The focus on resources as an essential component of an organisation’s power emanates from a long history of research on inter-organisational exchange relations (Cook, 1977). Resources, in their function as bases of inter-organisational power, can be regarded as

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anything that partners need for carrying out their activities, may create dependencies for others (Zeitz, 1980) and maybe utilised for the fulfilment of a partnership's task (Waddell, 2003, 2005). Resources can be more (e.g. financial and production means, Lodahl, 1973; Marfo, 2006), less or intangible or symbolic (Huang & Provan, 2006; Rogers, 1974). For all the many typologies and classifications of resources that exist (Alexander, 1996; Rogers, 1974), those are of a heuristic value only to the purpose of this research. The effective functioning of resources as bases of power cannot be read from differences in resources between partners that may exist 'outside' of partnerships but depend on the perception and assessment among partners. Those are relational in nature, change over time and vary across the constituent bases and contexts of partnerships (Gray, 1985). Further, resources build only one component of the potential power of an organisation and cannot be set equal to power and influence in partnerships. For example, Derksen and Franklin (Derkzen et al., 2008) describe how a governmental agency refrained from enacting its authority to decide unilaterally but left main decisions about the course of a partnership to its partners. In contrast, resources may potentially be accessible to partners but cannot be enacted in partnerships. Brown and Ashman (Brown & Ashman, 1996) demonstrate how indigenous and grass-root organisations exhibited potentially useful resources, such as their social capital in the affected communities. Yet, these resources were only possible for those organisations to enact in those partnerships in which their involvement in decisive decision-making processes was endorsed by the initiators. Hence, resources are important prerequisites for power in partnerships but no resource guarantees involvement and/or effective participation in all processes (Huang & Provan, 2006) or partnerships (Hardy et al., 2003).

Positions as bases of power

Despite the type and the extent to which partners access and control certain resources, partners need to be in a position to bring their resources to bear. Positions are defined by the "power infrastructure" (Huxham & Beech, 2003) of a partnership and indicate the level of involvement in partnership processes, interactions, negotiations, exchanges and decision-making processes. The same argument that applies to resources also holds for favourable positions in partnerships: both are analytically distinct from effective participation in partnerships. For example, Derkzen and Bock (2007) describe how limited effective community participation in partnership negotiations can be, when local knowledge and thus local say in these processes is not considered equally valuable to the technical and scientific expertise of the "professional" partners.

Bases of power and effective participation: Hypotheses

Together, the two bases of potential inter-organisational power: resources and positions; and their interplay in bringing about effective participation in partnerships, are analysed. The two analytical concepts and their theoretical relation to effective participation, in an

exchange or public-administrative coordinative model, provide the bases for the hypotheses that guide this research. The first part of the study will answer the question to what extent resources, via the horizontal and vertical dependencies they create, lead to an advantageous position and/or effective participation in partnerships. Resources and the organisations that control and/or access them gain importance, as hypothesised by exchange theorists, when they are perceived as valuable by others (Emerson, 1962). In this event, partners become involved in interactions and gain advantageous positions in the relational structures of a partnership, which increase their chances for effective participation. In the administrative model, the functioning of bases of power is contingent upon the potential contribution of resources to the achievement of the development task (Thomas, 1996). A partner is considered and involved by decision-makers to the extent to which a partner's resources are recognised as valuable to the fulfilment of this task.

In internationally operating development partnerships we can hypothesise such dependencies to exist, e.g. between foreign and local partners. On the one hand, foreign partners may depend on their local partners to identify and tailor partnership goals and processes to local needs (James, 2001), harness private investment (Kolk, Van Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008), and leverage other 'local' (social) capital, community commitment and ownership to the partnership (Sanyal, 2006). What in turn increases their own chances for future funding (Robinson et al., 2000). On the other hand, local organisations may depend on the technical expertise, management skills, and not least of all the financial means channelled through and provided by foreign partners (Lister, 2000). Based on such dependencies, one would assume that

H1: The extent to which an organisation can potentially contribute resources to a partnership that are valuable to others and/or are considered important for the achievement of the partnership task, positively relates to its position in a partnership.

H2: The extent to which an organisation can potentially contribute resources to a partnership that are valuable to others and/or are considered important for the achievement of the partnership task, positively relates to its effective participation in a partnership.

So far, the argument has been that resources, via the inter-organisational resource dependencies they create and via their utility for the performance of the partnership task, lead to an advantageous position and thus a greater potential power and chance for effective participation. By proposing an analytical distinction between the two bases of potential power and by distinguishing between potential, enacted power and effective participation, we have already suggested that potential power is not always enacted but

in fact that both bases of power may interact in defining a partner's chances for effective participation. Provan et al., (1980) highlight that it is as important to consider that neither one component of potential power, resources or an advantageous position alone is sufficient and that power cannot be enacted or perceived unless potential power is present. With regard to the two components, one can assume two ways of interactions. First, as demonstrated by Brown and Ashman's (1996) example of grass-root participation in partnerships, one could argue that resources alone are not sufficient for effective participation when organisations are not in the position to enact them. We hypothesise that:

H3: The extent to which a partner potentially can contribute resources to a partnership that are valuable to others and/or are considered important for the achievement of the partnership's task, only positively relates to effective participation when at the same time the partner is in the position to enact them.

On the contrary, as demonstrated by Derkzen and Bock's (2007) example of community participation in partnerships, one would assume that an advantageous position in a partnership becomes useful only in the event that partners show the necessary resources to make use of their position. Phillips describes that as making own claims and decisions "stick" (Phillips, 1997:44). Related to the previous hypotheses, one can assume that:

H4: The extent to which the partner holds an advantageous position in a partnership only positively relates to effective participation when at the same time the partner has the potential to contribute resources to a partnership that are valuable to others and/or are considered important for the achievement of the partnership's task.

Effective participation: The dependent variable

Potential power, derived from alone or in combination, the resources and positions of an organisation in a partnership can result in effective participation. The literature on inter-organisational collaboration is fuelled with accounts of a variety of strategies and tactics that organisations can employ to pursue their goals and gain a stake in partnerships²², for example, by using different negotiation tactics, frames and other discursive elements. In the present framework, these strategies and tactics are separately conceptualised as representing expressions of enacted power in partnerships (Provan, 1980), and not further accounted for here.

²² An overview of the literature on "enacted" power in partnerships is provided in Chapter 2 of this volume.

Effective participation of partners is indicated by the stake partners gain in the exchanges, negotiations and discursive struggles over partnership-related issues (Kim et al., 2005) and by the degree to which they attain their individual organisational goals in partnerships (Hardy et al., 2003). Both influence measure and goal attainment are considered in the present study. On the one hand, because resource diversity and coordination may not always involve all organisations in all decision-making or exchange processes (Huang & Provan, 2006) and on the other hand, because partners may not always need to take influence (Provan et al., 1980) to pursue their goals. Saying this, a systematic analysis of effective participation, as distinct from its preconditions (potential power) becomes even more important to prevent one from misleadingly interpreting a lack of influence as being powerless, or to attach too much importance to episodes of agency in partnerships. Ultimately, only a separate analysis of both components of potential power and their relation to effective participation can reveal the implications of their interplay and identify points for intervention.

3.4 Data collection, measurement, and methodology

In order to obtain information with regard to the concepts discussed above, survey data were collected from 175 organisations, 67 European and international organisations (IOs) and 108 local organisations involved in development partnerships. The partnerships, operating in and across 19 different African and Caribbean countries, derived from two financing instruments of the European Union: the European Union Water (EUWF) and Energy Facilities (EUEF).

The data collection has been conducted as follows: first, all 274 organisations which successfully applied for partnership funding were contacted and asked for participation explaining the purpose and procedure of the study. Forty-nine of the so-called intermediary organisations indicated their interest, which resulted in an initial response rate of almost 20%. In the case that interest was indicated, the intermediary organisations were asked to provide the contacts of all their partner organisations involved in the funded project partnership. This procedure resulted in a preliminary number of 249 participant organisations.

Second, all organisations of which the contacts were obtained were approached and asked for participation. If interested, the respondents could choose between three options: i) complete an online questionnaire which was provided in English and French; ii) receive a printed version of the questionnaire via post; or iii.) indicate a time and date and preferred language for a telephone interview, for example in case of unstable or no internet access. Questionnaire and interview guidelines were provided to each organisation and each partnership individually (see the full questionnaire in Appendix II). This was required due to the relational measures used in this study to be satisfied by

both the personalisation of all questions and the obtaining of the individual perspective of each responding organisation about all its partners. Another consequence of this approach is that only those partnerships could be included which showed full participation, meaning, all partners completed the questionnaire or participated in the interviews. Eventually, full data was obtained for 175 organisations. After the first round of the data collection, the data was analysed and complemented by follow-up telephone interviews, which were conducted with ten organisations. Since only those participants were included of which the intermediary organisations provided the contacts, non-response analysis at the partner-level of analysis could not be conducted. For the partnerships included however, confirmation of participation by the intermediary and the respective partners suggests complete partnership data (see Appendix III).

Power has been conceptualised in the study of partnerships in a variety of ways (see Chapter Two of this volume). Different measures are not strictly comparable (Provan et al., 1980). When trying to capture more than one dimension of the concept, in order to allow for systemic instead of generic interpretation, it is importance to be explicit about the measures used (Provan et al., 1980).

Resources. The concept of resources was operationalised following an approach presented by Jacobson and Cohen (1986). Resources were measured presenting the same list of 18 resources²³ at two points in the questionnaire/interviews. First, the respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale (to “extremely important”) the significance of each resource for their own organisation and/or the accomplishment of the partnership’s task. Later in the questionnaire, the same list was presented again but this time the respondents were asked to indicate for their own organisation and their partners, to what extent they can potentially contribute each listed resource (again on a five-point Likert-scale, to “very high potential”). The average of the self- and others-*perceived scores* for each resource represented the objective resource measure.

Resource utility. From the first resource assessment, the total sum of the utility scores ascribed to a resource by all partners was divided by the total sum ascribed to all resources in a partnership. This partnership-specific percentage was taken as a weight representing the utility of a resource. The objective resource scores of each resource were then weighted and the sum represented the individual *resource utility score* for each partner.

Position. The concept of position was measured in two ways: involvement in interactions with partners and in decision-making processes.

Interactions. Egocentric measures of the involvement of partners in the activities of the partnerships were used. Each respondent was asked to indicate for each partner, with whom the own organisation is most frequently involved with in four partnership-related

²³ A description of the development of this list is provided in Appendix I.

activities. The activities were operationalised two-ways directed (giving/receiving, or both): reporting, resources, advice, and support. Because the focus was on the most eminent relations between partners, only confirmed linkages were counted (Marsden, 1990). The obtained in- and out-degree centralities for each activity were normalised, controlling for differences in the size of the partnerships. Despite the loss of data, this conservative approach was required, since no direct observations were obtained (Huang & Provan, 2006).

Decision-making. Involvement in the decision-making processes of a partnership was measured through involvement in the decisions about ten²⁴ partnership-related issues. For each issue it was asked to indicate own and other partners' involvement. Following these criteria, the data were aggregated and new variables were created. A percentage measure was derived from all issues for which involvement was indicated by the respondent organisation relative to the total number of issues.

Effective Participation. Effective participation was measured by two dependent variables: goal attainment and influence.

Goal attainment. Goal attainment was measured by two items. The respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale (to “far above expectations”). The averaged sum represented the overall measure for goal attainment.

Influence. The level of influence of an organisation was measured by using the same set of ten partnership-related decision-making issues as described for involvement. For each issue it was asked to indicate whether the own organisation or any of the other partners have been influential on the decision about this issue. This measure represents an issue-specific adaptation of Huang and Provan's (2006) influence measure. Again, only those issues were counted as “influential” for which influence was confirmed by at least one partner. A percentage measure was created for confirmed influence relative to the total number of issues.

Before testing our hypotheses, three groups of variables were factor-analysed: the objective resource measures, the in and out-degree centralities in the four partnership-related interactions and the involvement in the decision-making. A principal component analysis (PCA) with subsequent orthogonal rotation and varimax solution was chosen for. When conceptually and statistically reasonable, sub-scales were created and the obtained *regression scores* were used in the following analysis²⁵. The final list of variables measuring each concept is displayed in Table 3.1.

²⁴ A description of the development of this list is provided in Appendix I.

²⁵ The results of the factor analyses can be reviewed in Tables IV.I-V of Appendix IV.

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Table 3.1: Variables and definitions

Variable		Definition
<u>Resources:</u>		Sum of the averaged self- and others perceived potential to contribute the below mentioned resources:
	Relational resources	<i>Regression score</i> for factor one, representing the objective measure of seven resources: negotiation skills, relations to committees, reputation and reach, personal relations to partners, political support, relations to decision-makers, relations to the public and media
	Administrative resources	<i>Regression score</i> for factor two, representing the objective measure of four resources: technological and scientific knowledge, project management experience, administrative capacities, financial means
	Authority	<i>Regression score</i> for factor three, representing the objective measure of three resources: coercive authority, licensing authority, ownership of licenses/patents
	Production means	Averaged self- and others perceived potential
	Manpower	Averaged self- and others perceived potential
	Local knowledge	Averaged self- and others perceived potential
	Representation of beneficiaries	Averaged self- and others perceived potential
Resource utility		Sum of self-and others-perceived <i>resource scores</i> , each weighted by the partnership-specific resource utility
<u>Positions:</u>		
Involvement in interactions		Normalised (for each partnership) confirmed in- and out degree centrality measures in the five partnership-related activities, described below:
	Control	<i>Regression score</i> for factor three, representing four centrality measures: in-degree reporting, out-degree resources, out-degree support, out-degree advise
	Resources	<i>Regression score</i> for factor four, representing four centrality measures: in-degree resources, out-degree reporting, in-degree support, in-degree advise
Involvement in the decision-making	Partnership design	Percentage of an organisation's confirmed involvement in the decision-making about the following five issues: partner selection, external monitoring, goal definition, resource contributions to the partnership, resource allocation to partners
	Partnership implementation	Percentage of an organisation's confirmed involvement in the decision-making about the following five issues: tasks and responsibilities, outcomes, internal monitoring, ownership and maintenance, definition of beneficiaries
<u>Effective participation:</u>		
Influence	Partnership design	Percentage of an organisation's confirmed influence on the decisions made about the following five issues: partner selection, external monitoring, goal definition, resource contributions to the partnership, resource allocation to partners
	Partnership implementation	Percentage of an organisation's confirmed influence on the decisions made about the following five issues: tasks and responsibilities, outcomes, internal monitoring, ownership and maintenance, definition of beneficiaries
Goal attainment		Averaged perception of individual organisational productivity and goal attainment in the partnership.

3.5. Empirical results

The descriptive statistics and mean comparisons for the whole sample are displayed for the partners and the intermediary organisations separately in Table 3.2. The results of the initial bivariate analysis testing the four hypotheses are presented in Tables 3.3. Each variable is listed in one of the groups representing the hypothesised concepts.

Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics and mean comparisons between partner and intermediary organisations

	Intermediaries				Partners						
	N = 38				N = 137						
Variable	Mean	Min	Max	S.D.	Mean	Min	Max	S.D.	s.e.	m.d.	Sig. ³
<u>Resources:</u>											
Resources (unweighted)	2,86	2	4	0,505	2,59	1	4	0,577	0,103	-0,270	n.s. ¹
Relational	0,301	-3,984	2,001	1,193	-0,083	-4,118	2,230	0,926	0,181	-0,385	0,035 ²
Administrative	0,685	-0,910	1,996	0,816	-0,190	-2,887	1,692	0,964	0,171	-0,875	0,000 ¹
Authority	0,233	-1,578	2,142	1,021	-0,064	-2,319	2,936	0,987	0,182	-0,297	n.s. ¹
Production means	2,27	0	4	0,867	2,51	0	5	1,107	0,194	0,236	n.s. ¹
Manpower	2,54	0	4	0,977	2,72	0	5	1,175	-0,235	0,208	n.s. ¹
Local knowledge	2,04	0	5	1,048	3,10	0	5	1,029	0,191	0,353	n.s. ²
Beneficiaries	2,07	0	4	0,957	2,73	0	5	0,935	0,169	0,264	n.s. ²
Resources utility	28,53	20	38	4,793	26,69	10	39	6,094	0,806	-1,84	n.s. ²
<u>Positions:</u>											
Involvement in interactions:											
Control	1,129	-1,126	6,635	1,212	-0,315	-1,590	3,129	0,647	0,204	-1,444	0,000 ²
Resource	0,062	-2,106	3,797	1,282	-0,017	-2,166	3,143	0,910	0,222	-0,079	n.s. ²
Involvement in decision-making:											
Design	0,836	0,25	1,00	0,198	0,562	0,20	1,00	0,275	0,046	-0,274	0,000 ²
Implementation	0,796	0,25	1,00	0,203	0,605	0,17	1,00	0,270	0,043	-0,192	0,000 ²
<u>Effective Participation:</u>											
Influence:											
Design	0,907	0,33	1	0,1607	0,389	0,00	1	0,359	0,040	-0,518	0,000 ²
Implementation	0,679	0,00	1	0,2743	0,573	0,00	1	0,346	0,053	-0,106	n.s. ²
Goal attainment	3,39	0	5	0,377	2,26	0	5	0,219	0,486	-0,129	n.s. ¹
¹ T-test ² Welch ³ two-tailed											

Bases of Power and effective Participation

Table 3.3: Correlation matrix: Whole sample

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<u>Resources:</u>								
1. Resources (unweighted)	--							
2. Relational	,619**	--						
3. Administrative	,497**	,000	--					
4. Authority	,457**	,000	,000	--				
5. Production means	,532**	,095	,272**	,089	--			
6. Manpower	,566**	,223**	,141	,069	,578**	--		
7. Local knowledge	,427**	,163*	-,018	-,069	,137	,351**	--	
8. Beneficiaries	,325**	,004	-,013	,142	,093	,305**	,479**	--
9. Resource utility	,724**	,362**	,547**	,322**	,318**	,577**	,496**	,459**
<u>Positions:</u>								
Involvement in interactions:								
10. Control	,169*	,100	,297*	,098	,035	-,147	-,041	-,149*
11. Resources	,019	-,021	-,071	-,026	,134	,175*	,217*	,215
Involvement in decision making:								
12. Design ¹	,148	,139	,172*	-,021	,093	,038	,029	-,103
13. Implementation ¹	,197	,105	,180*	-,015	,129	,122	,125	-,015
<u>Effective Participation:</u>								
Influence:								
14. Design	,273**	,114	,298**	,089	,038	,032	,100	,059
15. Implementation	,215**	,047	,095	,009	,250*	,266**	,239**	,169
16. Goal attainment	,156	,212*	,134	-,035	,001	,134	,171*	,140

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
<u>Resources:</u>							
1. Resources (unweighted)							
2. Relational							
3. Administrative							
4. Authority							
5. Production means							
6. Manpower							
7. Local knowledge							
8. Beneficiaries							
9. Resource Utility	--						
<u>Positions:</u>							
Involvement in interactions:							
10. Control	,200**	--					
11. Resources	,233**	,597**	--				
Involvement in decision making:							
12. Design ¹	,168	,167	,260	--			
13. Implementation ¹	,285**	,323**	,266**	,365**	--		
<u>Effective Participation:</u>							
Influence:							
14. Design	,408**	,306**	,266**	,365**	,356**	--	
15. Implementation	,261**	,308**	,417**	,479**	,336**	,415**	--
16. Goal attainment:	,174*	,122	,119	-,012	,116	,095	,090

*: significant at the 10% level

** : significant at the 5% level

***: significant at the 1% level

The descriptive statistics and mean comparisons between the intermediary and partner organisations show that the two groups significantly differ in the kinds of resources they potentially contribute and the activities they are involved. No significant differences were found with respect to the *unweighted score* and the *resource utility score*, and the level of influence on decisions about the implementation of partnerships and the level of goal attainment. One initial implication for the testing of our hypotheses is that intermediary organisations in partnerships are powerful in the sense that decision making, at least about the design of partnerships, seems to be to a large extent in their hands. Since the design of partnership entails i.e. the selection of partners and resource allocations, the eminent role of intermediaries in these decisions seems to indicate that the translation of resources into favourable positions, is subject to administrative decision-making rather than to horizontal, “functionally induced” dependencies (Huang & Provan, 2006).

The first two hypotheses posited that the resources an organisation can potentially contribute to a partnership confer power through the dependencies created for other organisations and/or the fulfilment of the partnership task. The bivariate results show that the partnership specific measure of resource utility displays a stronger correlation with the positional measures and effective participation than the *unweighted resource score*. Significant are those differences for centrality in the control-related activities ($\alpha = 5\%$, $z = 2,643$) and influence on the design of partnerships ($\alpha = 5\%$, $z = -2,583$). These findings demonstrate the more accurate data obtained from the partnership-specific perceptual measures and suggest resources to relate to advantageous positions and effective participation. The means comparisons show that intermediary organisations contribute the very resources that strongly correlate with the *utility measure* in the bivariate analysis. Both, their advantageous position as well as their resources hence, seem to strengthen the power of intermediary organisations relative to that of partners. Despite the difference in the nature of the resources potentially contributed by intermediary and partner organisations, their weighted *resource utility scores* do not significantly differ. Looking at the correlations between the resources and the utility score it appears that administrative resources, local knowledge, the representation of beneficiaries and manpower more strongly relate to the utility score than to the unweighted resource score. These resources and the partners who can access or control them hence, seem to benefit most from partnership-specific utility perceptions. Yet, only administrative resources, manpower and local knowledge at the same time show a direct significant positive relation to the *positional measures* and effective participation. In contrast, the representation of beneficiaries relates to none of the *positional measures* or to effective participation. Hence, this resource not only benefits from being perceived as valuable but also seems to most strongly depend on such a perception. Relational resources, authority, and production means display stronger correlations with the *unweighted resource score* than with the *utility score* and none of them directly relates to

one of the *positional measures* but yet to effective participation. The effect of these resources on effective participation, thus, seems relative invariant to utility perceptions and the need for enactment.

In summary, the utility ascribed to resources seem to mediate the power of partners. However, different resources seem to relate to different degrees to favourable positions and effective participation. The potential of partners to capitalise on the utility of their resources in predominantly administrative decision-making contexts of the partnerships under study will be analysed in the following. To test our first two hypotheses, the direct effects of the *unweighted* and the *weighted resource utility scores* on all other variables were tested for only the partner organisations. This was done to control for the interaction between the resources and advantageous position induced by the intermediary organisations. Because the sample consisted of only 38 intermediary compared to 137 partner organisations, it was not possible to test these assumptions on two equally sized groups. Table 3.4 displays the direct effects of the *unweighted resource scores*.

The results of the multivariate analysis for only the partner organisations give a different picture of the relationship between resources and the *positional and effectiveness measures*, compared to the *bivariate results* including the intermediary organisations. None of the resources shows a direct significant effect on involvement in the decision-making processes but on favourable positions in the interactions among partners and on direct influence on decisions related to both, the design and the implementation of partnerships. While this does not mean that partners are not involved in decision-making processes, their resources show almost no discriminating effect. Administrative resources, authority and local knowledge show a slightly positive effect on involvement in the design of partnerships, and local knowledge and production means on involvement in decisions about the implementation of partnerships. The discriminating effect of the other resources on influence on these decisions seems to be indirect, that is without showing an equally strongly discriminating effect on involvement. For example, manpower shows no effect on involvement but on influence in the decisions about the implementation of partnerships. While the effects of relational resources, authority, and production means appear relative invariant to utility perceptions, those seem to explain the direct effects of the other resources. Thus, it was chosen to more rigorously test the mechanism that underlies these observed relationships via the inclusion of resource utility as the mediator variable²⁶. Mediating models are tested for an effect of resource utility on each of the nine direct significant effects of the utility dependent resources (Table 3.5).

²⁶ For an overview of further testing strategies applied to latent constructs See Baron and Kenny's (1996) seminal work on the conceptual distinction between mediator and moderator effects.

Table 3.4: Multiple regression results and zero-order correlations of positional measures and effective participation on all resources (*only partners*)

		Independent variables: Resources								
		Relational	Administrative	Authority	Production means	Manpower	Local knowledge	Beneficiaries	R	Adjusted R ²
<u>Resource utility:</u>	beta	<u>.078</u>	<u>.496***</u>	<u>.105</u>	.083	<u>.357***</u>	<u>.242***</u>	<u>.214**</u>	.816***	.648
	R	.214	.560***	.102	.389	.566***	.409***	.305		
<u>Positions:</u>										
Involvement in interactions:										
Control	beta	<u>.061</u>	<u>.212***</u>	<u>.100</u>	<u>.171</u>	-.138	<u>.330***</u>	-.270***	.386***	.102
	R	.046	.134	-.009	-.131	-.134	.129***	-.131***		
Resources	beta	-.105	-.119	-.056	-.162	<u>.325***</u>	<u>.052</u>	<u>.197**</u>	.415***	.127
	R	-.010	-.107	-.042	-.020	.246***	.240	.307**		
Involvement in decision-making:										
Design	beta	<u>.061</u>	<u>.235</u>	<u>.226</u>	<u>.013</u>	<u>.013</u>	<u>.215</u>	-.107	.342	.017
	R	.148	.242	.220	.096	.103	.216	.025		
Implementation	beta	<u>.052</u>	<u>.125</u>	-.092	<u>.129</u>	<u>.015</u>	<u>.175</u>	<u>.036</u>	.283	.009
	R	.132	.105	-.103	.165	.174	.195	.066		
<u>Effective Participation:</u>										
Influence:										
Design	beta	<u>.002</u>	<u>.289*</u>	<u>.038</u>	<u>.071</u>	-.028	<u>.239*</u>	<u>.004</u>	.306*	.042
	R	.038	.227*	.019	.118	.138	.270*	.196		
Implementation	beta	-.024	-.047	-.065	<u>.116</u>	<u>.221*</u>	<u>.189*</u>	<u>.006</u>	.408***	.119
	R	.098	.052	-.068	.243	.342*	.297*	-.002		
Goal attainment	beta	<u>.106*</u>	.204	-.053	.155	.108	.216	.027		
	R	.136*	.208	.027	.101	.090	.201	.102		
* Underlined betas are in the hypothesised direction * significant at the 10% level ** significant at the 5% level *** significant at the 1% level										

Table 3.5: Mediating effect of resource-utility perception on the direct relationship between resources and positions and effective participation (*only partners*)

Independent variable	Dependent variable	Effect	beta	s.e.	Sobel Z
Administrative resources	Control	XM	3,538	,450	0,288
		XMY	,185	,641	
Administrative resources	Influence: Design	XM	3,538	,450	0,876
		XMY	,304	,345	
Manpower	Resources	XM	2,935	,368	0,258
		XMY	,231	,892	
Manpower	Influence: Implementation	XM	2,935	,368	1,079
		XMY	,356	,326	
Local knowledge	Control	XY	2,425	,465	0,267
		XMY	,172	,642	
Local knowledge	Influence: Design	XM	2,989	0,235	<u>2,077</u>
		XMY	0,398	0,189	
Local knowledge	Influence: Implementation	XM	2,425	,465	<u>1,964</u>
		XMY	,448	,211	
Representation of beneficiaries	Resources	XM	2,395	,522	0,314
		XMY	,332	,329	
___ significant at the 5 % level (Sobel, 1982)					

The findings show that their utility, only significantly mediates the direct effect of the resources of local knowledge on influence in the design and the implementation of partnerships. The other direct resource effects remain significant with only marginal mediating effects.

In summary, we can confirm our first two hypotheses. The extent to which partners are perceived to potentially have access to and control valuable resources has a positive effect on their power in partnerships. However, this effect holds only for some and not all resources and seems to follow different patterns. The utility attributed to the resources of partners was found to mediate their power, but only for some resources and not with regard to their involvement in the decision-making processes.

While previous work found similar relations and discriminative effects of resources and involvement in the interactions between partners (Huang & Provan, 2006), further inquiry is needed to explain why no significant impact was found on the involvement of partners in decision-making processes. One explanation might be that utility perceptions are only one-sided. This could mean that partners who potentially access useful resources recognise them as such, whereas this perception is not shared by those who are in the position to involve them. It could also mean that although the utility of the resources of partners is acknowledged by others, the partners themselves do not share this perception. Since data was obtained from both sides, from the partners and the intermediary organisations in each of the partnerships, the average weights given to each

resource by the partners and by the intermediary organisations were compared through a paired sample test.

Table 3.6: Paired samples test of resource utility assessments by partners and intermediaries

	Partners	Intermediaries
Resource	Rank	Rank
Financial means	3	6
Production means	2	9
Manpower	<u>1</u>	8
Coercive power	<u>18</u>	16
Licensing power	13	17
Reputation/reach	17	14
Beneficiaries	15	2
Regional/local knowledge	4	7
Administrative capacities	8	5
Negotiation skills	6	12
Project management experience	11	3
Relation to decision-makers	12	10
Relation to committees	10	13
Relations to the public/media	14	15
Personal relations to partners	7	4
Political support	5	11
Regional knowledge	9	<u>1</u>
Ownership of licenses/patents	4	<u>18</u>
R	,187	
T	-17,118	
Significance	,000	

The *utility scores* ascribed to the resources significantly differ across the two groups. Intermediary organisations ascribe significantly higher utility to local resources and in particular to local knowledge and the representation of beneficiaries than partners do. Partners instead assign equally high levels of utility to the resources potentially provided by the intermediary organisations, but not in particular to their own resources and/or those valued highly by the intermediary organisations. This finding might explain why confirmation exists of a direct effect of resources on the level of influence of partners, but not on involvement. On the one hand, one could argue that resources can only confer power when they are perceived as such by those who can potentially enact them and demand to be involved in decision-making processes. On the other hand, one might apply a path-dependence argument and state that only when partners have experienced that their resources grant them favourable positions and control, do they recognise them as such in the future.

From the testing of the first hypotheses, it became clear that partners can be influential on the decisions about partnership design and implementation, although their resources show no discriminating effect on the participation in the decision-making processes. Intermediary organisations instead, display high levels of involvement in decision-making processes but not always equally high levels of influence, in particular, not on decisions related to the implementation of partnerships. These findings strongly support a distinction between potential (preconditions) and enacted power and influence and/or goal attainment (Provan, 1980), and directly refer to our last two hypotheses about the interaction between resources and positions in their potential to impact on the effective participation of partners. To test these hypotheses the partner organisations were divided into groups on two counts: Firstly, according to their resource-related potential power, and secondly, with respect to their position, that is their involvement in the decision-making processes of partnerships.

The third hypothesis states that resources can convey power only if the organisations that can access them are in a position to enact them. We already know, however, that some resources confer influence to partners without their involvement in the decision-making process. The question then becomes if involvement in partnership-related interactions and decision-making processes can still increase the chances for effective participation of partners. Following our hypothesis, the four *positional measures* should have a strong impact on the level of influence and the extent to which an organisation can attain its individual goals. To test this assumption, the weighted *resource utility scores* of all participants were normalised for each partnership and all partners were divided into two groups, with low and high potential resource power, respectively. The indicators for effective participation were regressed on the *positional measures* for each group separately. The unstandardised *regression coefficients* were compared across the two groups (Blalock, 1965).

The findings displayed in Table 3.7, show that the *positional measures* significantly increase the chances for effective participation for both groups. However, advantageous positions seem to increase effective participation in partnerships, in particular for resource-wise less powerful groups. This is most likely because resource powerful partners already show high levels of influence and/or goal attainment, since their resources are acknowledged already. Resource-wise less powerful partners instead may increase the chances for their resources to be acknowledged by interaction and involvement in partnering processes. Specifically, a central position in the control-related activities and involvement in the design of partnerships significantly increase the effectiveness of participation of resource-wise less powerful organisations. Resource-wise powerful organisations seem to benefit from a central position in the resource-related activities and in the implementation of partnerships, in which potentially less powerful organisations seem to hold already comparatively strong positions.

Table 3.7: Cross-sub-sample comparisons of regressions of effective participation on positions, between partners with high versus low resource power

		Low potential power			High potential power		
		N=72			N=64		
		Influence: Design	Influence: Implementation	Goal attainment	Influence: Design	Influence: Implementation	Goal attainment
<u>Positions:</u>							
Control	/3	0,072	0,009	<u>0,813</u>	0,053	-0,051	<u>-0,340</u>
	b	0,110	0,014	0,159	0,118	-0,127	-0,076
	s.e.	0,077	0,075	0,401	0,061	0,050	0,443
Resources	/3	0,014	0,113	0,222	-0,069	0,104	0,126
	b	0,032	0,260**	0,060	-0,196	0,335**	0,034
	s.e.	0,055	0,054	0,479	0,055	0,041	0,537
Involvement: Design	/3	<u>0,269</u>	<u>0,167</u>	1,512	<u>0,146</u>	<u>-0,022</u>	1,218
	b	0,386***	0,240**	0,288**	0,187	-0,031	0,147
	s.e.	0,081	0,079	0,649	0,114	0,092	1,204
Involvement: Implementation	/3	0,147	0,179	1,246	0,198	0,229	1,354
	b	0,189	0,229*	0,189	0,192	0,251*	0,108
	s.e.	0,101	0,099	0,867	0,161	0,131	1,894
R		0,514***	0,536***	0,438**	0,336	0,500**	0,219
Adjusted R2		0,264	0,288	0,192	0,113	0,250	0,048
s.e.		0,308	0,308	2,459	0,353	0,287	3,707
* significant at the 10% level ** significant at the 5% level *** significant at the 1% level ____ Indicates significant differences (p < .05) between parallel coefficients in the two sub-samples (Blalock, 1965)							

Bases of Power and effective Participation

The last hypothesis states that advantageous positions in partnerships result only in effective participation if partners access the decisive resources to substantiate their position (Jacobson & Cohen, 1986). To test this assumption, all partner organisations were again divided into two groups according to their involvement in the decision-making processes of partnerships. This time all weighted resources were regressed on effective participation, for both groups, involved and not involved.

Table 3.8: Cross-sub-sample comparisons of regressions of effective participation on potential resource power, between partners with and without positional power

		Not involved N= 59	Involved N=70	Not involved N=31	Involved N=89
		Influence: Design		Influence: Implementation	
Relational resources	/3	<u>,109*</u>	<u>-,024</u>	,007	-,016
	b	,289*	-,076	,024	-,046
	s.e.	,040	,059	,067	,035
Administrative resources	/3	,065	,072	,099	-,037
	b	,177	,221	,265	-,124
	s.e.	,071	,049	,122	,038
Authority	/3	,052	,028	-,071	,015
	b	,139	,084	-,185	,049
	s.e.	,058	,042	,088	,032
Manpower	/3	<u>-,061</u>	<u>,110**</u>	<u>,178**</u>	<u>,009</u>
	b	-,172	,428**	,451**	,038
	s.e.	,062	,052	,067	,039
Production means	/3	<u>-,106</u>	<u>,119**</u>	-,057	,088**
	b	-,260	,477**	-,133	,353**
	s.e.	,080	,042	,111	,033
Local knowledge	/3	<u>,007</u>	<u>,121**</u>	-,021	,114**
	b	,073	,408**	,080	,284**
	s.e.	,052	,012	-,068	,038
Beneficiaries	/3	<u>,010</u>	<u>,170*</u>	-,013	-,014
	b	,027	,207*	-,035	-,046
	s.e.	,058	,052	,092	,038
R		,487*	,493**	,552	,491**
Adjusted R2		,104*	,243**	-,004	,173**
s.e.		,305	,296	,370	,251
* significant at the 10% level ** significant at the 5% level *** significant at the 1% level ____ Indicates significant differences ($p < .05$) between parallel coefficients in the two sub-samples (Blalock, 1965)					

The findings displayed in Table 3.8, indicate that indeed resources have a discriminating effect on the effective participation of those partners involved in the decision-making processes. However, not all resources have this effect. While local knowledge, the representation of beneficiaries and production means show such an effect, when partners are involved administrative resources. Authority and relational resources display no or even slightly negative effects in case of involvement. In addition,

relational resources show a strong positive effect in the case of no involvement in the decisions about design, while manpower displays the same effect on the implementation of partnerships. This finding further supports the initial assumption that so-called “discursive resources” gain weight by interaction and involvement, whereas already “institutionalised” resources remain effective bases of power, regardless of their involvement and enactment in partnering processes.

3.6. Conclusion and discussion

This study set out to examine some of the basic tenets and underlying mechanisms of inter-organisational power in the empirical context of development partnerships. The findings confirm that the two main components of potential power, resources and positions, both represent bases for effective participation in partnerships. At the same time, the findings reveal several limitations to the present understanding of the functioning of bases of power, in particular in their interplay in the specific context of development partnerships.

Following the structure of this chapter, it will first discuss the two main findings presented in the first part of the analysis. The potential of partners to gauge power via their resources turned out to have discriminating effects on their positions in partnership-level interactions and on their effective participation. Yet, no comparable effects were found for their involvement in the decision-making processes; and this despite their acknowledgement as valuable for other partners and/or for the partnership task. Similar to previous studies (Huang & Provan, 2006) the findings indicate that involvement and favourable positions in the interactions between partners partially depend on the kind of resources they bring to a partnership. In the present study, factor analysis showed that partnership-level interactions can be divided. On the one hand, into activities related to resources acquisition, receiving support and advice. On the other hand, into activities aiming at gaining control, while giving resources, support and advice. This finding seems to describe the rather “typical” pattern of interactions between foreign intermediaries and local partners. Yet, central positions in the control-related interactions were not only explained by administrative resources, such as financial means, project management capacities and experience, but also by local knowledge, thus a divide between local and foreign partners with respect to their involvement in control-related activities is not supported.

Seen in the light of the overall population of organisations involved in the study however, it becomes apparent that the initiatives target and attract specific groups of local partners, by being largely directed at co-financing and harnessing private capital for development²⁷. Other local resources, which showed comparably high *utility scores*,

²⁷ See: EUEI (2003) and EUWI (2006)

such as the representation of beneficiaries, displayed a significant negative effect on involvement in the control-related activities and almost no effect on involvement and influence on the decisions about neither the design nor the implementation of partnerships. These findings demonstrate that although resources may be recognised and acknowledged as useful and valuable in partnerships, an effective translation into positions and effective participation does not come true for all resources, e.g. beneficiary representation. Since knowledge exchange and capacity building of recipients are seen as decisive for partnership effectiveness when such groups are involved (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Brown & Ashman, 1996; Derkzen & Bock, 2007; Thomas, 1996), the findings lead to the question where governance interventions may best address the functioning of bases of power of such groups in development partnerships.

The second part of this study hypothesised the possible effects of governance interventions on the effective participation of partners through the interplay between the two components of potential power, resources and positions. Controlling for the resource-related potential power of partners, the findings showed that involvement in partnership processes indeed increases the chances for effective participation, in particular for resource-wise less powerful partners. This finding indicates that in the case of a lack of resource knowledge and institutionalisation (Entwistle et al., 2007) amplified interactions and involvement in partnering processes, in particular in the control-related activities and in the decisions about the design of partnerships can increase the chances for effective participation. On the contrary, when controlling for actual involvement, it was demonstrated that resources, which most strongly depend on their perception as valuable do not automatically lead to advantageous positions and effective participation but benefit most from their involvement and probably enactment in decision-making processes.

The implications for governance interventions aiming at creating the conditions for effective partnerships are twofold. First, contrary to what was expected based on the findings about broad but ineffective participation, the present findings show that once partners get involved in decision making processes, less institutionalised resources can be successfully enacted and show a discriminating effect on effective participation. Second, since involvement and favourable positions do not automatically evolve from valuable resources, addressing this issue by governance interventions that enable broader and systematic involvement in particular in decisive processes, such as control-related activities and decision-making about the initial design of partnerships, can be seen as an adequate governance response. More generally, such a response represents an important contribution to an institutionalisation of bases of power in diversely resourced partnerships and inter-organisational domains (Gray, Bougon, & Donnellon, 1985). Resources may be seen as valuable. Yet, such perceptions are of only limited use if resources do not function as bases of power and translate into favourable positions for partners to effectively participate in partnerships.

Chapter 4

Governing Development: A qualitative comparative Analysis of the Relationship between Partnership-level Conditions and the Adoption of Governance Forms²⁸

Abstract

In theory, the adoption of certain ways of governing inter-organisational partnerships depends on several factors. For practitioners, past experience, personal preferences and discretion in their decisions may determine this choice. On the other hand, this choice may depend on the conditions practitioners encounter in partnerships, such as its size, the extent to which trust and goals are shared and compatible among participants, and the magnitude of environmental and task-related requirements. In the context of international development cooperation, it is emphasised that challenges that arise from unbalanced power relations and the complexity of a partnering environment require adequate governance responses.

This qualitative-comparative analysis explores the relationship between the presence and absence of these conditions and the governance forms adopted by development partnerships. Going beyond the analysis of single cases, the findings confirm that different partnership-level conditions relate to different governance modes across 38 development partnerships. The combined presence or absence of these conditions mark a distinction in particular with respect to the adoption of shared over brokered governance. Part of the explanation for this distinction can be derived from considerations of effectiveness in the context of international development cooperation, which, at the same time, are reflective of changes in the potential constituencies and actor-configurations in this field of partnership operation today.

²⁸ An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Academy of Management Annual Conference 2010 in Montreal, Canada.

4.1 Introduction

Approximately 18% of the world population have no access to safe drinking water, more than double that figure lack adequate sanitation (Rowan, 2009) and around 1.6 billion people do not have access to electricity with the vast majority of these people living in developing countries (Thirlwall, 2007; UN, 2007). In 2002, at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), governments restated their support for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to halve the number of people lacking access to safe water, adequate sanitation and energy by 2015.

In the past, such large-scale international efforts usually were undertaken by bilateral and multilateral agreements between states (Stewart & Gray, 2006). Yet, since the birth of modern “development management” in the fifties and sixties (cf. Robinson et al., 2000) partnerships between a wide array of organisations, non-governmental, non- and more recently for-profit organisations, from the global South and North, became the prevalent means for implementing development efforts. Nowadays, nearly one third of official development assistance (ODA) is allocated to such partnership initiatives (Rochlin et al., 2008). While the over-arching goals are still being directed by bilateral and multilateral frameworks for cooperation (Dearden & Salama, 2003; Hope, 2003) the implementation of partnerships is set and done on-site by the partners (Mommers & Van Wessel, 2009).

Previous research has demonstrated the challenges that arise from building and sustaining effective partnerships, given on the one hand, the differences between partners in organisational skills, resources, cultures, and agendas (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Fowler, 1998; Mahanty, Yasmi, Guernier, Ukkerman, & Nass, 2009) and on the other hand, the challenges posed by highly uncertain operational environments (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Little is known however, about how partnerships are designed, implemented and governed by practitioners in order to tackle these issues (Bornstein, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2002b). This is partly due to the fact that apart from donor and funding requirements (Abers, 2007) almost no legal imperatives for the governance of partnerships exist (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Yet associated with pronounced pressures to enhance partnership accountability (Rochlin et al., 2008) and effectiveness (Brinkerhoff, 2002a), questions about their governance have increasingly gained attention.

One of the most recent arguments in the public-management literature is that different partnership governance modes vary in the extent to which they represent adequate responses to different partnership conditions (Provan & Kenis, 2008). This preliminary argument of a relationship between governance fit to partnership-level conditions, however, has so far not been applied to partnerships in the context of international development cooperation yet. Since the criteria for defining adequate governance responses, in this area of operation as in any other area, are an evolving subject among practitioners and scholars alike (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Rochlin et al., 2008), the primary

concern of the present study is to explore the relevant conditions that may result in the adoption of a specific governance form. The study seeks to answer the following question: *What are the relevant partnership-level conditions that can explain the adoption of a particular governance forms by development partnerships?*

4.2 Theoretical background

The focus of the present study is on field-level partnerships in international development cooperation. In this context, development partnerships are inter-organisational collaborations, involving all kinds of organisations, from the global North and South, to implement development efforts on the ground²⁹. Development partnerships mostly derive from the initiatives of larger donor and governments (cf. Robinson, Hewitt & Harriss, 2000) aiming to (co-)finance the development initiatives of NGOs, businesses, local or other national governments that seek to jointly address or develop complimentary or shared development goals. Development partnerships typically entail many kinds of partners and address many kinds of issues, ranging from small dyadic projects (e.g. Ashman, 2001a), to large-scale national or cross-border infra-structure projects, involving several public and private parties (Bell & Park, 2006; Carter & Danert, 2003; Gentry & Fernandez, 1998; Maviya & Munyai, 2005; Muller, 2003; Sherwill et al., 2007; Suleiman, Van Well, & Gustafsson, 2008). Inherently diverse in the issues addressed and the actors involved, partnerships in international development cooperation nonetheless share some common characteristics and challenges to effective collaboration that require adequate governance responses as in any other area of partnership operation, such as the co-existence of different individual-organisational and over-arching development goals, interests and resources (e.g. Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Hence, the concepts operationalised in this study are drawn from two bodies of literature. Firstly, there is the governance of collaborations, partnerships and networks (Gray, 1989; Gray & Wood, 1991; Huang & Provan, 2007; Jones et al., 1997; Kickert et al., 1997a; Provan et al., 1980; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Raab & Kenis, 2009). The second is specifically on international development cooperation (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2006; Cooke, 2003; Cooke, 2004; Thomas, 2007)³⁰ and the governance and management of partnerships therein (Ashman, 2001a, b; Awortwi, 2004; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 1999; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002a; Dolan & Opondo, 2005; Johnson & Wilson, 2006; Morse & McNamara, 2006; Patel, 2001).

²⁹ Distinct to multilateral and bilateral partnership agreements (e.g.. EPAs).

³⁰ All four facets of development management as ‘means to institutional agendas’, ‘toolkit’, ‘process’ and ‘values’ (cf. Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2005) are acknowledged and incorporated where possible in the conceptual thinking of this dissertation.

Partnership governance

The concept of partnership governance is used in many different ways including informal and formal rules, agreements, structures and norms as well as leadership-styles and interventions (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Armistead et al., 2007). Following Simon's (1946) plea for an empirical approach rather than using pre-defined typologies and classifications, the combination of two, a structural-analytical (see for instance: Jones et al., 1997) and a governance perspective (Ansell & Gash, 2007), as proposed by Provan and Kenis (2008), was found to be the most coherent way of accessing the concept. The latter perspective draws attention to different leadership styles and interventions in the design and implementation of partnerships (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001a; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Ashman, 2000; Bryson & Crosby, 2005; Derkzen et al., 2008). The former perspective offers the incorporation of structural partnership-level characteristics as analytical devices which can be utilised to evaluate variation in the structures that underlie partnership interactions and decision-making processes (Milward & Provan, 1995). In combination, both perspectives can systematically be employed for a comprehensive evaluation of different governance modes and to explore their adoption in the presence of different partnership-level conditions.

Proceeding from this combined approach, Provan and Kenis (2008) distinguish three "ideal" forms of partnership governance; shared governance, a lead-organisation model and the NAO form along the two dimensions. First, the structural dimension indicates the level of brokerage as the extent to which decision-making, coordination, interactions and control are shared/decentralised and or centralised/concentrated among partners. Second, the governance dimension encompasses several interventions on behalf of practitioners, for example, whether the partnership is participant governed by one of the direct partners or externally governed by an extra organisational entity or partnership brokers that are specifically assigned with the governance task (Warner, 2003). While shared and lead-organisation governance can be regarded as the two extremes of the structural dimension (cf. Figure 4.1), the NAO form introduces several governance interventions that may supplement and/or explain the occurrence of structural relations in partnerships.

Governance structures

Shared governance is described as the collective of partners themselves governing the partnership and its external representation, with no distinct governing body or brokering staff involved. Although some activities may be performed by only some members, decision-making power is more or less balanced among the majority of partners. Lead-organization governed partnerships instead, show asymmetric internal governance relations (cf. Figure 4.1). Main activities are coordinated and decided by one or only a few leading organisation(s) who administer the partnership's operations and facilitate the collaborative process towards the partnership's goals that ergo are often closely linked to

their own organisational goals (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The lead-organisation's responsibilities may include budget raising and administration and taking responsibility for liabilities towards external donors (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Lead organisations may be selected by partners or mandated by these external instances.

In theory, shared governance is most strongly promoted by development scholars and practitioners alike (Fowler, 1998). On the one hand, since shared governance reflects upon values of equality in partnerships (Thomas, 2007). On the other hand, because shared governance is seen as an effective catalyst for capacity building (James, 2001), knowledge transfer (Johnson & Wilson, 2006) and therefore argued to increase ownership among partners and the sustainability of outcomes (Abers, 2007; Brown & Ashman, 1996; Craig & Mayo, 1995). Yet, albeit an intrinsic theoretical value ascribed to this governance form, in particular in development (Finsterbusch & Van Wicklin II, 1987), its core principles may in practice run counter to control-oriented, effectiveness and not-least efficiency considerations (Ingle & Shpresa, 2007). The lead organisation governance model instead frequently evolves directly from funding requirements or from the bottleneck function of intermediary organisations that channel funds from donors to recipients through partnerships (Sanyal, 2006). Although such clearly contoured funding and control relations to only one or a few organisations are desirable for donors, questions arise about how lead organisations share power and control and facilitate capacity-building and exchange among partners (Brinkerhoff, 1999).




Figure 4.1: Shared versus lead-organisation governance³¹

Governance interventions

The first two forms, shared and lead-organisation governance describe two extremes of the structural dimension. The third, the NAO form of governance instead, posits some interventions that directly target the design and herewith the development of those underlying relational structures of partnerships. This form is characterised by a network

³¹ Adapted from Kenis & Provan (2008)

administrative organisation (NAO) that is an entity specifically assigned with or set up for the purpose of governing the partnership. A NAO may be a separate organisational body or just one or a few partnership-brokers (Rondinelli & London, 2003; Warner, 2003). All partnership-level operations and decisions are centralised around this entity, supplemented by reciprocal monitoring structures, for example, with respect to partnership-level strategic as opposed to operational decisions, which are left to the NAO (Provan & Kenis, 2008). In contrast to the first two governance forms hence, the NAO form introduces several interventions into the conceptual framework, e.g. a separation of operative from strategic partnership-level decisions, a centralisation of the management and coordination of external partnership representation and relationships and a supplementation of the governing entity by reciprocal control structures. In a development context, such external governance bodies are often established by donors or governments for the purpose of coordinating numbers of or larger sized partnership initiatives (Abers, 2007), for example, for sector-wide aid programming and integration (e.g. Bornstein, 2003; Mommers & Van Wessel, 2009).

Yet, while the interventions introduced by the NAO governance form in Provan & Kenis' (2008) framework put a strong focus on control-related measures, development scholars emphasise the need for "enabling" interventions aiming at relationship and trust-building in partnerships (e.g. Ashman, 2000), through e.g. learning, knowledge transfer and capacity building (Jakimow, 2008; Johnson, 2007; Johnson & Wilson, 2006; Marra, 2004; Porter, 2003). Those kinds of interventions have largely been neglected by public-administrative models of partnership governance (Bryson et al., 2006) but have received a great deal of attention as a governance response in the development literature (Hastings, 1999), in particular in the face of often vast differences in power between partners (e.g. Ashman, 2000).

Yet, the structural forms and interventions described in the above merely represent "ideal" type of governance responses, which can be adopted in practise, alone or in combination for a variety of reasons. Without knowing the specific situation that practitioners will encounter in a partnership, no single model can be regarded as the ultimate choice (Provan & Kenis, 2008). However, partnership design and implementation frequently are pursued at some degree of discretion by development practitioners (cf. Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Rochlin et al., 2008) who may base their choice for a specific governance form or intervention on their experience and their evaluation of the presence or absence of certain partnership-level conditions.

Partnership-level conditions

A multitude of factors have been proposed in the literature to potentially influence the adoption of governance modes by practitioners within the realm of recommendations for 'best partnership practice' (Rochlin et al., 2008). Yet, comparative data across a number of partnerships are mostly compiled by larger donor agencies and governments looking

at favourable factors of what Brinkerhoff (2002a) calls the ‘indirect partnering environment’, such as the choice for recipient countries (Collier & Dollar, 2004) on the basis of their economic, political and socio-cultural stability and relation to donors’ interests (Migdal, 1988). Rarely however, such data comes under scrutiny for systematic scholarly assessment (Selsky & Parker, 2005) of the influence factors that reside at the inter-organisational-level and may inform the governance of inter-organisational relations (Brinkerhoff, 2002b).

A multitude of potential influence factors can be generated from the literature (for an overview see: Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Provan and Kenis (2008) establish such linkages for four conditions: partnership size, trust, goal compatibility and consensus and the need for partnership-level competencies. Development scholars identify, in particular, differences in power between partners (Ashman, 2000; Thomas, 1998) as an internal factor and the complexity of the operational environments of partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2002) as external challenges that require adequate governance responses. On this basis, the conditions examined in the present study are presented and their theoretical linkages to the governance forms and interventions are explored.

Size

Even though myriads of potential development partners, such as international agencies, local and foreign NGOs, community organisations, private and state-owned providers and public agencies, result in high levels of complexity characterising even smaller or dyadic partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Eweje, 2007; Ashman, 2001a; Ashman, 2001b), this further increases by the number of partners involved (Faerman, McCaffrey & Van Slyke, 2001). At a certain size, face-to-face contacts become less feasible, in particular in international development cooperation, where partners are geographically widely spread and shared decision-making and horizontal interactions result in high transaction costs and partnership inefficiency (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Hence, the more general argument in the literature is made in favour of the adoption of brokered governance forms when size, organisational diversity and geographic diversification, increase complexity and at the same time decrease the chances for horizontal coordination (Faerman, McCaffrey & Van Slyke, 2001).

Trust

The relational concept of inter-organisational trust (cf. Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998) has so far mainly been applied to the dyadic level (e.g. Gulati & Nickerson, 2008) where high levels of trust imply that not all partners trust all other partners but those with whom they share previous partnering experience (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Conceptualised at the partnership-level, Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that if trust is found pervasive throughout a partnership, shared governance will be chosen, since autonomous governance forms are more likely to emerge from voluntary commitments

(Rondinelli, 2003) and shared collaborative pasts (Gulati, 1998; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008). In addition, it is argued that shared governed partnerships are less formalised through control structures compared to brokered ones (Milward, Provan, Fish, Isett, & Huang, 2009). Control structures may function as a substitute for low or fragmented trust in partnerships (Reed, 2001). Yet, if trust is present, they may be considered unnecessary (Tomlinson, 2005).

Goal agreement

The extent to which goals are compatible among partners and with the overall objective of a partnership is crucial for the definition of a partnership's governance task (Nijhof, de Bruijn, & Honders, 2008; Provan et al., 2004a; Provan, Veazi, Teufel-Shone, & Huddleston, 2004b). Partnering processes are more easily coordinated and governed and partners are more likely to be involved and committed when there is a general agreement on the goals of the collaborative endeavour (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Yet, development partnerships are often sites of contestation and resistance (Bornstein, 2003) characterised by differences in values and involving deeply held beliefs (Thomas, 2007). Hence, even when organisations work on the same issue partners may disagree not only over how to best pursue the partnership's objectives, but also more fundamentally, over how these objectives are precisely understood and defined to function as "resources for collective action" (Gray et al., 1985:85). The extent to which a partnership builds on an alignment of interests and goals or to which partnership governance needs to facilitate processes of co-definition makes different governance forms more or less suitable. When goals and interests are less clear and there is only little consensus, leadership may be provided by brokered governance rather than by autonomous forms (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Yet, authentic processes of co-defining goals and objectives require mutuality and reciprocal control (Bryson & Crosby, 2005) as proposed by shared governance and the NAO form.

Power

Previous research has shown that there are challenges in building and sustaining development partnerships given differences in, e.g. organisational skills, resources and assets; or what some refer to as power differentials between partners (Fowler, 1998; Lister, 2000; Mahanty et al., 2009; Provan et al., 2004a). Power relations apply and manifest at many different levels and stages of a collaboration (cf. Chapter 2 of this volume) and their governance can take various forms. Scholars distinguish interventions aiming at changing perceptions of mutuality and equality among partners through relationship and trust building from those that address structural barriers to mutuality (Ashman, 2000) through rights-based approaches that grant involvement, voice and control to partners (Bryson & Crosby, 2005; Bryson et al., 2006; Cooke & Kothari, 2002; Craig & Mayo, 1995; Dar & Cooke, 2008; Elbers, 2010; Elbers & Schulpen, 2010; Ingle & Shpresa, 2007). With respect to the two-dimensional governance

conceptualisation of Provan and Kenis (2008) power differences between partners seem to require both, enabling interventions, relationship and trust building and horizontal coordination, mutual decision-making and reciprocal control. Horizontal structures characterise the shared governance model. Yet, to arrive at such structures in the face of power differences mechanism and interventions seem to be required that make power sharing possible in the first place (Bryson & Crosby, 2005, 2006). Such interventions may be more likely be introduced and sustained by a broker or governing instance separate from the direct partners such as proposed by the NAO rather than by the lead governance model.

Need for partnership-level competencies

Apart from the abovementioned internal factors, the nature of the task and its external environment define another essential part of the conditions that need to be considered when designing and implementing a partnership. Previous research highlighted, in particular, the management of external funds as a major source of environmental uncertainty (Milward & Provan, 1995). Proceeding from the argument that in the face of high funding uncertainty, centralised coordination much easier and faster responds to donor requests and pressures, choice may be made for brokered governance rather than shared governance. In particular, when the aim is to create centralised external representation to convey reliability and enhance external perceptions of partnership legitimacy and accountability (Provan & Milward, 2001).

Though frequently desired by governments and donors, especially in the development of sector-wide service structures, research has shown (e.g. Mahanty et al., 2009; Mommers & Van Wessel, 2009) that it is rather difficult to build such legitimate external representation (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004). On the one hand, difficulties can arise from a lack of internal acceptance of a central entity by the partners (Provan & Kenis, 2008). On the other hand, several studies point out factors of the development context that may be 'hostile' rather than conducive to effective partnering (Brinkerhoff, 2002b:25-46), such as a lack of embeddedness of the partnership's objectives into local development agendas (e.g. Ndandiko, 2006), a general absence of strong public and/or private sector institutions (Adams & Hastings, 2001; European Commission, 2002; European Council, 2002), an unsystematic and ad-hoc introduction of partnerships and replacement of existing governance structures (e.g. Bontenbal, 2009; Desai, 1998; Ebrahim, 2004) and resulting uncertain or even hostile rather than cooperative relationships with beneficiary communities (e.g. Franks & Cleaver, 2007). Until a necessary level of legitimacy is established by the partnership or by a central entity representing the partnership, existing relations of individual partners with external stakeholders may be enhanced and strengthened, rather than replaced by a centralised partnership representation (Elliott, 1987).

Two more general arguments can be derived from previous study into the adoption of governance structures and interventions in the face of different partnership conditions (cf. Provan & Kenis, 2008). First, the more challenging the conditions that describe a partnership, for example, when goals are not specified or trust is not widely dispersed, the more likely seems the adoption of brokered instead of shared governance. Second, between brokered governance forms, the NAO model seems more sustainable in face of challenging conditions, since a separate entity or broker provides coordination, decreases the likelihood for conflict between partners and between partnership-level and individual interests and at the same time by supplementing reciprocal control structures increases mutuality and autonomy within the partnership.

These straightforward assumptions however, seem to be challenged by the specific context of partnerships in international development cooperation. On the one hand, by the likely presence of power differentials and the fundamental intricacies of the operating environments of development partnerships, and on the other hand, by the strong emphasis on governance interventions aiming at mutuality through learning, trust and relationship building. A systematic assessment of partnership-level conditions may help gaining a more nuanced understanding of the relevant drivers for the adoption of specific form of partnership governance. Further, it can be assumed that not the presence or absence of only one of the proposed partnership-level conditions or governance structures and interventions alone but their interplay explains the adoption of a specific governance form (Provan & Kenis, 2008). For example, while power imbalances in partnerships may object to the idea of consensus and shared goals, reciprocal control granted to partners may gauge ownership, avoid conflict and merely a directive of objectives (Stewart & Gray, 2006). Alternatively, depending on the issue area what is being attempted by a partnership may not be the subject to overwhelming controversy and power play so that installing a brokering instance (Ashman, 2001a) may be considered unnecessary even between unequal partners (Thomas, 1998). The focus of the present study hence is on the combination of factors that can explain the adoption and choice for a certain partnership governance form over another. To explore and identify these configurations, 38 development partnerships have been analysed via a comparative case analysis. Institutional background on the sample, the data collection and methodology of the study are presented below.

4.3 Methodology

Case comparisons across 38 partnerships were conducted via a comparative qualitative analysis in order to accomplish the goal of the inquiry of the chapter that is, seeking to devise partnership-level explanations of the phenomenon of the adoption of partnership governance forms.

Institutional background

Inter-organizational collaboration receives peculiar attention in contemporary aid policies and practice (Robinson, Hewitt & Harriss, 2000). It has been argued that infrastructure and national and cross-national resource management and service provision, in particular, will increasingly be implemented by inter-organizational development partnerships (Bayliss, 2003; Bell & Park, 2006; Sherwill et al., 2007; Suleiman et al., 2008). The EU, collectively, the world's largest provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA) (i.e. Rowan, 2009), states that while for some funds mandatory, generally, "[F]orming strategic partnerships is recommended as a first and key step in ensuring innovative and effective project design and implementation" (EUWI, 2006:1).

In 2005, the EU committed itself to doubling its current level of ODA by 2010 and spent EUR 6.2 billion on the delivery of development aid. At the same time, the EU and its member states signed the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (OECD, 2005) and endorsed a tripartite development policy, the European Consensus on Development (EU, 2005). In its annual aid strategy, the EU stated its objective to scale up its contribution to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). By 2004, as part of this objective, the allocation of a total amount of € 500 million to an EU Water Facility in the ACP (African-Caribbean-Pacific) region was decided to be financed by the conditional €1 billion from the Ninth European Development Fund (EDF). Via two tender competitive calls for proposals, in 2005 and 2006, this facility co-financed with a total € 420 million, 175 partnerships concerning issues of sustainable water generation, provision, and sanitation. Through the first call³² for another facility, this time dedicated to the development and provision of sustainable energy in the ACP region, in total 75 partnership projects were co-financed by the EU with a total budget of € 220 million in 2005.

The data for this study were drawn from 38 of the partnerships that received financing from the two facilities. We focused on these partnerships for reasons of comparability: Firstly, there is comparability in terms of the issue areas the partnerships operate in, since water, sanitation and energy, all closely relate to service delivery and national and cross-border resource management (Rowan, 2009). Secondly, this way we were able to ensure a main donor design, since "the diversity of partnership approaches is less

³² A new call for proposals was launched by the Energy Facility on the 30th of November 2009.

indicative of the varied developing country contexts than it is of the numerous, often overlapping, and sometimes contradicting donor initiatives promoted” (Brinkerhoff, 2002b: 13). Thirdly, the choice lies with respect to the duration of the partnerships from their inception (2004-2006) to the point of data collection (September 2008-May 2009), since variation can be assumed to affect the adoption of and changes in governance form (Milward et al., 2009). Finally, the choice lies with respect to the organisations involved, since all three calls for proposals were open to foreign as well as ACP local state and non-state actors³³.

Data collection

In order to obtain information with regard to the concepts of partnership conditions and governance, data was collected from 38 development partnerships operating in and across 19 different African and Caribbean countries. All 250 applicant organisations which had successfully applied and were eligible for funds²¹ from the two facilities, the EUWF and the EUEF, were contacted and asked for participation, explaining the purpose and procedure of the study. Forty-nine of those direct implementing partners³⁴ indicated their interest resulting in an initial response rate of almost 20%. These intermediary organisations were asked to provide the contacts of all their local and foreign partner organisations participating in the specific project. The total of 249 organisations were contacted, asked for participation and, if interested, requested to choose between three ways of taking part in this study: i) to complete an online questionnaire which was provided in English and French ii) to receive a printed version of the questionnaire or iii) to indicate a time and date and preferred language for a telephone interview. Questionnaire and interview guidelines were provided for each organisation and each partnership individually. The collection of relational data was required to individualise most of the items. Of further implication from this process is that only those partnerships can be included of which all partners completed the questionnaire or participated in the interviews (Provan et al., 2007). Eventually, such complete data sets were obtained for 38 partnerships, involving in total 175 organisations, which is a sufficient number for the first step towards generalising findings across partnerships (*Ibid.*).

This conservative approach results in the response rate of only 15,2% (of the total number of 250 partnerships that received EU co-financing) for this study, which is not surprising however, in the face of generally low response rates from quantitative studies

³³ For a detailed description of funding requirements and an overview of all selected proposals see for the Energy Facility:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/energy/index_en.htm

and for the Water Facility:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/water/index_en.htm

³⁴ Distinctive from operational partners with no direct funding obligations (Mommers & Van Wessel, 2009)

in a development context (Brunetti et al., 1998; Bulmer & Warwick, 2001; Devereux & Hoddinott, 1992; Warren et al., 2000). Moreover, the extensive reporting requirements of study participants receiving publicly provided funds understandably limited their willingness to get involved in yet another inquiry. A non-response analysis conducted on the base of the data published by the main donor showed no significant selection effects with respect to the region of operations of the partnerships, their budget size, or the regional affiliation and type of the intermediary organisations (see Appendix III for an overview of the results of this analysis).

Multiple sources were employed to gather case information (Yin, 2008). After the first data was collected and analysed, this information was complemented by document studies on the basis of publications and project reports, resulting in a detailed case description for each partnership. When further questions arose, these documents were used to guide follow-up telephone interviews, which were conducted with ten organisations. The vast majority of data, however, originated from the organizational questionnaire and telephone interviews. Originally in English, the items were translated into French and four other languages (Italian, Spanish, Arabic and Amharic) for the telephone interviews.

Measurements

In this study, the concepts of partnership governance and partnership conditions are measured for each partnership through the perspectives of the intermediary and all their partner organisations. Even though the two perspectives may sometimes diverge, by combining both, the aim is to gain a more complete understanding of the proposed conditions and the adoption of governance modes.

The dependent variable: partnership governance

Partnership governance is measured via two components: structures and interventions. Governance structures are evaluated through the network-analytic part of the survey, which is presented and answered by all participants. Those are then supplemented by adding a set of items which are administered only to the intermediary organisations, asking about specific governance interventions, such as, is there one present, the lead and administrative organisation's status, and if support and assistance were given to partners to be able to fully participate in the partnership.

Partnership integration and centralisation. First, the structural governance properties of the partnerships are analysed. For this exercise, two complementary sub-concepts are evaluated based on the network analytic data: partnership integration and centralisation; which are computed, following Milward and Provan (1995), separately for the partnership (integration) and for the most central organisation (centralisation), respectively.

Four partnership-related activities define the relational structures of the partnerships: reporting, resource exchange, advice and support. Egocentric data is gathered by asking about each partner's involvement in these activities with all other partners. The items are formulated two-ways directed, viz. none, giving or receiving, or both. Since the focus is on the most eminent of these subjective and non-contractual relations between partners, only those linkages that are confirmed by the two partners at the sending and receiving end of the linkage are considered (Marsden, 1990). Again, despite the loss of data, this approach is required since no direct observations were obtained (Huang & Provan, 2006).

Partnership integration or *density* measures the overall connectedness among actors in a partnership and *partnership centralisation* measures the extent to which the network is clustered around one or a few actors. Whereas density indicates the extent of involvement among partners, centralisation demonstrates if involvement in the partnership activities is clustered around one or a few partners (Huang & Provan, 2006: 442). Partnership integration is computed by the average mean *organizational link density score*. This is done by dividing the total number of linkages between all partners by the total number of participants. Partnerships with high *density scores* are referred to as integrated (Provan & Milward, 1995). Comparing *density scores* across partnerships, however, is only possible if partnerships are comparable in size. Since the partnerships included in the present study vary in size between 2 and 16 partner organisations, *density measures* are normalised across all partnerships.

Partnership centralization indicates the ratio of the sum of actual differences between the degree centrality of the most central partner and that of all other partners in a partnership and the maximum possible sum of differences in actor degree centrality (Freeman, 1979). *Centralisation scores* vary between $0 < 1$, when all partners have exactly the same centrality indices to one partner being linked to all other partners but no other partner is connected to another.

Decision-making power. The concentration of influence and control is another measure of partnership integration (Milward & Provan, 1995) and is evaluated through the involvement in and the actual influence and control of partners on the decision-making processes of a set of partnership-relevant issues. For each issue³⁵, inquiry is made asking if partners perceived themselves as having been involved and/or influential in the decision-making process and using a complete list of all partners, to select those partners who have had been most influential on its decision. Employing an issue-specific adaptation of Huang and Provan's (2006) *influence measure*, influence refers to the extent to which one partner's views and actions are taken into consideration by its partners. Whereas for involvement, own perceptions are seen as sufficient, only those issues were counted as 'influential' for which influence of the respondent is confirmed

³⁵ A description of the development of this list is provided in Appendix I.

by at least one partner. The data is aggregated and a *percentage measure* is obtained for each respondent from all issues for which involvement and/or influence is indicated relative to the total number of issues. Subsequently, for both *percentage measures*, the most frequently involved and the most influential partner organisation(s) are determined for each partnership and the distribution of involvement and influence among those and the remaining partners (average) were determined (Milward & Provan, 1995).

Influence. A partnership is described as concentrated in influence when the average of the remaining partners show less than half the *influence score* of the most influential organisation.

Control. A partnership is described as concentrated in control when the remaining partners show less than half the perceived *involvement score* of the most frequently involved organisation. While the concentration of influence is taken as an indicator for the distribution of decision-making power in partnerships, involvement in those processes is utilised as a measure for the distribution of control. That is, partnerships with dispersed involvement offer the possibility for control to partners over the decisions made regardless of whether partners eventually are influential (Jacobson & Cohen, 1986).

Governance interventions. In addition to the structural properties of the partnership governance forms, a set of six items is administered to the intermediary organisations. Encompassing questions about the characteristics of and interventions applied in the partnership, the intermediary organisations are asked whether these characteristics (external governance/representation) were present (“yes”/“no”) and interventions (formalisation, goal clarification, conflict mediation, and assistance and support) were applied in the partnership (on a 5-Likert scale, to “strongly agree”). Once the data is collected, the four interventions are factor-analysed (Principal Component Analysis) resulting in each intervention measuring a separate dimension of governance intervention.

The independent variables: partnership-level conditions

The five partnership conditions; size, trust, goal agreement, power and the need for partnership-level competencies are measured as follows:

Size. Myriads of potential partners, such as international agencies, local and foreign NGOs, community organisations, private and state-owned providers, other businesses and governmental agencies, result in high levels of complexity to characterise even smaller or even dyadic development partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Eweje, 2007; Ashman, 2001a; Ashman, 2001b). This factor is constant in the present sample, since all partnerships include foreign and local partners and encompass, grouped with respect to

their organisational type³⁶ and compared for each partnership, more than one and on average three different types of organisations. Hence, the variable size is measured by the number of participants in each partnership.

Trust. Although Provan and Kenis (2008) propose the density of trustful relations as an indicator for trust as a partnership-level condition, density derives from relational data, which is in the present study only applied to the evaluation of governance forms. Instead, trust is measured by four items, which were administered to all participants. The items are taken from the short-form of the OTI (Organisational Trust Inventory, Cummings & Bromirley, 1996 in Nyhan & Marlowe, 1997) and measure perceptions of faith-based and confidence-based trust, respectively³⁷. A factor analysis is conducted to verify the existence of two dimensions as proposed by the original scale. After the factor analysis results in only one dimension of trust measured by the four items in the present study (for the results of this analysis see Table IV.IV of Appendix IV), the average and standard deviation of trust are computed for each partnership.

Goal agreement. Goal agreement is separately measured at the organisational and the partnership level, since both do not have to be identical (Provan & Kenis, 2008), but known to partners (Nijhof, De Bruijn & Honders, 2008), in order to function as devices for collaborative action (Gray et al., 1985). Hence, two items measured on a 5-Likert scale (to “strongly agree”) the perceptions of partners about i) the extent to which the organisational goals and interests of their partners are known to them; and ii) their perception of agreement with their partners on the goals of the partnership. The average level of goal clarification and agreement is computed for each partnership.

Power. The concept of power is measured via two concepts: a perceptual measure of resource-related power differentials and an ‘objective’ measure that indicates the degree of equity financing in a partnership.

Power differential. First, an assessment of the same list of 18 resources³⁸ is conducted at two points in the questionnaire/interview. In the first instance, the respondents are asked to indicate on a five-Likert scale (to “extremely important”) the significance of each resource for their own organisation and/or the accomplishment of the partnership’s task. In the second instance, the same list is presented again but this time the respondents are asked to indicate for their own and each of their partner organisations to what extent the organisation can potentially contribute the listed resources (again on a five-Likert-scale, to “very high potential”). The average of the self-perceived and *others-perceived scores* for each resource represents the *objective resource measure*, specific for each resource and partner. From the first resource assessment, the total sum of the *importance scores*

³⁶ The categories were defined as follows: IOs and foreign national governments, national local governments, regional local government, foreign NGO, foreign energy/water operator, local operator, local NGO, research institute.

³⁷ As in the original scale, all items were measured on a 5-Likert scale (to “strongly agree”)

³⁸ A description of the development of this list is provided in Appendix I.

ascribed to a resource by all partners is divided by the total sum ascribed to all resources in the partnership. This partnership-specific percentage is taken as a weight for the *objective resource scores* and their sum represents the *resource-related power score* of each partner. The standard deviation is computed for each partnership indicating the perceived resource-related power differential.

Equity financing: A second standard deviation is computed among partners based on their financial contribution relative to the total share of the partnership's budget, which is financed internally by the partners themselves (excluding the percentage financed by external donors). This measure is coded reversely to indicate the level of equity financing of a partnership.

The need for partnership-level competencies is measured via two variables: environmental and separately, funding uncertainty.

Environmental uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty, namely uncertainty conveyed by the operational partnering environment, is measured deriving from three aspects: the local political environment, the resource environment and the level of acceptance and support by the targeted group of beneficiaries (five-Likert scale, to "strongly agree"). Since a factor analysis confirms that the three items measure one dimension of uncertainty, the average value is computed for each partnership.

Funding uncertainty. Another aspect of environmental uncertainty is measured separately as the level of funding uncertainty (Milward & Provan, 1995). Based on the publications by the main donor³⁹, funding uncertainty is operationalised via two indicators: the percentage of the total partnership budget financed by external parties and the number of these external funding sources (Milward & Provan, 1995).

Eventually, additional data was gathered. This was information about the type of the partnership following a typology proposed by Rochlin and colleagues (2008) that distinguishes between service-delivery and rules and standards setting partnerships and if participation in the partnership is mandated. Furthermore, the duration of the partnership by the time of the study was obtained and whether the scope of the project is national or cross-national, since trans-boundary resource management is argued to require much stronger political skills and conflict management capabilities (Castro, 2008a; Castro, 2008b; Chen, 2008; Marfo, 2006; Mollinga, N., & Lahiri-Dutt, 2008; Sherwill et al., 2007).

³⁹ For the Energy Facility, see:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/energy/index_en.htm;
for the Water Facility, see:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/water/index_en.htm

4.4 Findings

For all but three standard-setting partnerships, the primary objective was specified as service-delivery. Largely within the timeframe determined by the three calls for proposals of the two facilities (in 2005 and in 2006), the average duration of the 38 partnerships is 42 months from the point of their inception to the time of the data collection (ranging from 15 to 94 months, including two partnerships with a duration of 94 and 81 months). Seven partnerships operate across countries and five partnerships are mandated by donors.

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Min	Max	S.D.	F	%
<u>Partnership governance:</u>						
Interaction:						
Integration	0,5531	0,23	1,00	0,248		
Centralisation ¹	0,4014	0,10	1,00	0,278		
Decision-making power:						
Influence ²	0,523	0,10	1,00	0,240		
Control ²	0,430	0,10	1,00	0,239		
Interventions:						
External governance					9	0,24
Centralised external representation					11	0,29
Formalisation	3,37	0	5	1,076		
Goal clarification	3,66	0	5	0,966		
Conflict mediation	2,71	0	5	1,354		
Assistance and Support	3,79	0	5	0,875		
<u>Partnership conditions:</u>						
Size (MEAN)	4,58	2	16	3,019		
Trust (MEAN)	3,751	2,06	4,75	0,508		
Goal agreement (MEAN)	3,759	2,50	4,83	0,511		
Power:						
Resource differential (S.D.)	4,264	0,08	9,64	1,926		
Equity financing (S.D.)	31,148	0,00	70,71	18,68		
Need for partnership-level competencies:						
Environmental uncertainty	3,158	1	5	1,431		
Funding uncertainty						
% of external funding	0,619	0,05	0,95	0,209		
Nº of funding sources	1,50	1	4	0,862		
¹ This is the <i>in-degree centralisation score</i> ² This is the <i>percentage score</i> of the remaining partners relative to the score of the most frequently involved/influential partner						

Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all concepts and for all partnerships. The descriptive statistics show that *partnership-level structural measures*, such as *integration* and *centralisation* of interactions, are relatively high (Freeman, 1979) partially due to the four dyadic partnerships. The difficulties one encounters by including dyadic partnerships are acknowledged, for example *partnership-level structural measures* such as the network measure of density, differ considerably between dyadic and partnerships of say 16 partners (Scott, 1999). This is, i.e. why the inclusion of dyadic partnerships is not in accordance with the definition of networks, consisting of a minimum of three partners. Yet, the dyadic partnerships are purposefully not excluded, since they represent a common and important part of the reality of partnership practice in development cooperation (Ashman, 2001a; Robinson et al., 2000), in particular between foreign and local partners.

The findings of this study are presented in three steps. First, the different partnership governance forms are identified and the sample is grouped accordingly. Secondly, the findings of the qualitative comparative analysis are presented for each group with respect to the combinations of partnership-level conditions that explain the adoption of one form over another.

Partnership governance

The structural component of the three “ideal” governance forms proposed by Provan and Kenis (2008) serves as the starting point for the identification of governance forms. All partnerships are grouped with respect to their interactions and decision-making structures. The extent to which a governance form is considered shared or centralised/concentrated is decided on the basis of a combined assessment of the distribution of involvement in the interactions between partners and their influence on partnership-level decisions. To give an example, when neither involvement in the interactions of a partnership is de-central (*centralisation score* \Rightarrow 0.50), nor is influence shared among partners (*average score* of influence on partnership-related decisions $<$ 0.50% of the most influential partner), then the partnership is considered centralised and concentrated. These steps result in the identification of four different groups.

Frequency and mean comparisons were conducted to assess differences between the four structural types with respect to the seven governance interventions (see Table 4.2). No significant differences are confirmed to exist between the groups with respect to the first four interventions. Yet, governance interventions aiming at the clarification of goals, tasks and responsibilities, and measures of giving assistance and support to partners are found slightly stronger among the brokered governance forms than the shared governance forms. Surprisingly, the shared form shows almost equally high levels of formalisation as the two brokered forms with centralised activity structures.

Three additional interventions have been evaluated: On the one hand, all intermediary organisations are asked, i) whether the partnership was participant governed or by an

Partnership-level Conditions and the Adoption of Governance Forms

external entity; ii) if the external representation of the partnership was centralised; and in addition, it was evaluated via the data obtained for all partners about their involvement in the partnership-related decision-making processes, iii.) whether control, meaning the involvement of partners in partnership-related decision-making, was concentrated or shared (*average score* of involvement was $>0.50\%$ of the most frequently involved partner). The findings demonstrate significant differences between the four structural governance forms with respect to shared control and a centralised external representation. Whereas, in parts, shared control seems to condition shared influence, the choice for participant versus externally governed partnerships seems to predicate on influences other than structural partnership properties.

Table 4.2: Ranked mean and frequency comparisons between governance forms

	Shared governance	Decentralised interactions/ Concentrated influence	Centralised interactions/ Shared influence	Centralised interactions/ Concentrated influence			
	<i>N</i> =16	<i>N</i> =11	<i>N</i> =7	<i>N</i> =4	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Governance Intervention	Mean Rank	Mean Rank	Mean Rank	Mean Rank			
Formalisation	19,19	14,79	22,32	21,25	2,308	3	0511 ¹
Goal clarification	14,50	20,64	20,22	20,13	0,841	3	0,487 ¹
Conflict mediation	13,09	24,39	22,19	12,76	3,124	3	0,428 ¹
Assistance and support	16,78	21,07	21,05	23,38	2,190	3	0,534 ¹
Shared control	5(6)	1(4)	6(2)	1(1)	10,327	4	0,035** ²
External governance	0(4)	5(2)	3(2)	1(1)	2,353	3	0,502
Centralised external representation	0(5)	5(3)	2(2)	4(1)	11,115	3	0,011** ²
¹ Kruskal-Wallis-Test							
² Fisher's Exact Test: significant at $\alpha=0,05$							

In summary, the four governance forms identified here partly reflect on the three “ideal” types, proposed by Provan & Kenis (2008). Specifically the shared and the centralised form with concentrated influence seem to resemble the shared and the lead-organisation model, respectively. Less clearly assigned are the three governance aspects proposed for the NAO form, viz. central governance by a separate entity that represents the partnership externally and is supplemented by control structures that allow for “representative participation for key strategic issues“ (*Ibid*: 243). Yet, only three cases fully display this combination of criteria. Box 4.1 provides illustration of the four governance forms.

Box 4.1: Case-descriptions of governance forms⁴⁰

Shared governance

Goal: Provision of un-served poor households in five districts with off-grid energy devices

Partners: local research institutes, European and local energy companies

All energy providers, local and European ones, are financially involved in the partnership to almost equal shares. Their individual organisational goals are agreed by contract and resemble the overall goals of the partnership. Involvement of the research institutes is co-financed by external sources to leverage expertise and experience gained from previous off-grid pilot projects in that region, of which companies can make use against payment. Partners decide autonomously yet individual efforts are concerted through contracts and regular meetings.

Decentralised interactions and concentrated influence

Goal: Implementation of small-scale water systems in nine villages and communities in one rural region

Partners: local national and European Ministry of Water and the Environment, Federation of European water companies, European public utility companies, local village councils

Partnership-level decisions are made by the National Directorate of Water in collaboration with the European Federation of companies. While those decisions are reported to the companies, the Federation decides on their behalf. The companies have equal investments in the partnership and organise their operations in accordance with the National Water Directorate via the Federation. Operative decisions are made directly by the companies, who act as liaisons between the partnership and beneficiary communities, thereby providing trainings to local staff to assist, e.g. in the monitoring of services and maintenance of the pipes. The village councils monitor the services and report via external public resource agencies to the Ministry.

Centralised interactions and shared influence

Goal: Provision of portable water to twelve rural communities

Partners: European NGO, local community initiatives, local public users (hospitals, schools, etc.)

Partnership operations centre around the European NGO. Its European office acts as a liaison between donors and the partnership, while the local office governs the partnership onsite. In this role, the local office coordinates the initiatives in each community, moderates interests, organises trainings and workshops for specific user groups and facilitates the exchange and supply of teaching material to schools and hospitals (related to hygiene, sanitation, etc.). All partners and their related sub-initiatives are represented by a spokesperson in regular meetings in which strategic decisions are made. Although operating rather autonomously in each community, all initiative and the European NGO have to report to all other partners during these meetings. Depending on the issues raised, meetings are open to external stakeholders (e.g. local government and manufacturers) and future action plans and initiatives are designed.

Centralised interactions and concentrated influence

Goal: Securing access to safe and portable water for four communities

Partners: European NGO, local NGO

The partnership is funded by the European NGO and implemented onsite by the local NGO, who works together with the communities. The communities themselves are not directly involved in the partnership. That is their representatives are not involved in partnership-level decision making and communication with the European NGO happens via the local NGO. Communication and control between the European and the local NGO is rather one-sided. The local NGO is assigned with the implementation of the partnership but has no influence on the design and broader strategy for implementation (e.g. selection of relevant partners or content of educational material and training), which is stipulated by the European NGO. Reporting and monitoring is equally one-sided and the local NGO and the communities have no information to keep track of funding flow.

⁴⁰ The descriptions derive from the document studies and interviews with the respondents.

Partnership-level Conditions and the Adoption of Governance Forms

Together, the structural characteristics and related interventions of the four governance forms are displayed in Table 4.3. In the following sections, their adoption will be discussed in the light of the presence or absence of the proposed partnership-level conditions.

Table 4.3: Overview of governance forms

		Brokered governance		
	Shared governance	Decentralised interactions/ Concentrated influence	Centralised interactions/ Shared influence	Centralised interactions/ Concentrated influence
Interaction	Decentralised	Decentralised	Centralised	Centralised
Decision-making power	Shared	Concentrated	Shared	Concentrated
Externality of the governing entity	Absent	Frequent	Frequent	Frequent-
Centralised external representation	Absent	Frequent	Frequent	Frequent
Shared control	Frequent	Rare	Frequent	Rare
Formalisation	Moderately high	Moderately low	Moderately high	Moderately high
Goal clarification	Moderately low	Moderately high	Moderately high	Moderately high
Conflict mediation	Moderately low	Moderately high	Moderately high	Moderately low
Assistance and support	Moderately low	Moderately high	Moderately high	Moderately high

Governance forms and partnership-level conditions

The interplay between single and combined partnership-level characteristics and the adoption of one governance form over another are analysed employing the qualitative-comparative approach, first outlined by Charles Ragin in 1987 (cf. Ragin, 1998). QCA applies Boolean logic to analyse the necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome based on set-theoretic relations. For example, all partnerships with large power differentials also display shared governance or all shared governed partnerships show at the same time large power differentials. QCA methodology was chosen for two reasons: On the one hand, because the relatively small number of cases studied here represents only a first step towards the generalisation of findings across cases (Provan et al., 2007) but does not yet permit inference statistical analyses (Lijphart, 1971). On the other hand, theoretically complex configurations of partnership-level conditions rather than single factors are assumed to explain the adoption of one governance form over another (Ragin, 2002). Boolean sets, indicated by the presence or absence of certain conditions in the parallel presence of the four governance forms, require the re-coding of the empirical

indicators for the partnership-level conditions into dichotomous sets (0, 1). Because already the governance forms, to simplify the analysis, are coded dichotomously, the same approach was applied to the partnership-level conditions, as outlined below⁴¹:

Size. There is no fixed threshold for the number of partner organisations that indicates when a partnership is considered large in the sense of increasing the complexity of the governance task. Yet, Provan and Kenis (2008) refer to small-group research (Faerman, McCaffrey & Van Slyke, 2001), when considering partnerships up to six organisations as small. In the present sample, partnerships range in size from dyadic relations to sixteen participant organisations and are divided into two groups: a value of “0” is ascribed to all dyadic and partnerships with up to eight participants and a value of “1.00” to those with more.

Trust. Standard deviation and average level of trust are aggregated for each partnership. Since the distribution of trust is considered as more important for the definition of the governance task than the actual level of trust (Provan & Kenis, 2008), cut-off values are determined at 50% of the sample for each measure. The sample is divided into two groups, as follows: the value “0” (no membership) is ascribed to partnerships with very low and highly centralised trust or high but centralised trust and the value of “1.00” to partnerships with dispersed but low levels of trust or with high and widely distributed trust.

Goal agreement. Goal agreement and individual organisational goal clarification are aggregated and the sample divided into two groups, as described for trust before with a preference given to partnership-level goal agreement rather than goal clarification (*Ibid.*), e.g. the value “1.00” is ascribed to all partnerships with high levels of goal agreement.

Resource-related power differential and equity financing. For the two indicators of power in partnerships, the standard deviation for each partnership is obtained, cut-off values at 50% of the two scores are determined and all partnerships are divided into two groups for the presence and absence of *resource-related power differential* and of *equity financing* (reversely coded), respectively.

⁴¹ The membership values of each case are displayed in Appendix V.

Need for partnership-level competencies. The determinants of a need for partnership-level competencies are coded as follows:

Environmental uncertainty. The *average score* of environmental uncertainty across all partnerships is taken as the threshold and the sample is grouped accordingly.

Funding uncertainty. The two measures of funding uncertainty, the percentage of external funding and the number of sources are regarded as equally important (Provan & Milward; 1995). However, since no partnership is entirely self-financed by only the partners both criteria are aggregated following the same procedure as for trust and goal agreement but giving preference to the number of external funding sources (e.g. Brinkerhoff, 2002b).

Combinatory set-theoretical solutions

Having identified the four governance forms in the above, those are analysed in their relation to the combinations of partnership-level conditions. By the means of a so-called truth-table analysis (Ragin, 2002), an algorithm is employed that obtains a measure of *consistency* in an inductive fashion, based on membership in a combination of conditions equal with membership in one of the governance forms (Ragin, 2006).

For each governance form, the complex and the parsimonious solutions are obtained. The complex solution represents all combinations of conditions that appear in the positive instances of an outcome in the present data. A counterfactual analysis of absent cases, or remainders (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005), is not undertaken. The parsimonious solution displays the combinations of core conditions for an outcome. Most aggregated, the occurrence of more than one parsimonious solution is a strong indicator for the existence of different pathways to arrive at an outcome. Boolean logic implies that the parsimonious solutions are contained in the complex solutions. Differences in the parsimonious solutions and corresponding complex solutions are displayed (cf. Ragin, 2002). An additional benchmark indicates the chances for producing random models, based on the proportion of variables relative to cases (Marx, 2006: 19). *Raw coverage* measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained by each single term of the solution, computed for each term from the membership values by dividing the sum of consistent membership in the solution by the sum of membership in the outcome. *Unique coverage* measures the proportion of membership in the outcome explained solely by each individual solution term (memberships that are not covered by other solution terms). Table 4.4 reports the complex solutions for each governance form by highlighting the parsimonious combinations as core conditions⁴²:

The findings indicate two different pathways to shared governance (see the two columns of model one and two). One pathway shows the combination of core-conditions addressing internal partnership-level characteristics, the presence of equity financing and

⁴² The full truth table for this analysis is displayed in Table VI.I of Appendix V.

Partnership-level Conditions and the Adoption of Governance Forms

trust in combination with the peripheral conditions of the presence of size, but the absence of perceived resource-related power differentials. The second pathway describes the combination of two external conditions, the absence of funding and the presence of environmental uncertainty, in combination with the contributing condition of a presence of power differentials. Trust, in shared governed partnerships seems to be strongly linked to equity financing agreements (Model One). This may be further reasoned in the unlikely parallel presence of equity financing and perceived resource-related power differentials. The finding of the two pathways indicates that both internal and external core contingencies do not have to be present in combination for shared governance to occur.

Table 4.4: Combinatory solutions for each governance form

	Shared governance		All brokered		Decentralised interactions/ Concentrated influence	Centralised interactions/ Shared influence	Centralised interactions/ Concentrated influence
	N = 16		N = 22		N = 11	N = 7	N = 4
	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI	Model VII
Size	●				●		
Equity	●			⊖		⊖	⊖
Trust	●					●	
Goals				●	●	●	●
Power differential	⊖	●		●	⊖	●	●
Environmental uncertainty		●	●		●		⊖
Funding uncertainty		⊖	●		●		●
Probability of random model	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Raw coverage	0,625	0,376	0,817	0,542	0,545	0,571	0,75
Unique coverage	0,625	0,376	0,590	0,591	0,545	0,143	0,75
Consistency	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00
	<p>● = Core causal condition present ● = Contributing to causal condition present</p> <p>⊖ = Core causal condition absent ⊖ = Contributing to causal condition absent</p>						
	<p>> 0 = Models developed on the basis of this specification are valid</p> <p>1<10% = Model-specification will almost always be valid</p> <p>>10<33% = Significant possibility of finding valid model</p> <p>>33% = Models could also be generated ad random</p>						

Two pathways were also identified to explain the presence of brokered governance forms (see columns of Model three and four). One pathway allows for explanation by the parallel presence of the core characteristics of environmental and funding uncertainty, and the second by combining the absence of equity financing with the presence of goal agreement and perceived power differentials. These two pathways are further specified by the three individual brokered models. Brokered partnerships with centralised activity structures display the core contingencies of an absence of equity financing and a parallel presence of goal agreement. Along the group of brokered partnerships with dispersed activity structures showed the combination of the presence of both factors, funding and environmental uncertainty, similar to the first path (Model three) of the “all brokered” models and the second path (model four) of the shared governed form.

4.5 Conclusion and discussion

The findings demonstrate that indeed variation exists among the combinations of partnership-level conditions that describe the adoption of one governance form over another by development practitioners. These differences are most pronounced in the combinatory conditions that describe shared governed compared to brokered partnerships. The interplay between the three instances that are evaluated in this study, governance structures and interventions and the partnership-level conditions, however, suggests a more nuanced picture of governance responses than initially assumed by the conceptual frameworks adapted by this study.

The first assumption that the more complex the situation in a partnership encountered by development practitioners the more likely is the adoption of brokered governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008) is only partly confirmed by the findings of this research. Neither the partnership-level conditions, nor the governance response of shared-compared to brokered governed partnerships can be described as more or less complex. In fact, shared governed partnerships display many of the conditions and interventions that are similarly found for brokered partnerships. On the one hand, shared governed partnerships display conditions that are usually assumed to characterise complex governance tasks. For example: they are relatively large in size and show high levels of external uncertainty, conveyed by their operational environments. On the other hand, shared governance is characterised by interventions similar to those of the brokered models, for example by a comparably high level of formalisation. Both, the conditions encountered and the governance responses of shared-governed and brokered partnerships are not more or less complex but resemble rather different intricacies. In particular, the incorporation of the two conditions of power differentials and the extension of the concept of environmental uncertainty, comprising not only the funding but also the operational partnering environment convey this more nuanced picture.

For the clearly distinct conditions of the parallel presence of trust and equity financing and for the external condition of high levels of uncertainty conveyed by the operational environment, shared governance seems to be a reasonable response. High levels of trust and equity financing convey the picture of inter-organisational relations at eye level with governance interventions asking for equal responsibility and reciprocal control in partnership-level decision-making. Equity financing that is operationalised as a partnership-level condition in the present study, has been discussed as a governance measure that enhances the stability of business alliances (cf. Muthusamy & White, 2006) but not for development partnerships, so far. Partially, this may be reasoned from a traditional view on development partnerships as largely publicly financed principal-agent donor-recipient relations. Yet, the prominence of the combined presence of equity financing and trust and the absence of funding uncertainty of shared governed partnerships in this study, can be seen as an indicator for an increased involvement of financially equally, or at least comparably strong parties (e.g. Dhanarajan, 2007) in development partnerships. Financially strong(er) constituent bases may be a consequence of donor policies utilising partnerships as co-financing instruments through which private capital is leveraged for development (Kolk et al., 2008). Since partnerships among non-traditional development partners may to a lesser extent be able to draw back on long-standing mutual collaborative experiences as sources of trust, the present finding may further signify a need to pay stronger attention to equity financing as a potent governance mechanism for development partnerships in the future.

In contrast to what has been suggested by the literature, shared governed partnerships respond to high levels of environmental uncertainty with a decentralised and not a centralised governance approach (Milward & Provan, 1995; Milward & Provan, 1998; Provan & Kenis, 2008). This discrepancy may be explained by the rather narrow conceptualisation of external uncertainty for partnerships operating within rather uniform contexts, which has been rather narrowly confined to only the funding environment (cf. Milward & Provan, 1995; Provan et al., 2004a; Provan, Nakama, Veazie, Teufel-Shone, & Huddleston, 2003) instead of to the multiple dimensions of the operational environment in a development context. The present findings suggest that interactions with external groups, apart from donors, play an equally important role in defining the governance task of development partnerships. Depending on the contacts of local partners, the adoption of a decentralised approach to the management of external relations to those groups seems to be a reasonable response by development practitioners. Specifically, this is significant in the case of larger partnerships that affect a number of groups larger than those directly involved in the partnership (Lane, 2009), and when partners, such as the energy or water providers in the present study have their own service provision liabilities to their customers (Prasad, 2006; Rowan, 2009; Sherwill et al., 2007). The transfer of those liabilities and responsibilities to the partnership, albeit desired by donors and governments (Suleiman et al., 2008), is

identified as one major challenge faced by partnerships (Provan & Milward, 2001). This is in particular in a development context (Walker, 2009) where partnership practitioners are frequently confronted with rather weak public and/or private sector institutions, which may not provide the institutional environment to absorb the potential risks of partnering (Awortwi, 2004; Ndandiko, 2006).

One essential means to legitimise a partnership and its governing entity in the eyes of its defined constituencies, is to allow for reciprocal control and give partners the opportunity to exert influence on partnership-level decisions (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). However, and in contrast to Provan and Kenis' (2008) conception of the NAO governance form, in only four of the nine and three of the eleven cases, in which partnerships are externally governed and/or external representation was centralised, are control and/or influence shared, respectively. This is surprising, considering the fact that at the same time brokered partnerships most strongly display perceived resource-related power differentials and consequently interventions aiming at giving assistance and support to partners to effectively participate in partnering processes. Yet, at the same time, the majority of brokered partnerships (fourteen out of in total 22 partnerships), most clearly exemplified by the four partnerships of model six, describe relationships in which control was not shared and structural barriers to mutuality continue to persist (cf. Ashman, 2000). Hence, the conclusion can be drawn from the present findings is that the majority of brokered governed partnerships still resemble the more traditional implementation model of development cooperation in which the nature of participation and the allocation of power depends on the courtesy or as Thomas (1996:99) put it, the development perspective of the more powerful partner.

Chapter 5

(When) does Governance matter? An Analysis of the Effects of ‘Governance Fit’ on Partnership Effectiveness

Abstract

It has recently been emphasised that partnership governance enhances the accountability and legitimacy of partnerships. Yet, its impact on partnership performance in face of different partnership-level conditions has not been explicitly addressed. By the means of a comparative case analysis of 38 development partnerships, drawing on development theory and practice and the emerging field of network theory, the effect of governance fit on partnership effectiveness is explored. Looking at those partnering conditions under which different governance modes are effective, three main challenges to effective partnering are specified: the absences of trust and goal agreement and the presence of power resource-related power differentials between partners. Centrally governed partnerships with shared influence and control are identified as most effective under these conditions. The findings are discussed in the light of previous theoretical thinking on partnership governance and effectiveness.

5.1. Introduction

Associated with pronounced pressures for enhancing aid accountability (Rochlin et al., 2008) and impact (Burnside & Dollar, 2004; Collier & Dollar, 2004), increasing the effectiveness of development efforts (Brinkerhoff, 2002b) is regarded a main reason for the ever increasing proportion of development efforts being implemented through inter-organisational partnerships (cf. Robinson et al., 2000). Partnerships, for that matter, promise to provide an effective means of developing strategic direction and coordination at a scale and integration of resources, reach, interests, and services that cannot be provided by any actor alone (Thomas, 2007). Yet, both a blessing and a curse, previous research has identified a multitude of challenges that arise from building and sustaining effective partnerships in the face of such diversity in organisational skills, resources, cultures, and agendas (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Fowler, 1998; Mahanty et al., 2009). Albeit that a similar trend towards partnership can be observed in other issue areas and service spheres (Milward & Provan, 2000), the need for and the challenges associated with effective partnering, become most pronounced in achieving sustainable development, since sustainable development efforts predicate on the equally strong request for ‘good governance’ (Brinkerhoff, 2002b:25).

For all that, scholars and practitioners alike realise that partnerships are no panacea for sustainable development and have started to look at the circumstances and factors that make them effective. Development scholars have paid primary attention to the identification of environmental obstacles and success factors, for example in the national and local operating contexts (Awortwi, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Fiszbein & Lowden, 1998; Fowler, 1998; Ndandiko, 2006). In contrast, researchers in the emerging field of network theory (Milward & Provan, 1995; Milward & Provan, 1998; Milward et al., 2009; Provan et al., 2007), have started to tackle the question about how the governance of inter-organisational relations may best respond to certain partnering conditions for collective endeavours to become effective.

In an early attempt to set out a preliminary theory of partnership effectiveness, Milward and Provan (1995) explained variation in the performance of partnerships by differences in the degree of structural integration of services and the distribution of influence among participants. Provan and Kenis (2008) further developed this idea. Keeping the structural angle at the core, this is supplemented by a governance perspective that incorporates different interventions, such as designing a partnership as external or participant governed, into their conceptual framework. This way, they arrive at a typology of partnership governance forms and propose their performance to be contingent on their fit to four partnership-level conditions: size, trust, goal agreement, and the extent to which partnership-level competencies are required that go beyond what can potentially provided by the participants themselves. Development scholars in addition, emphasise the need for relationship-building and enabling governance

interventions for partnership governance to account for and adequately respond to the particular challenges posed by power differentials between partners (e.g. Brown & Ashman, 1996; Thomas, 1996), and by the complexity of their local operational environments (Choi & Brower, 2006; Krishna, 2003; Mohan & Stokke, 2000; Parker, 2001; Syrett, 1997).

Building on this work, the present qualitative comparative analysis of development partnerships is guided by the question: *which combinations of partnership-level conditions and governance forms that being the governance-fit, are effective?* The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: First, the concepts of partnership governance and its theoretical linkage to the proposed partnership-level contingencies are presented, resulting in the introduction of the concept of ‘governance fit’ and related hypotheses towards partnership effectiveness. After data collection and methodology are described, the findings are presented and discussed in the light of previous works.

5.2 Theoretical background

The theoretical framework of the present study derives from previous thoughts and empirical findings on the effectiveness of public-service networks, incorporating insights gained from research on partnerships in international development cooperation. The framework proceeds from the threefold argument that the fit between partnership-level conditions and governance form impacts upon partnership effectiveness. The empirical grounds in which light this argument is examined are development partnerships, a type of inter-organisational partnerships that perform development efforts on the ground⁴³. Development partnerships consist of various organisations, which are legally separate but linked to each other through contracts, social, and/or exchange relations that are sustained over a period of time in order to jointly achieve some common or complementary development goal(s) (Alter & Hage, 1993).

Partnership governance

The idea, that different ways of governing inter-organisational systems impact upon their performance, is not particularly novel (cf. Galaskiewicz, 1985; Milward & Provan, 1995). Yet, since in the initial promotion of the concept towards various potential partners it seemed more conducive to put stronger weight on its collaborative notion than on considerations related to governance and control (Brinkerhoff, 2002a), the latter regained scholarly attention only very recently (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001b; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Provan & Milward, 2001; Rochlin et al., 2008).

Early studies on partnership effectiveness have proposed the performance implications of various governance aspects. For example, following a network analytic approach,

⁴³ Distinct to multi- and bilateral partnership agreements (e.g. EPAs)

scholars have focused on the relational structures of partnerships and set out a preliminary theory of their effectiveness that explained superior performance by centralised administrative structures and decision-making (cf. Milward & Provan, 1995). Others instead (e.g., Ansell, 2007; Bryson, 2006), in particular in the field of development studies, have, together with the institutionalisation of the partnership concept, started to advocate participative and enabling governance measures, contrary to prior donor-induced approaches (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Any development effort, which in its goal, design, or implementation is externally imposed, is seen as ultimately counter-productive (Cooke, 2004) since such efforts neglect and hence cannot truly address the needs of the people affected. To make greater participation through partnerships also meaningful (Derkzen & Bock, 2007), enabling governance interventions have been proposed as the practical way to facilitate effective participation (Ashman, 2001a), build local capacity and ownership (James, 2001) and this way ensure sustainable partnering outcomes (Brinkerhoff, 2002b).

Although these ideas have on their own strong intrinsic value, based on the present paucity of comparative partnership data (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Milward et al., 2009; Provan et al., 2007; Selsky & Parker, 2005), one cannot assume any one of them alone neither to suffice in defining the complex reality of governance practice, nor to be an unmixed blessing for all partnerships. Comparative research across a number of partnerships however, is extremely rare still and previous conceptualisations of governance have been fragmented, looking at the effects of specific aspects, e.g. structures and interventions, in the light of particular cases (Rochlin et al., 2008).

In an attempt to develop a more holistic analytical framework, Provan and Kenis (2008) propose the integration of the two above mentioned perspectives. A governance approach that specifies interventions in the design and implementation of partnerships (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Berry et al., 2004) and a network analytic approach that utilises the relational structures of partnerships as analytic devices. By following this approach, it is not claimed to account for all possible aspects of a partnership's governance that may potentially influence the effectiveness of partnerships. Still, it was demonstrated by previous explorative analyses (see Chapter Four of this volume) that both perspectives systematically link to each other and this way result in a rather comprehensive picture of partnership governance (Milward & Provan, 1998). Employing network analytic and partnership-level attributional data, different governance forms are identified along the two dimensions: from a structural perspective, the extent, to which the interactions among partners are centralised or decentralised, and whether decision-making influence and control are concentrated or shared among partners (Milward & Provan, 1995), are evaluated. Governance interventions such as if support and assistance are given to partners, and whether partnerships are participant-governed or coordinated by an external entity, among others, are examined in their relation to these structural

properties. This way, four different governance forms were identified by previous explorative analysis as they are presented in Table 4.3 of Chapter Four (p.:93).

The first form describes shared governance, through the equal involvement in and shared control of partnership-level processes and decisions and external representation of the partnership by all or the majority of partners. The other three forms instead all involve some level of brokerage that applies to the centralisation of interactions and/or decision-making power, e.g. centred around and/or held by only a single or a few partners. These governing entities or partnership brokers can further be direct participants or external entities, supplemented by reciprocal control structures, and may function as a liaison between the partnership and external stakeholders. Finally, the four governance forms to different degrees derive from and lead to the employment of governance interventions, such as the formalisation of relationships or the provision of support and assistance, conflict mediation and goal clarification to partners.

Since the four governance forms are identified based on empirical analysis (see Chapter Four of this volume), one of the contributions of the present study is that it does not rely upon practitioners' judgement for classification according to some a priori typology (Simon, 1946). Thereby, the goal of this inquiry is not to elaborate upon the ways and means by which different governance aspects can be built into partnerships, as it has been the focus of previous works (cf. Rochlin et al., 2008). Instead, the purpose is to further detail the factors, which in combination with a certain governance form, define governance fit and this way contribute to partnership effectiveness.

Partnership-level conditions

Recently, the argument has been made that the effectiveness of partnerships depends on the fit between governance form and partnership-level conditions. Provan and Kenis (2008) specify, based on their review of the literature on public-service partnerships, four such relevant conditions: size, trust, the extent to which goals are shared and the need for partnership-level competencies. Development scholars specify power differentials between partners (Ashman, 2001b; Buse & Harmer, 2004; Garvey, 2007; Haque, 2004; Lister, 2000; Mohan & Stokke, 2000; Thomas, 2007) and intricacies of the operational partnering environment (Adams & Hastings, 2001; Altenburg & Chahoud, 2001; Awortwi, 2004; Ebrahim, 2004), as conditions that require adequate governance response for development partnerships to be effective.

Differences in power between the myriads of potential development partners that come together in partnerships constitute a large part of the reality of development work (Thomas, 1996). Ignoring this aspect and merely passing over less powerful partners, is regarded as a major obstacle to partnership success (Bryson & Crosby, 2006; Ingle & Shpresa, 2007). Apart from negative consequences for individual (less powerful) partners (Ashman, 2001a; Lister, 2000), this may also alleviate the benefits of greater participation for the project itself. This may be the case, if partners lack the resources,

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experience, skills or acceptance to effectively contribute and play their part in the partnership (Derkzen & Bock, 2007), or when less powerful partners are excluded from essential parts of the partnership-level processes. In such events, partners may indulge in fundamental clashes about rights and positions rather than focussing on the negotiation of mutual interests and gains (Bäckstrand, 2006; Brown, 1992; Brown & Ashman, 1996).

Equally challenging and prevalent in the context of international development cooperation are external uncertainties, conveyed by the direct operational and institutional environments of partnerships (Brinkerhoff, 2002b:25-46). Previously, external uncertainty as an influencing factor on partnership effectiveness, has mostly been defined by the funding environment (Milward & Provan, 1995), for example, by the extent to which a partnership is externally funded and on how many different and potentially conflicting donors it depends and needs to satisfy. Yet, in the context of international development cooperation, uncertainty conveyed by the operational partnering environment equally requests adequate governance response. Uncertainty may arise from weak local infrastructure, resource supply or a lack of local social capital and trustful relations (Brown & Ashman, 1996), or from weak public and private institutions (Ndandiko, 2006) and uncertain institutional and political environments, for example, when a partnership's objectives run counter local development agendas and receive only little support (Fowler, 1998). Uncertainty ultimately arises when efforts are not embraced by the beneficiary communities whose needs the partnership seeks to address (Castro, 2008a; Chen, 2008; Muller, 2003).

In combination, the following partnership-level conditions are incorporated in this study: size, trust, goal agreement, power differentials between partners, and the need for partnership-level competencies. With the latter being conceptualised as the degree of uncertainty conveyed by the funding and the external operative environment of partnerships. The partnership literature proposes a myriad of potential obstacles and "success factors" (e.g. Brinkerhoff, 2004; Selsky & Parker, 2005) and it is not claimed that this selection encompasses all relevant ones. Yet, it was demonstrated by the findings of a previous explorative analysis (see Chapter Four of this volume) that the adoption of one of the four governance forms over another involves configurations of the presence or absence of these conditions.

Governance fit and partnership effectiveness

The effectiveness of partnerships is a strongly value-laden and contested subject (Thomas, 2007). It is very much driven by interests and political agendas, inherently multi-dimensional and strongly discipline-bound. In a way that definitions range from successful top-down implementation and attainment of institutional agendas, over the provision of public goods and services, the creation and exchange of knowledge and values, to the facilitation of enduring processes of social transformation and change

(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2006). Nevertheless and keeping in mind its limitations, research on partnership effectiveness is of crucial importance for both, theory and practice (Provan & Kenis, 2008), and several attempts have been made to systematically access and empirically explore the concept. Some draw a distinction between objective and subjective indicators (Korssen-Van Raaij, 2006). Others specify different analytical levels at which effectiveness can be evaluated, e.g. at the individual organisational or partner-, the partnership-, or the beneficiary-level (Provan & Milward, 2001). Since, as reflected by the range of definitions applied, the concept of effectiveness is compounded by the reality that development partnerships entail processes of change (Brinkerhoff, 2002b), again others set apart outcome from process-related indicators (Thomas, 2007).

Despite this variety of possible operationalisations, empirical research on partnership effectiveness to date has mostly focused on the evaluation of individual organisational partnering outcomes (Selsky & Parker, 2005; Van Huijstee et al., 2007). As a notable exception have studies on partnerships in a development context paid a comparable strong attention to the broader effects of partnerships that go beyond the direct partners, most notably with respect to beneficiary communities (Altenburg & Chahoud, 2001; Awortwi, 2004; Bäckstrand, 2006; Thomas, 2007). Meanwhile however, this broader focus somewhat disregarded the inter-organisational aspects of effective partnering (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Robinson et al., 2000). As it has been noted before (Provan & Milward, 2001), a sole focus on merely one dimension, does not suffice for an evaluation of partnership effectiveness in complex areas of partnership operation (O'Toole, 1997), such as international development cooperation. In the present study, partnership effectiveness has been conceptualised and measured at two, the individual partner and the partnership-level of analysis, by evaluating the subjective perceptions of individual organisational and of overall partnership effectiveness through all partners. Such complete data across a number of partnerships is extremely rare so far (Provan et al., 2004a). On the one hand, this is because of the difficulties of gathering full partnership data from all participants (Provan et al., 2007). On the other hand, because the diversity of disciplines that have approached partnerships to date, brought along a rather fragmented scholarly interest in the perspectives of only single actors (Hasnain-Wynia et al., 2003; Thomson et al., 2007) or particular sectors or groups of partners (Elbers, 2004; Gazley & Brudney, 2007; Milne et al., 1996). Due to the geographical spread of the partnerships under study we are not able to obtain neither direct observational data (Korssen-Van Raaij, 2006), nor to include the perspectives of stakeholders, other than the direct partners involved (Provan & Milward, 2001). Yet, the inductive evaluation of partnership effectiveness through all partners somewhat limits the subjectivity of the data (Provan et al., 2007) and includes the perspective of relevant actor groups, at least to the extent to which they are represented among partners.

The threefold argument for a joint analysis of partnership governance and conditions in their relation to effectiveness derived from previous research on public-service

partnerships (Provan & Kenis, 2008) is that different combinations of the presence and absence of conditions imply different challenges to effective partnering and thus demand appropriate governance responses. A fit of governance structures and interventions to conditions is required in order for partnerships to be effective. One line of argument suggests that favourable partnership-level conditions, e.g. the absence of size and parallel presence of trust and goal agreement, low levels of funding uncertainty and only little need for partnership-level competencies, may be effectively dealt with by shared governance. Since close and frequent interactions are possible when partnerships are smaller in size this facilitates the development of trustful relations, which are a premise for effective joint decision-making and power sharing. Shared goals can guide collective action without the need for one partner or a governing entity to provide leadership, and externally, low levels of uncertainty may successfully be managed by the decentralised individual interactions of partners with their own contacts and affiliates, without the need for centralisation. Centralised interactions, partnership administration and decision-making to different degrees displayed by the brokered forms instead, may effectively govern even partnerships that display more challenging conditions. Brokered governed partnerships may rather be effective in the coordination of larger numbers of partners, do not inevitably require widely dispersed trustful relations among all partners as a premise for joint action and can provide leadership and guidance even when goals are to a lesser extent clear or shared among partners. Externally, centralised representation may generate more stable communication channels and more efficient responses to external demands (Milward & Provan, 1995), such as to donors' (Lane, 2009) and beneficiaries' requests (Castro, 2008b; Prasad, 2006; Suleiman et al., 2008).

By the same argument, the two conditions characteristic of a development context, power differentials between partners and uncertainty conveyed by the operative environment, require adequate governance responses for partnerships to become effective. Yet, both conditions have not been systematically incorporated in previous frameworks (e.g. Ashman, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002a; Provan & Kenis, 2008), yet. In a precedent explorative analysis, distinct governance responses to the absence and presence of these conditions were identified (Chapter Four of this volume). Partnerships with power differentials between partners are less frequently governed by shared than by brokered forms. Shared governed partnerships instead are characterised by a presence of shared or equal financing arrangements. For brokered governance forms, which are characterised by power differentials, two ways of responding are specified: On the one hand, almost all brokered governance forms incorporate enabling interventions, e.g. the provision of assistance and support, conflict mediation, and goal clarification. In theory, such interventions are described as primarily aiming at relationship building and changing perceptions of inequality (Ashman, 2000) and contrasted with interventions aiming at overcoming structural barriers to mutuality, for example by granting shared participation and reciprocal control (Ashman, 2000; Bryson & Crosby, 2006; Elbers, 106

2010). The latter form of interventions are argued to be most likely implemented, when a partnership is externally governed (Provan & Kenis, 2008). That is by assigning an organisational entity or partnership broker specifically with the governance task, a separation of partners' interests and partnership-level concerns is implemented. As a result resource-commitments and governance interventions are more likely to go beyond and may even run counter those of individual partners, in particular with respect to power sharing.

Two distinct ways of governance response are identified to adjust to external uncertainty. On the one hand, shared governed partnerships with decentralised interactions respond to uncertainty in their operational environments by keeping the individual partners as liaisons between the partnership and contacts and relationships to external stakeholders. On the other hand, in particular the partnerships that faced funding uncertainty, responded by centralising their interactions and external representation. The two responses might arise from the difficulties encountered by partnerships when centralised external partnership representation instances or organisational entities are set-up but (initially) lack the needed legitimacy to be effective (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004). Hence until legitimacy is established, it may be advisable to strengthen existing relations of individual partners with their external stakeholders, rather than replacing them by centralised external representation (Elliott, 1987). Partnerships may more efficiently react to donors' requests and in turn easily be overseen and controlled by those when decision-making power and external representation is centralised. For these reasons, it is proposed that among the brokered governance forms, those that show one or more of the abovementioned aspects, are rather effective, when partnerships face one or a combination of the abovementioned conditions. Table 5.1 displays the configurations of partnership-level conditions and governance forms that are proposed, based on the framework of Provan and Kenis (2008) and the previous explorative findings about the adoption of governance forms by development practitioners, to show a contingent effect on partnership effectiveness.

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Table 5.1: Proposed ‘Governance Fit’

	Shared governance	Brokered governance		
		Decentralised interactions/ Concentrated influence	Centralised interactions/ Shared influence	Decentralised interactions/ Concentrated influence
<u>Governance structures:</u>				
Interaction	Decentralised	Decentralised	Centralised	Centralised
Decision-making power	Shared	Concentrated	Shared	Concentrated
<u>Governance interventions:</u>				
Externality of the governing entity	Absent	Frequent	Frequent	Frequent-
Centralised external representation	Absent	Frequent	Frequent	Frequent
Shared control	Frequent	Rare	Frequent	Rare
Formalisation	Moderately high	Moderately low	Moderately high	Moderately high
Goal clarification	Moderately low	Moderately high	Moderately high	Moderately high
Conflict mediation	Moderately low	Moderately high	Moderately high	Moderately low
Assistance and support	Moderately low	Moderately high	Moderately high	Moderately high
<u>Partnership-level conditions:</u>				
Size	⊖	●	●	⊖
Power differential ¹	⊖	⊖	●	⊖
Trust	●	⊖	●	⊖
Goals	●	⊖	●	⊖
Environmental uncertainty ¹	⊖	●	●	●
Funding uncertainty	⊖	●	●	●
	● = condition present ⊖ = condition absent			

5.3 Data collection and methodology

To explore the proposed contingent effects of governance fit, 38 development partnerships have been analysed via a comparative case analysis. A detailed description of the institutional background of the partnerships, the data collection and methodology of the study are presented in the corresponding sections of Chapter Four of this book. At this point, only divergences and additions in the measurements applied in the present analyses, to the approach outlined in Chapter Four are described.

Measurements

In this study, the concepts of partnership effectiveness, and governance fit to the partnership-level contingencies are measured through the perspectives of the intermediary and all partner organisations, respectively. Even though the two perspectives may sometimes diverge, by combining both we aim at gaining a most comprehensive understanding of the contingent effects governance fit on partnership effectiveness.

The dependent variable: partnership effectiveness

Partnership effectiveness is measured at two levels, as individual organisational effectiveness, which is assessed via one item administered to all partners, and an extra set of three items, on the basis of which partnership effectiveness was evaluated by only the intermediary organisations. The first item assesses individual organisational effectiveness *in the partnership* by all partners. The second set of items asks only the intermediary organisations to evaluate the effectiveness of the partnership on the basis of three general project efficiency criteria, the impact of the partnership on beneficiary communities (goal attainment), and its expenses relative to its benefits and time efficiency (Finsterbusch & Van Wicklin II, 1987). The latter set of items is factor-analysed and after obtaining confirmation for only one dimension measured, the average-level of both effectiveness-measures is computed for each partnership.

The independent variable: Governance-fit

Governance fit is operationalised via the two concepts, governance and partnership-level conditions. The applied measurements for both concepts are presented in detail in Chapter Four, with the exception of the indicator for power differential, which is aggregated for the present analysis, as follows:

Power. The concept of power is measured via two concepts: a perceptual measure of *resource-related power differentials* and an ‘objective’ measure that indicates the degree of *equity financing* in a partnership. Since previous explorative analysis (see Chapter Four of this volume) revealed that both concepts, perceived resource-related power differentials and equity financing, occur mutually exclusively in partnerships, both measures are aggregated to one indicator for the present analysis, representing the resource-related perceived power differential in a partnership.

Eventually, additional data was gathered about the type of the partnership, following a typology proposed by Rochlin and colleagues (2008) that distinguishes between a focus on service-delivery or rules and standards setting; the duration of the partnership by the time of our inquiry; whether the scope of the project was national or cross-national because trans-boundary resource management is argued to require much stronger political skills and conflict management capabilities (Castro, 2008b; Chen, 2008; Marfo,

2006; Mollinga et al., 2008; Sherwill et al., 2007); whether the partnership was mandated; and finally, whether, from the point of inception up until the time of the inquiry, the partnerships had experienced any cases of participant turnover. Finally, although specified as an influencing factor on effectiveness by previous studies (Provan & Milward, 1995), resource munificence is not explicitly evaluated, since sufficient project financing is specified as one funding requirement by the two facilities.

5.4 Findings

For all but three standard-setting partnerships the primary objective is specified as service-delivery. Largely within the timeframe determined by the three calls for proposals of the two facilities (in 2005 and in 2006), the average duration of the 38 partnerships is 42 months, from the point of the inception of their operations to the time of the study (ranging from 15 to 94 months, including two partnerships with a duration of 94 and 81 months). Seven partnerships operated across countries. Five partnerships were mandated by the EC and/or other donors, and only two partnerships reported upon a turnover of partners within the period from inception to the time of the data collection. The descriptive statistics are presented at this point only for the two effectiveness measures for the whole sample, as follows (again an overview and descriptive statistics of the measures applied for the concepts of partnership governance and each partnership-level condition can be found in the corresponding Tables 4.1 and 4.3 of Chapter Four):

Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for partnership effectiveness

Variable	Mean	Min	Max	S.D.
<u>Partnership effectiveness:</u>				
Partner-level	3,4290	1,50	4,67	0,68214
Partnership-level	3,5205	2,25	4,67	0,64392

The presentation of the findings of this study follows the two steps of the analysis. The interplay between the two concepts, partnership conditions and governance forms, in relation to partnership effectiveness is analysed by utilising a heuristic for stepwise comparative research via qualitative comparative analysis (QCA; Ragin, 1998). A comparison between cases that differ in only one of the conditions or governance aspects (Mill, 1843) is ideal but not feasible due to the small number of cases in this study. Instead it was chosen to conduct the analysis of the effects of governance fit on effectiveness, following a step-wise comparative research design as presented by Levi-Faur (2006). This was done for groups of cases that differ in the outcome, partnership effectiveness, and in one of the contingent factors, either in the governance modes, or in the partnership-level conditions, controlling for the other one, respectively.

To begin with, the combinations of partnership-level conditions are explored that characterise effective and ineffective partnerships, in the presence of each of the governance forms separately. This way, we answer the question under which combination of partnership level conditions each governance form is effective. In the second part of the analysis we approach the data from the reverse angle and ask which governance form is effective, given the presence of adverse partnership-level conditions. For the latter step, those partnership-level conditions that are identified to occur in parallel with an absence of effectiveness are utilised as selection criteria. All those partnerships that show one or a combination of these adverse partnership-level conditions are considered for further analysis, looking at which governance form is effective under these adverse circumstances.

The relationships between the concepts are analysed employing the qualitative-comparative approach, first outlined by Charles Ragin in 1987 (Ragin, 1998). QCA applies Boolean logic to analyse the necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome based on set-theoretic relations. For example, all partnerships with power differentials also display shared governance, or all shared governed partnerships show at the same time the presence of power differentials. QCA methodology was chosen for, for two reasons: on the one hand, because the relatively small number of cases represents only a first step towards the generalisation of findings across cases (Provan et al., 2007) and does not permit inference statistical analyses (Lijphart, 1971). On the other hand, because the concept of governance fit implies that theoretically complex configurations of partnership-level conditions and governance form, rather than single factors explain partnership effectiveness (Ragin, 2002). Rather than trying to discover the net linear effect of single independent variables, QCA assesses how each configuration of partnership-level conditions and governance forms compares to other configurations on their level of the dependent variable. A great deal of recent empirical work has shown that QCA is useful in studying causally complex configurations (for an overview see: Ragin 2000). Indeed, QCA is well suited to the study of contingency (i.e., equifinality and synergy) in the interplay between partnership-level variables.

Boolean sets, indicated by the presence or absence of certain conditions and governance forms relative to effectiveness require recoding the empirical indicators for the partnership-level conditions into dichotomous sets (0, 1). Effectiveness, partnership-level conditions and governance forms were coded dichotomously. The calibration process is described in detail for each condition and governance form in the corresponding section of Chapter Four of this volume and will be demonstrated at this point only for the concepts of partnership effectiveness and the condition of power differentials, which is used as an aggregated indicator in the present analysis⁴⁴.

⁴⁴ The membership values of each case are displayed in appendix V.

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Power. After obtaining the standard deviation for perceived resource-related power differentials, a cut-off value of 50% of the *deviation scores* of all partnerships is computed and the sample is divided into two groups, depending on whether (“1”) or not (“0”) partnerships display a perceived resource-related power differential.

Partnership effectiveness. Data on partnership effectiveness are obtained from two perspectives: the intermediary organisations and the partners, and conceptualised at two analytical levels, the individual organisational and the project-level. To allow for the evaluation of partnerships across the two perspectives, a cut-off value of 50% of the average scores for all partnerships is computed for both measures. The sample is then divided accordingly into four groups; not effective (12 partnerships), effective only at the individual partner-level (three partnerships), effective only at the partnership-level (five partnerships), and finally, those partnerships that are effective at both levels (18 partnerships). Depending on the group, each partnership receives a value of “0” or “1”. At first sight, no difference became apparent between partnerships that were effective at either the partner or the partnership-level of analysis. To simplify the following analysis, both dimensions are aggregated and a more conservative definition of effectiveness is used, considering as effective only those partnerships that were effective at both levels (18 partnerships).

Combinatory set-theoretical solutions

In the following, combinations of the conditions and governance forms that together indicate governance fit, are examined in their relationship to partnership effectiveness from two different angles, answering the following questions: “*under which partnership-level conditions are certain governance forms effective?*” and “*given the presence of adverse partnership-level conditions, which governance form is effective?*”

To answer the first question, the partnerships are divided into four groups with respect to the governance form they displayed. By the means of a truth-table analysis (Ragin, 2002), it is examined for each group, which combinations of present and absent partnership-level conditions sufficiently explain partnership effectiveness. For a truth-table analysis, an algorithm is employed that defines a measure of *consistency* in an inductive fashion, based on membership in a combination of conditions that shows membership scores equal with membership in the outcome (effectiveness) for each of the governance forms (*Ibid.*). Combinations of sets are called *configurations*. For any configuration, *coverage* indicates the number/proportion of cases that at the same time are effective, relative to the total number of effective partnerships. The higher the *coverage score* of a certain configuration of partnership-level conditions, the higher the proportion of effective cases explained by this configuration. *Consistency* assesses the degree to which a subset relation has been approximated, whereas *coverage* assesses the empirical relevance of a consistent subset (Ragin 2006). Both, *consistency* and *coverage* are important, since in the face of only a limited number of cases, *coverage* may not

always be given but *consistency* still specifies the accuracy of the explanation given by a solution (Goertz & Levy, 2005).

As the result of a truth table analysis, QCA specifies two solutions that together describe a complexity/parsimony continuum of obtained configurations. One end of the continuum privileges complexity, with the *complex solution(s)* specifying the whole range of combinations found in the data to explain the outcome; the other end privileges parsimony, with the *parsimonious solution(s)* describing those core elements of the explanation that apply to all instances of the outcome. While both are rooted in evidence (Ragin & Sonnett, 2004:14), the complex solution constitutes subsets of the membership in the parsimonious solution. Differences in the parsimonious solutions and contributing conditions obtained from the corresponding complex solutions are indicated (Ragin, 2002). Because in particular, the brokered groups are relative small, additional benchmarks indicate the chances for producing random models, based on the proportion of variables relative to cases (Marx, 2006: 19). *Raw coverage* measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained by each single term of the solution, computed from the membership values by dividing the sum of consistent membership in the solution by the sum of membership in the outcome. *Unique coverage* measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome solely explained by each individual solution term (memberships that are not covered by other solution terms).

Table 5.3 shows the complex solution(s) that explain effectiveness for each governance group, while displaying the parsimonious solution(s) as core conditions⁴⁵. Comparing the proposed configurations of governance fit (Table 5.1) to the findings of the first configurational analysis, no clear support is found for the proposition that shared governance (see Models I to III) is less effective than brokered governance (see Models IV to XI), when partnerships are larger in size (see Models II and III). Size is only part of the effective solutions of the centralised brokered governance forms (see Models VII and X), yet as such even effective when partnerships are participant-governed (Model X). We found strong support for the assumption that trust and goal agreement are essential conditions for effective partnering. Less clear, however, is the evidence found for a proposed distinction between shared and brokered governed partnerships, with respect to their fit to these conditions. It is proposed that their presence is an essential prerequisite for effective shared governance and that brokered governed partnerships can be effective albeit their absence since brokerage can provide guidance when goals are not shared and trust must not be widely dispersed among partners when a brokering entity functions as a ‘hub’ (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Yet, none of the effective solutions for any of the governance forms include the parallel absence of goal agreement and trust. Nevertheless, slightly different configurations for each governance mode seem to support the assumption that goal agreement may be more important for effective

⁴⁵ The truth table for the analyses is displayed in Table VI.II of Appendix VI.

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brokered partnerships with centralised interactions between partners (see Models VII to XI) than trust, and vice versa for effective partnerships with decentralised interactions (see Models I to VI).

The assumption that external uncertainty is a disadvantage for shared governance is confirmed in the face of uncertain funding but not uncertain operative environments (see Model II and III). Yet, only decentralised partnerships with concentrated decision-making power, which, in contrast to the shared governed partnerships frequently display centralised external representation, are effective in face of uncertainty conveyed by both, the funding and operative environments (see Model IV). Among the brokered forms, some further evidence is found for the assumption that funding uncertainty are more effectively governed by partnerships with centralised interactions (cf. Models VII to XI).

In the final step of the analysis, the reverse angle on governance fit is taken. If certain governance forms are more or less effective under different partnership-level conditions, then the reverse argument should equally hold. That is, different ways of governing partnerships should vary in their effects on potentially adverse partnership-level conditions. From this perspective, differences in the effectiveness of governance forms are explored given the presence of adverse partnership-level conditions. First, those combinations of conditions are identified that characterise ineffective partnerships, regardless of the presence or absence of any particular governance mode. As it had already been suggested by the findings of the first step of the analysis, the parsimonious solution for adverse partnership-level conditions confirms as such the presence of power differentials and the absence of goal agreement and trust (*solution consistency* = 0.89, *solution coverage* = 0.67). In total, 25 partnerships faced one or a combination of those adverse conditions: 17 of the 22 brokered and eight of the 16 shared governed partnerships. These 25 partnerships were selected and their effective solutions were obtained. Table 5.4. shows the findings of the analysis involving those 26 partnerships that faced one or more of the adverse conditions.

The findings show that brokered partnerships with centralised activity structures and shared decision-making power are most effective even in face of adverse partnership-level conditions, namely when perceived resource-related power differentials between partners characterise a partnership. However, the effective solutions specifying this governance form, at the same time displayed the presence of the presence of goal agreement and trust, respectively. Hence, although this governance form appears as the most suitable response in case partnerships face the existence of perceived resource-related power differentials, it still seems to require the parallel presence of the other two

Table 5.3: Combinatory solutions for the effectiveness of governance forms

	Shared governance			Decentralised activities/ concentrated decision-making power			Centralised activities/ shared decision-making power			Centralised activities/ concentrated decision-making power	
	(N=16)			(N= 11)			(N=7)			(N=4)	
	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI	Model VII	Model VIII	Model IX	Model X	Model XI
	Effective	~ effective	~ effective	effective	~ effective	~ effective	effective	effective	~ effective	effective	~ effective
Size		⊖	●	⊖	●	●	●	●	●	●	
Trust	●	⊖	⊖	●		⊖		●			⊖
Goals	●	⊖			⊖	●	●	●	⊖	●	⊖
Power differential	⊖	●	●	⊖	●	●	●	●	⊖	⊖	●
Environmental uncertainty		⊖		●	⊖		⊖		●	⊖	●
Funding uncertainty		●	●	●			●	●	⊖	⊖	
P of generating random model ¹	>1-10%	>1-10%	>1-10%	>33%	>33%	>33%	>33%	>33%	>33%	>33%	>33%
Raw coverage	0,52	0,22	0,33	0,67	0,33	0,14	0,47	0,47	0,27	0,67	0,67
Unique coverage	0,52	0,14	0,20	0,67	0,33	0,14	0,30	0,30	0,27	0,67	0,67
Consistency	0,83	0,80	0,84	0,86	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	0,80
Solution coverage		0,47			0,47		0,67				
Solution consistency		0,88			1,00		1,00				
	● = core causal condition present ⊖ = core causal condition absent					● = contributing to causal condition present ⊖ = contributing to causal condition absent					
	¹ > 0 = Models developed on the basis of this specification are valid 1<10% = Model-specification will almost always be valid. >10<33% = Significant possibility of finding valid model >33% = Models could also be generated ad random.										

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favourable conditions, trust and goal agreement, for partnerships to become effective. The net effect of this governance form on partnership effectiveness in face of power differentials cannot clearly be determined on basis of the present data because no counterfactual cases (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005) exist that are effective despite the presence of all three adverse partnership-level conditions.

Table 5.4: Combinatory solutions in the face of adverse partnership conditions

	Effective	
	Model I	Model II
Trust		●
Goals	●	
Power differential	●	●
Shared	⊖	⊖
Decentralised/ Concentrated	⊖	⊖
Centralised/ Shared	●	●
Centralised/ Concentrated	⊖	⊖
P of generating random model ¹	>10-<33%	>10-<33%
Raw coverage	0,38	0,29
Unique coverage	0,17	0,08
Consistency	1,00	1,00
Solution coverage	0,46	
Solution consistency	1,00	
	● = core causal condition present ● = contributing to causal condition present ⊖ = core causal condition absent ⊖ = contributing to causal condition absent	
	¹ > 0 = Models developed on the basis of this specification are valid 1<10% = Model-specification will almost always be valid. >10<33% = Significant possibility of finding valid model >33% = Models could also be generated ad random.	

The findings show that brokered partnerships with centralised activity structures and shared decision-making power are most effective even in face of adverse partnership-level conditions, namely when perceived resource-related power differentials between partners characterise a partnership. However, the effective solutions specifying this governance form, at the same time displayed the presence of the presence of goal agreement and trust, respectively. Hence, although this governance form appears as the most suitable response in case partnerships face the existence of perceived resource-related power differentials, it still seems to require the parallel presence of the other two favourable conditions, trust and goal agreement, for partnerships to become effective.

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The net effect of this governance form on partnership effectiveness in face of power differentials cannot clearly be determined on basis of the present data because no counterfactual cases (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005) exist that are effective despite the presence of all three adverse partnership-level conditions.

In a similar vein, and despite the conservative definition of effectiveness applied, it should be noted, that the findings do not suggest that power differentials are the only or most important adverse partnership-level condition that requires adequate governance response for partnerships to become effective. For example, no case in which trust is absent is effective at both, the individual partner and partnership-levels of analysis. In fact, the condition of a presence of power differentials merely displays the strongest variation in its relation to effectiveness, depending on the parallel presence of one of the governance forms.

The only three cases in which there was no trust present but that showed effectiveness at least at one level, namely at the partnership-level, combine the presence of goal agreement in three cases with concentrated (one by the centralised and two by the decentralised form) and in one case with additional shared decision making power (cf. Appendix V). Although for these cases no systematic combinatory contingent effects in relation to any one of the governance forms are obtained from the truth table analysis, the findings suggest that partnerships facing the absence of trust may still be effective. Yet, effectiveness is confined to the partnership-level of analysis and occurs only in case goal agreement is present.

Finally, in support of the contingent effects of brokered partnerships in face of power differentials, the proposition is that two governance aspects are decisive: the presence of shared control and influence, and the employment of enabling and supportive governance interventions. As demonstrated by the findings presented in Table 5.5, the presence of shared control and influence in partnership-related decision-making seem indeed crucial for partnerships to become effective in the face of the otherwise detrimental effects of power differentials. Notably, this finding does not imply that both governance aspects, shared influence *and* control, have to be present in any partnership to be effective. Yet, in case of perceived resource-related power differentials and a parallel absence of equity financing the combination of both aspects seems most effective. Less clear are the results obtained for enabling interventions, which are argued to facilitate meaningful participation and overcome imbalances that arise from perceived resource-related power differentials. Even though such interventions are to a lesser or greater extent applied by almost all brokered governed partnerships, all brokered partnerships with shared influence and control also apply these interventions. As a consequence, it can not be said if these partnerships would have been equally effective without these interventions. Rather, the findings suggest that these interventions alone do not produce a similar effect compared to if they are combined with structural measures of shared control and influence.

Further, one of the main arguments of Provan and Kenis' (2008) framework, the proposition of benefits derived from a separation of operational and individual organisational from partnership-level governance and interests, finds no strong support. The argument is that brokered governed partnerships in which an entity or partnership broker is assigned with the governance task show a superior performance in face of adverse partnership level conditions, since such a separation would prevent a conflict of interests to arise. In the present data however, not all nine externally governed partnerships, but only those that at the same time showed shared influence and control, are effective. This finding suggests that neither the aspect of external governance per-se to contribute to effectiveness, nor a separation of individual organisational and partnership-level interests to per-se result in reciprocal control and influence. When instead both, influence and control are shared, nine out of thirteen partnerships (all either shared governed or with centralised interactions and shared influence) are effective. Nonetheless, when compared across the whole sample, partnerships are effective even though less frequently, without the parallel presence of shared control and/or influence. In case of the presence of only shared influence (among shared governed partnerships and partnerships with centralised interactions and shared influence but no shared control) five out of twelve partnerships are effective. Reversely, the two cases that displayed only shared control but not influence (two partnerships with concentrated influence) are both effective. This finding may give vague direction that shared control has a stronger effect than actual shared influence on enhancing effectiveness, yet needs further examination. Hence, demonstrated by the means of cases facing the potentially detrimental partnership-level condition of resource-related power differentials, neither a separation of partner- and partnership-level interests, nor efforts to support partners, alone, but their combination with enabling structural measures that facilitate shared control and influence, seem to show the most profound effect of governance fit on partnership effectiveness.

5.5 Conclusion and discussion

The present study demonstrated the contingent effect of governance fit on the effectiveness of 38 development partnerships, from two different angles. First, it is shown that the combined presence or absence of partnership-level conditions described situations in which governance forms are more or less effective. Subsequently, three partnership-level conditions, the absence of trust and goal agreement and the presence of power differentials, are identified as potentially adverse conditions for effectiveness. Based on an analysis of those partnerships that showed one or more of these adverse conditions, it is asserted that the brokered governance form with centralised interactions and shared influence and control is most effective, in particular in the face of power differentials. A full analysis and subsequent generalisation of the net effect of any of the

conditions or governance forms alone, however, is not possible, due to the unbalanced representation of conditions and governance forms by the sample and the consequently limited number of counterfactual cases. Hence, following a heuristic for stepwise comparative research, our findings show clear limitations in their generalisability. Strictly speaking, each governance mode or even each single governance aspect and partnership-level condition must be analysed in their combined effect on effectiveness, given the presence of a range or at least equal number of counterfactual cases. Such an analysis was not possible. Albeit the possibility to include hypothetical counterfactual cases in a QCA analysis (Ragin & Sonnett, 2004), this option was not utilised, since the specific configurations of governance fit, obtained from the present data can be regarded as a finding in itself. Yet, foremost demonstrating the need to broaden and diversify the empirical basis on which current thinking about effective partnership governance fit builds.

In the course of this limitation of the present study, several findings must be interpreted with caution, when comparing them to previous studies in this field. First, the selection of relevant partnership conditions and governance interventions followed existent reviews and integrations of relevant concepts derived from the literature on both, public-service partnerships in a non-development (Provan & Kenis, 2008) and on partnerships in international development cooperation (see Chapter Two of this volume). The limitations in the interpretation of differences to previous findings in these fields will be briefly exemplified by the conditions of size and power differentials. A strong impact of partnership size on the superior contingent effect of in particular centralised administrative governance forms (Simons, 1984) was not supported by our findings. Yet, the insights gained with respect to size are generally limited, because the partnerships under study were relatively small compared to the inter-organizational networks analysed in previous studies (e.g. Milward & Provan, 1995; Milward et al., 2009; Provan et al., 2004; Provan et al., 2007). This characteristic of the present sample is also more generally disputable in terms of the employment of network analytical measures for the analysis of the governance form, including (in the present sample four) dyadic partnerships. Although we acknowledge the methodological argument that high density in a dyadic partnership is much easier to achieve than among say fifteen partners, from a practical and also theoretical point of view we see the inclusion of dyadic relations justified. First, dyadic partnerships, between Northern and Southern partners of various kinds, describe large parts of the reality of the phenomenon of partnerships in international development cooperation (Ashman, 2001; Awortwi, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002a; Brinkerhoff, 2004; Sanyal, 2006). Secondly, the meaning of an absent tie in this context can be argued to be equally, if not more important, in dyadic governance relationships compared to more complex inter-organisational structures and makes the demarcation of governance modes for smaller and dyadic partnerships even stricter in the present study. Proceeding from this argument, the findings support previous

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arguments of a superior performance of centralised compared to decentralised structures in case of larger partnerships. Among the partnerships with centralised interactions and concentrated decision-making power, only one and here the effective partnership was larger in size, while the remaining three partnerships, were dyadic and apart from one, all ineffective.

Eventually, the main contribution of the present study to the existing literature on partnership governance may be the incorporation of power into a contingency framework. The partnership literature is fuelled with discussions about the impact of seemingly insuperable power imbalances on partnership processes and outcomes. Mainly however, of an advocating nature, and rarely empirically comparative but mostly based on single partners or cases existent research on power in partnerships seems almost in avoidance of establishing any link to effectiveness considerations. This way an apparently artificial gap is created between a self-constituted “critical” perspective and a “mainstream” focus on effectiveness. The present findings do not identify power as the only or most important condition that needs to be addressed by governance measures for partnerships to be effective. Yet, a more nuanced picture of the issue of power and its interaction with other partnership-level conditions is given, most notably with governance interventions. Power imbalances represent a challenge to effective partnering in many areas of partnership operation as demonstrated by the strong attention the issue receives by the literature on multi-sector partnerships for sustainable development. The finding that the potentially detrimental effects of power differences are capable of —to some extent— being influenced by concerted interventions in the governance of partnerships, can serve as a starting point for further systematic inquiry into such effects also in other areas of partnership operation. The present findings demonstrate that both aspects power and effectiveness can be integrated in one contingency framework through the concept of partnership governance. Future efforts may further explore and specify those partnership-level conditions, under which governance matters.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

6.1. Introduction

Proceeding from the notice that, on the one hand, differences in power between a range of diverse organisations from different societal sectors, regions, with different resources, diverse interests, perspectives and attitudes render conflict and partnership failure, but nonetheless, on the other hand, effective participation and partnerships exist, the present study set out to reconcile these seemingly contradictory observations. The research presented in this dissertation set out to explore what the origins and consequences of power in partnerships are and ergo which partnership-level influences effectively govern power relations in this context. More specifically, the research focused on the following over-arching research question:

“What are the origins and effects of power and differences in power in partnerships on the effective participation in and the effectiveness of partnerships? And what is the role of ‘governance-fit’ in this context?”

Answering this question adds to the scientific literature as existing knowledge about power in and partnership effectiveness has largely been disconnected so far. On the one hand, power has mostly been regarded as something that determines the prospects of successful participation for individual partners or groups but rarely conceptualised and empirically examined across *all* participants that is as a partnership-level condition that impacts upon and interacts with other conditions and partnership-level outcomes. On the other hand, power dispositions and the way differences in such impact upon the prospects of effective participation and partnership have been neglected and uniformity has been predicated. This way, power differentials have not explicitly been addressed as a partnership-level condition that derives from individual organisational differences in power dispositions, yet impacts upon collective outcomes and the prospects of overall partnership success (Chapter 2).

Based on the review of existing insights with regard to the origins that is bases of power and their effect at the individual organisational level of analysis, it can be concluded that differences in power dispositions between partners have a discriminating

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effect on the degree of effectiveness of individual organisational participation. Taking this idea beyond single actors or groups of participants to a more general level, by incorporating partnership-level influences on organisational bases of power, these effects are confirmed through attending to differences in the functioning of two bases of power: resources and positions. Namely, discriminating effects are found for resources on involvement in the interactions between partners and influence on decision-making processes but not on involvement in the latter. Proceeding from this finding, conclusion is drawn that even though partnership-level assessments of organisational bases of power, namely resource perceptions, may turn out positive, nonetheless their functioning in partnerships and thus effective participation is not guaranteed. This is in particular, since no discriminating effect is found of resource perceptions on involvement in partnership-level decision-making.

Yet, in their interaction, the two bases of power, resources and positions, turn out to significantly increase this function and the chances for effective participation. On the one hand, involvement in partnership interactions and decision-making significantly increases the influence in particular of resource-wise less powerful partners. Reversely, in particular those resources that most strongly depend on utility perceptions in partnerships show discriminating effects on effectiveness, when the partners who access and/or control them are involved and can enact them in decision-making processes. This finding points out several possibilities for interventions in order to enable effective participation in partnerships, for example through interventions aiming at changing resource-related perceptions and/or aiming at overcoming structural barriers through turning particular attention to the involvement of partners in and control over decision-making processes (Chapter 3).

The outcome of this analysis is the idea that micro-level phenomena, such as the functioning of bases of power at the individual organisational level of analysis find their ways into and are influenced by macro- that is partnership-level phenomena, such as partnership governance and effectiveness. The interaction between micro- and macro-level causes and consequences of power in partnerships is analysed in two steps. By the first inquiry into partnership-level conditions that explain the adoption of governance forms, it is demonstrated that the presence or absence of power differentials play a decisive role. In particular, differences in power differentials are found to explain the adoption of shared vis-à-vis brokered governed forms. Shared governed partnerships are more frequently characterised by equity financing arrangements, trust and an absence of perceived resource-related power differentials. Brokered partnerships instead, frequently represent the governance response to perceived resource-related power differentials and a parallel absence of equity financing, with enabling and supportive interventions, such as assistance and support given to partners and to varying degrees supplemented by structural adjustments, e.g. the implementation of external instead of participant-governance and shared control. In this way, certain logics of adopting one governance

form over another in face of different partnership conditions, in particular power differentials between partners, by development partnerships are identified. Those are discussed in the light of previous thinking, in particular of Provan and Kenis' (2007) threefold framework on partnership effectiveness. Distinctive 'own' logics for the adoption of governance forms by development partnerships are developed, with regard to the conditions encountered, e.g. power differentials and uncertainty conveyed by the operational environments, and governance interventions applied, e.g. rights-based and enabling interventions, which are found characteristic of partnerships in the context of international development cooperation (Chapter 4).

Finally, based on the concepts established in the precedent chapters, it is demonstrated by the findings of the last empirical chapter that the interactions between partnership-level conditions and governance responses, which is conceptually integrated to 'governance fit', have an impact on partnership effectiveness. Not only are different governance forms effective depending on the presence and/or absence of certain combinations of partnership-level conditions but variation exists also in the degree to which they represent effective governance responses in face of particularly challenging conditions, which are identified as the absence of trust and/or goal agreement and the presence of power differentials. Notably, the impact of governance fit, that is the interaction between partnership-level conditions and governance form, on effective partnership becomes most significant with respect to the governance of power differentials. In face of which, the governance form that displays a parallel presence of centralised interactions, shared control and influence, and enabling partnership interventions proves to be most effective (Chapter 5).

The subsequent sections elaborate upon the main effects of power at the individual-organisational as well as at the partnership-level of analysis, on partnership effectiveness, under consideration of the effect of governance fit. The interactions between the micro- and macro-level foundations of power in partnerships will be discussed based on the empirical results presented in more detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In section 6.4, an assessment will be made as to what extent the expected contributions to the existent knowledge about power and its governance in partnerships have been realised. In section 6.5, the limitations of the research undertaken will be discussed. Based on these limitations, possible directions for future research are developed.

6.2 The micro-foundations of power and effective participation

A lot of research has already been conducted regarding the relationship between power dispositions and effective partnering. However, most of these studies focus on the chances for successful partnership involvement of single actors or certain groups and without much attention being paid to partnership-level influences on this relationship. In

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Chapter 3, the existing insights generated by this large but fragmented body of literature have been used to construct a baseline model of the micro-foundations of power in partnerships, encompassing the interaction between bases of power in their relationship to effective participation. In this model, partnership-level influences are incorporated to the extent that bases of power of individual partners are evaluated, not as static or 'centred' within partners or groups (Allen, 2003) but as being subject to relational partnership-level assessments. On the one hand, such influences are integrated through resources being subject to partnership-level perceptions of their utility for other partners and the success of the partnership and through positions being derived from the ongoing interactions among partners, and the selection of partners for involvement in partnership-level decisions, on the other. This approach allows for a critical analysis of the added-value of the systematic inclusion of partnership-level relational influences on top of already existing insights.

With regard to the perceptual measures of resources, the analysis shows that high levels of utility perceptions indeed added discriminative value to the impact of resources on effective participation. Similar explanatory value is found to be added by considering not only participation in partnerships as a means in itself but incorporating partnership-specific positional measures of involvement in the interactions and decision-making processes. With these findings, a distinction between potential power, enacted power, influence and effective participation, and herewith a discriminative effect of partnership-level specific influences on the power dispositions of partners, that has been predicted theoretically by various scholars (e.g. Jacobson & Cohen, 1986; Provan & Gassenheimer, 1994; Provan, 1980) is confirmed empirically in the context of development partnerships. Discriminative effects have previously been confirmed to mark a distinction between resources (Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; Provan et al., 1980), and between structural positions in their effects on partnering outcomes (Provan et al., 2009). Yet, such effects are only confirmed for resource-related perceptions on the involvement in the ongoing interactions between partners and on influence in partnership-level decision-making but not on involvement in the latter processes. Thus, the present findings question the equity-related assumption of these effects to automatically develop and hold for all resources and on all instances of power. Rather they point out the need to reconsider traditional views on the functioning of bases of power and the development of resource-dependencies and related relational structures in resource-diverse and often externally induced, for example mandated contexts, such as development partnerships. The findings demonstrate that not all resources to the same extent result in advantageous positions and/or effective participation. While such discriminative effects of resources were found by previous studies (e.g. Alexander, 1996; Huang & Provan, 2007), the present findings are of particular importance for several reasons. Firstly, not any but namely the beneficiary-related resources, e.g. manpower and the representation of beneficiaries, show a strong dependence on utility perceptions and

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at the same time no or even negative effects on involvement in the control-related activities and decision-making processes. This finding raises questions, about the chances for effective participation of those partners controlling and/or accessing these resources, which would typically be those partners whose development needs partnerships actually seek to address, or those who represent these needs in partnerships. Secondly, herewith this finding as well calls into question the overall success of the collective endeavour. This is on the one hand, because partnership effectiveness depends on knowledge exchange and building of, not at least, organisational and administrative capacities of and the transfer of control to these very constituents (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2005; Brown & Ashman, 1996). On the other hand, possibilities for reciprocal control and mutual influence may be of less importance when conditions are favourable, e.g. shared goals serve as a motive of coordination and integrative mechanism (Ansell & Gash, 2007) and areas of responsibility and expertise are well-defined (Huang & Provan, 2006). Yet, safeguards for equitable collaboration become crucial for partnerships to become effective, in the event that such favourable conditions cannot be taken for granted and risk lies in rendering conflict and withdrawal (Brown & Ashman, 1996). In these latter events, the question arises, how the conditions for the development of these structures can be created. In particular, if they do not ‘automatically’ manifest themselves from the interactions between partners, as it is demonstrated by the present findings but implicitly assumed when taking cues from theories about the functioning of bases of power in markets (Jones et al., 1997) or administrative decision-making contexts (Entwistle et al., 2007). From the subsequent testing of the effects of the absence of one base of power against the presence of the other, several conclusions with regard to such efforts of creating these conditions can be drawn. On the one hand, interventions aiming at increasing the chances for involvement in the more constitutive decisions about the design of partnerships and in the control-related activities significantly impact upon the prospects of influence and effective participation. Notably, these effects most strongly appear for resource-wise less powerful actors. On the other hand, it is demonstrated that, contrary to previous findings (Derkzen & Bock, 2007), if involved in decision-making processes, a discriminating effect on influence holds, in particular for those resources that most strongly depend on their effectiveness on partnership-related utility perceptions, such as manpower and the representation of beneficiaries. These findings indicate that if reciprocal control and influence do not automatically develop between partners in resource diverse partnerships, interventions aiming at both changing perceptions and addressing structural barriers to effective participation can significantly increase the chances for effective partnership. Yet, the parallel finding of a missing linkage of the translation of these very resources into involvement that are perceived as useful and display the strongest effect on influence, *if* they are involved, may ascribe more importance to interventions addressing structural rather than perceptual barriers to mutual control and influence.

Summarised, the findings show that adding partnership-level influences on top of already existing insights about the functioning of bases of power in different inter-organisational settings significantly enhances the explanatory power of dispositional understandings of the micro-foundations of power in partnerships, i.e. the relational notion of power in resource-dependence theories. This way, beyond a mere demarcation of more or less powerful actors, the more fundamental question of why are certain actors more powerful than others is answered. Yet, at the same time, the limits of such relational thinking in diversely resourced inter-organisational contexts are demonstrated and it is exemplified where interventions can best address the functioning of inter-organisational bases of power to facilitate effective participation in partnerships.

6.3 The macro-foundations of power and effective partnerships

With regard to the macro-foundations of effective partnerships, a situation similar to the one with regard to the micro-foundations is encountered. Theoretical perspectives that had seemed likely to provide synergy benefits when studying power in relationship to partnership effectiveness exist but have rarely been systematically integrated in one framework and analysed across a number of comparable cases. Firstly, comparable to what has been attempted in the previous chapter, dispositional and episodic understandings of power in partnerships are integrated through the aggregation of the individual perspectives of *all* partners in a partnership to the partnership-level of analysis, herewith establishing power differentials as a partnership-level condition. Secondly, insights gained from two threads of research, one on the public-service and the other one on partnerships operating in the context of international development cooperation are integrated to examine the threefold contingency argument recently presented by Provan and Kenis (2008). Their argument builds upon the assumption that certain governance forms are more or less effective in the face of certain combinations of the absence or presence of partnership-level conditions. Again, a multi-disciplinary model is built and examined. This model incorporates the combined perspective on partnership governance, involving structural governance properties and interventions, of which the latter are supplemented by enabling measures that are identified as relevant by development scholars. In addition, the conditions of size, trust, goal agreement and funding uncertainty that are proposed to be impact upon the effectiveness of public-service partnerships (*Ibid.*), are supplemented by the two conditions of internally, power differentials between partners, and externally, uncertainty conveyed by the operational environment that are proposed to be relevant in a development context.

Based on the integration of these perspectives it was expected that development partnerships will show, on the one hand, their own governance challenges and logics in adopting one governance form over another and that differences in ‘governance fit’, that

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of governance forms to certain combinations of partnership-level conditions, impact upon the effectiveness of partnerships, on the other. The conclusions drawn from the testing of these assumptions are presented in two steps:

With regard to the findings with regard to the relationship between the presence and absence of partnership-level conditions and the adoption of governance forms, which is examined in Chapter 4, several conclusions can be drawn. To begin with, the identification of governance forms from the present data reveals that differences between structural governance properties indeed relate to differences in the interventions applied. For example, shared governed partnerships (with decentralised interactions and shared influence on partnership-level decisions) display almost equally high levels of formalisation compared to brokered forms but shared control and low levels of applying enabling interventions and lack the application of structural interventions, such as the establishment of a governing entity or centralised external representation. Further, three distinct brokered governance forms are identified along the two structural dimensions of decentralised to centralised interactions and shared to concentrated influence in partnership-level decisions. With regard to the interventions that accompany these forms, difference is found for the occurrence of shared control, which seems to be a prerequisite for the shared influence that characterises only the brokered form with shared control. This finding contributes to the present understanding of partnership governance by demonstrating that structural properties and interventions systematically relate to each other (*Ibid.*). Secondly, the finding that explanations for the adoption of different combinations of structural governance properties and interventions are found in the parallel absence or presence of certain partnership conditions supports the underlying logic of the threefold argument of Provan and Kenis (*Ibid.*). The main differences are identified between the conditions that characterise brokered versus shared governed partnerships. Shared governed partnerships are frequently adopted either in the face of the combination of the internal conditions of a parallel presence of trust and equity financing and an absence of resource-related power differentials, or if funding uncertainty is absent but the operational environment is perceived as uncertain. Brokered partnerships, instead, are adopted when power differentials and goal agreement are present and funding environments are uncertain. The logics of the adoption of different governance forms in the face of certain partnership conditions identified here only partially support those specified for public-service partnerships by Provan and Kenis (*Ibid.*) but instead suggest the existence of domain-specific ‘own’ logics, characteristic of partnerships in the context of international development cooperation. Shared governance seems to predicate on the absence of resource-related perceptions of power differences. This is reasonable in the face of equity financing arrangements that often come along with high levels of formalisation (e.g. Muthusamy & White, 2006) and herewith create the basis for relations at eye-level that demand shared control and influence in partnership-level decisions. Brokered governed partnerships, instead,

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predicate upon the presence of perceived resource-related inequality, in terms of the acknowledgement of potential contributions to the partnership and actual levels of financing by partners. The common denominator in brokered governed partnerships is identified as goal agreement rather than trust. This seems reasonable, since in only the minority of brokered cases are control and influence (actually and) effectively shared among partners and in face of funding being provided by only one or a few partners, goal formulation and agreement is likely to precede successful fund application. With regard to external conditions for partnering, the findings are ambiguous. On the one hand, decentralised interactions are found to be adopted in the presence of uncertain operational environments, e.g. by shared governed partnerships. This is argued to be reasoned in the difficulties encountered by often donor-directed attempts to establish centralised external representation and consequently a decision by practitioners to rely on and keep the individual contacts of partners if such instances lack legitimacy. Yet, if brokered and equally as in the shared model displaying decentralised interactions internally, governance often was supplemented by a centralised external representation, which was not adopted by shared governed partnerships. This finding may indicate that although both governance forms are frequently adopted when uncertain operative environments are faced, practitioners in shared governed partnerships are financially less dependent on and therefore may enjoy more discretion from 'external' demands and donors' interests in their decision to keep individual partners as liaisons with external stakeholders.

Hence, both conditions characteristic of partnering in a development context, power differentials between partners and uncertain operative environments, received much stronger significance than expected based on the propositions derived from research on public-service partnerships (*Ibid.*). Yet ultimately, although different logics for adopting one governance form over another in the context of development cooperation are identified and compared to existing theoretical thinking on public-service partnerships. The actual reasons for their adoption can only be assumed to be guided by, e.g. considerations about their effectiveness, but not tested to that effect as guided by the explorative research objective of this chapter.

In Chapter 5 instead, the objective is to test Provan and Kenis' (*Ibid.*) contingency framework and examine the relationship between 'governance fit' and partnership effectiveness. Two arguments with regard to 'governance fit' are contrasted to explain this relationship. To begin with, there is the argument of Provan and Kenis' (*Ibid.*) distinction between shared and brokered governance forms. This argument posits that the more complex the conditions encountered in a partnership, such as when partnerships are larger in size, lack goal agreement and trust, and face uncertain funding environments, the more likely it is that brokered rather than shared governance forms will be effective. The second argument builds on the previous analysis and discussion of different logics for the adoption of governance forms by development partnerships in Chapter 4. Based

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on this analysis, it is argued, that in face of uncertain operational environments decentralised interactions and the governance of external relations via the contacts of single partners may be equally or more effective than centralised interactions and external representation, if such representation is not (yet) legitimate. Secondly, two ways of governing power differentials in partnerships are proposed to be effective. On the one hand, by applying enabling interventions and on the other, by interventions targeting structural barriers to mutuality, such as sharing control or the separation of partnership-level from individual organisational interests through assigning an external governing entity or partnership-level staff with the governance task. These arguments are examined from two directions: firstly, it was analysed under which partnership-level conditions the governance modes are effective; secondly, those conditions that showed detrimental effects on effectiveness across cases are identified and subsequently tested for which governance form is most effective in their presence.

From the results of these analyses, it can be concluded that external uncertainties are more effectively governed by decentralised interactions, if conveyed by the operational environment and by centralised interactions, if conveyed by the funding environment. This finding confirms existing knowledge about the superior performance of centralised structures in the governance of donor relations (e.g. Milward & Provan, 1995) and adds insight about the superior performance of decentralised structures and partner-directed governance of external relations, in face of uncertain operational environments. Despite these external conditions, most clearly, is the detrimental impact on effectiveness observed across almost all partnerships for the internal conditions of an absence of goal agreement and trust and the presence of power differentials. A lack of goal agreement and/or trust in partnerships have previously been specified as potentially detrimental to partnership effectiveness (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Hardy & Phillips, 1997; Klaster et al, 2010). Power instead has to date mostly been defined and examined as determining the prospects for effective participation of single actors or groups. That power differentials between partners represent a partnership-level condition, which influences the prospects for success of the *collective* endeavour, has frequently been assumed (e.g. Alter & Hage, 1993; Brett, 2003; Brown & Ashman, 1996; Bryson & Crosby, 2005; 2006), but not empirically examined so far. As such this finding represents an important contribution to the existing literature. In particular, because in contrast to the absence of goal agreement and trust, which, in almost all cases result in ineffective partnerships, the presence of power differentials was identified as 'governable'. That is the presence of power differentials as a partnership-level condition shows variability in its relationship to effectiveness, depending on the combination with certain governance forms. The brokered form, combining centralised interactions with shared influence and control, is identified as the governance form that is most effective in the face of power differentials. Subsequently, cases with this governance form are compared with cases that display a different form but one or more of the same

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governance aspects that supplement the effective form, e.g. enabling governance interventions, external governance and/or a separation of individual organisational from partnership-level interests. From this comparison the conclusion is drawn that not one of these single aspects alone but their combination by the brokered form with centralised interactions and shared influence and control, effectively governs the otherwise detrimental condition of power differentials.

Based on the above and with regard to the interaction between the micro- and macro-foundations of effective participation and partnership, the following general conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, if power differences exist, a functioning of the micro-foundations of effective participation, that is, a translation of bases of power into involvement, control and influence is cast into doubt even when perceptions of resource-related potential power are shared. As such, power differentials represent a partnership-level condition that requires interventions, in terms of structural adjustments, as well as relationship building, assistance and support in order for partnerships to become effective. Not only the need but a requirement for intervention is made explicit, since neither at the micro-level from the interactions and perceptions among partners, nor at the macro-level from an 'installed' separation of individual organisational and partnership-level interests alone, does governance fit emerge automatically. To inform the design and implementation of partnerships and increase governance fit in the light of these findings, combining theoretical insights from different areas of partnership operation and research provides synergy benefits. By treating power seriously but not insurmountable for partnerships to become effective, more complete insights with regard to the interaction between micro- and macro-level phenomena can be gained. Rather than by, either treating power as a non-issue or as something 'merely' affecting the prospects of effective participation of individual (powerless) partners, or by taking power differences between partners for granted in the context of highly diverse inter-organisational contexts. By combining both perspectives, a picture of various complex relations between the micro- and macro-foundations for effective partnership emerges and several aspects of the governance of partnerships turn out to play an important role in the development of these relations.

6.4 Research implications

Besides the specific contributions of each individual chapter, the research findings presented in the above contain more general contributions to the scientific literature on power in partnerships and its governance as well.

By combining the concepts of power, governance and effectiveness in one framework, the study addressed, not only in terms of the literature, but also in the themes and

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priorities set, a Northern/Western bias in existent partnership research. This issue has been brought up by scholars of inter-organisational networks and partnerships (Raab & Kenis, 2009) and development scholars (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Thomas, 1996) alike. The findings presented here clearly indicate that developing, in this sense, multi-disciplinary models yield added value in both fields. For example, the findings reveal that the governance of power relations is an issue that not only affects the prospects of effective participation of individual partners but in fact, can, if not adequately addressed, significantly limit the chances for overall partnership success. Large differences in and high levels of diversity of resources of partners combined with the diverse goals and values of development work seem at first sight to provoke the empirical significance of power in this specific context. Yet, since such partnership arrangements become ever more frequent also in a Northern/Western context (Selsky & Parker, 2005), as demonstrated by the comparably strong level of attention paid to power by studies on multi-sector partnerships (Bryson & Crosby, 2005; Buse & Harmer, 2004; Hardy et al., 2006). The present findings may be of a general value also in fields of partnership operation other than in the specific context of international development cooperation. In development studies, partnerships research has to less extent been informed by systematic theoretical frameworks (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). In particular and despite the great deal of attention it received, the issue of power has largely been the theme of single case studies and anecdotal evidence. The present inquiry may contribute to a more systematic theoretical and empirical approach in that it adds a theoretical framework and comparative perspective and this way, through a synthesis of insights from both fields, addresses several crosscutting issues and contributes to the literature in several distinct ways.

First, the current study contributes to the broader literature on power in partnerships (see Chapter Two of this volume) in that it integrates the two most pervasive but also separately pursued research directions, following a dispositional or episodic understandings of power in this context. Studies following a dispositional understanding have to date focused on single partners or groups but largely neglected context that is partnership-specific influences on the relationship between power dispositions and outcomes. The current findings add to this understanding in the way that they demonstrate the significant effect of such influence on this relationship, for example by the impact of partnership-level perceptions on the effectiveness of resources as bases of power, or by the impact of partnership-level structural positions on effective participation. These findings highlight the context-dependency of the effectiveness of bases of power and further question any static and context-invariant conceptualisations of power dispositions to be read of from partners' resources or differences in resources that may exist 'outside' of a partnership (cf. Allen, 2003; Derkzen, Franklin & Bock, 2008). Yet, at the same time, the present integrative approach, by incorporating such partnership-level influences, reveals the limitations of relational and constructivist

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understandings of power as, entirely defined in and through the processes and contexts of partnerships, from an episodic perspective. Certain resources showed in their perception a significantly stronger context-dependency than others and at the same time no or an even negative discriminative effect on partners' involvement in and influence on partnering processes. These findings imply that partnership-level theories and analytic approaches to the study of power, such as discourse- as well as network-analyses, must remain sensitive to actor- or 'node'-related differences in power dispositions. Only if uniformity is *not* postulated, neither by conceptualising partnerships as 'neutral' or freely negotiated discursive spaces (e.g. Gray, 1985, 1989), nor known resource-environments (e.g. Entwistle et al, 2007), can it be examined, if and what kind of conditions for effective processes and interactions are needed and which ones partners are able to develop by themselves. The current study contributes to this line of literature by providing empirical evidence that even if (resource-related) mutual perceptions are favourable those do not automatically translate into structural embeddedness, in particular in the control-related interactions and partnering processes.

Second, this research contributes to the rising theme of how constructs and theories that originate from the individual organisational or dyadic-level of analysis, such as resource-dependence and exchange theories, can be extrapolated and examined at the partnership-level, that is as collective phenomena (Provan et al, 2007b). The present findings demonstrate, for example through the relationship between partnership-level conditions and adopted governance forms in Chapter Four, that partnerships are not merely the sum of their parts but distinct organizational systems, with their own logics of adapting to internal and external conditions. A primary contribution is that the present study benefits these more recent attempts for theory development (Barnes, MacLean & Cousens, 2010; Entwistle & Martin, 2005; Provan et al., 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008) through the analysis of interactions between partnership-level phenomena, partnering conditions, governance form and effectiveness. The examination of partnership-level concepts and relationships is at the heart of this emerging field and, illustrated by the concept of power differentials, likely to benefit from multi-disciplinary and multi-level analysis. In the next section of this chapter, some concrete recommendations for future approaches into this direction will be presented.

Furthermore, even though micro- and macro-level analyses each have their own merits, the present findings support their interrelation. On the one hand, it is demonstrated that the adoption of certain governance forms is influenced by aggregated micro-level conditions, such as trust, goal agreement, and not at least power differentials between partners. On the other hand, are the effects of these conditions, influenced by their interaction with partnership-level phenomena and interventions, on both collective and individual organizational outcomes. The present findings, building on data from all participants, demonstrate the strong dependency between the two levels of analysis and thereby highlight the need for multi-level integration rather than treating both levels

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mutually exclusive (Isett & Provan, 2005; Provan & Kenis, 2008). This circle of reasoning is closed by the finding that in the vast majority of cases, partner-level and partnership-level effectiveness, show a parallel presence or absence. Yet, interestingly, for example the presence of goal agreement is found to be linked to partnership- rather than partner-level effectiveness, while trust displays a reverse relationship to the two effectiveness measures. Similarly, trust and shared influence are found to characterise effective shared governed partnerships even without shared control. Whereas in the face of power differentials, goal agreement seems necessary and shared influence and effective participation seem to predicate upon shared control, which without brokerage through selective measures at the partnership-level do not emerge automatically due to a lack of functioning of bases of power at the individual organisational level. Hence, the implication seems to be that different micro-level conditions encountered in partnerships require different macro-level interventions for collective action to be effective.

Yet, different perspectives on partnership phenomena and the need for intervention are not only determined by what would theoretically be the best solution but also by the institutional backgrounds and possibilities of different actors to design and implement partnerships and thereby create such conditions. How such perspectives can differ is most significantly demonstrated when comparing the present findings to the possibilities for intervention discussed in the respective bodies of literature on public-service and on development partnerships. For example, one of the most significant findings of Chapter 4 is that shared governance and trust frequently rest upon equity financing. Equity financing is considered a partnership-level indicator for the absence of power differentials in the present study, yet, is discussed in the business-alliance literature as a governance mechanism (Muthusamy & White, 2006). Another example is found in that structural interventions, as they are argued to enhance the effectiveness of public-service partnerships (Provan & Kenis, 2008), are largely neglected as interventions in the governance of development partnerships (Ashman, 2000). Specifically from the perspective of NNGOs and other intermediaries, such are often regarded beyond their scope of possibility (*Ibid.*) mostly for reasons of resource scarcity (Robinson et al., 2000) and inflexible financing and reporting requirements and structures (e.g. Ashman, 2000; Ashman, 2001b). Examples of which are when separate governing bodies are provided only for partnerships with a certain budget or size (Bryson et al., 2006), when those instances are 'installed' rather than chosen by partners (Awortwi, 2004), when interventions and ways of governing a partnership being predetermined before partners have a say or partnering conditions can be considered (Hale & Mauzerall, 2004). The present study demonstrates the benefits of going beyond such institutional lenses, backgrounds and disciplines, by looking at what works best, in combination and under different constellations of conditions across cases.

6.5 Reflection and recommendation for future research

Like most research, the present study suffers from several limitations and raises numerous (new) questions. First, the limitations of this research will be discussed and both their reasons as well as their impact on the results of the study will be addressed. Most limitations of this research are the results of conscious choices made during the design phase of this research, whereas others only became apparent after analysing the gathered data. Some of the questions that came up during and after carrying out this research will be discussed. Based on both the limitations of the present study and on the new questions it generates, this dissertation will conclude by outlining several directions for future research.

First, a single-donor over other possible strategies, e.g. a national or regional, or mono-issue design, was chosen. The main reasons for this choice were as follows. First, partnership initiatives of this size (involving in total 248 partnerships) are rarely found outside of the initiatives of such main donors and it has been argued that the diversity of partnership approaches are often less indicative of the various country contexts than of the donor initiatives promoted (Brinkerhoff, 2002b). Secondly, though the issues addressed by the partnerships are diverse, the common themes of the funding facilities, water, sanitation, and energy provided a common framework and eventually all but three standard-setting partnerships in fact primarily focus on the delivery of public-services in these areas, instead of on other issues such as policy setting or awareness raising. Thirdly, the goal of the study is to examine power in resource-diverse partnership-settings, which is ensured, since both facilities were open for proposals from a broad range of actors, non-state and state, international actors and participants from Europe and the ACP countries. By focusing on partnerships from these two facilities, access to the largest possible database on field-level partnerships is utilised. Thereby involving a level of diversity characteristic of partnerships in international development cooperation but at the same time filtering out heterogeneity in the data on irrelevant criteria, e.g. as a result of fragmented initiatives that is partnerships initiated by single or dyadic actors. Yet, a clear limitation derives from the chosen design for in-depth inquiries with different analytical foci, e.g. on actor-related sub-groups or comparisons between partnerships operating in different country contexts. While it was attempted to control for these influences when possible, the organisational data obtained clearly is not suitable for in particular full-fledged comparisons of the latter kind, since external influences are merely incorporated via the perceptions of participants, e.g. of their direct operative environments.

A second and related major limitation of the chosen approach is the focus on cross-sectional, largely quantitative data. The main reason underlying this choice is the fact that it is virtually impossible, within the framework of this dissertation, to gather complete partnership data across a number of geographically widespread development

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partnerships operating in and across nineteen different countries, by the means of in-depth qualitative or longitudinal data. Therefore, a trade-off arose between the generalisability of the findings of the study and the possibility to gather in-depth and/or information over a longer period of time. However, since the literature on partnerships is fuelled by single in-depth and often longitudinal data, the trade-off was made in favour of generalisability. Yet, with respect to this choice several limitations must be discussed. First, the approach chosen to collect data for the present study can be criticised at several points. For example, the choice to draw the boundaries of the partnerships by the means of gathering a list of participant organisations from the intermediary organisation that successfully applied for co-funding can be criticised with regard to the studied concepts. On the one hand, for sampling on the dependent variable, that is the governance modes (cf. Provan et al., 2007), on the other hand, for sampling on the dependent variable, which is power. In an attempt to avoid the first issue, it has been tried to directly contact the partners in each project and this way avoid dependence on the decisions of the intermediary organisations to provide this data. Yet, only the contacts of the intermediary organisations were provided by the donor so that direct establishment of first contact was possible only via the intermediary organisations. The latter issue then also raises ethical questions. During the data collection, particular attention was paid to the issue of obtaining data from all partners involved in the partnerships. Yet, in three cases partners whose names were received from the intermediary organisations negated their participation and posited their concerns about the authenticity of the obtained participant lists. In all three cases, these concerns were accompanied by complaints that though their names being 'used' as representing certain groups in the partnership for reasons of increasing the chances for funding, in fact, those 'partners' had never been contacted nor were they actively involved in the partnerships. Although these examples were excluded they nevertheless give indication that the obtained data must be treated with caution with regard to sampling on the concepts that are analysed and in particular power. Due to the cross-sectional and quantitative data obtained, in-depth knowledge about possible reasons for or against participation in the present study is lacking. Since it was impossible to conduct interviews about the reason for their refusal with each of the remaining 211 partnerships that did not participate, the findings must be seen relative to these concerns.

With regard to the generalisability of the study, the total of 38 partnerships involved can firmly be regarded as a first step towards this goal with respect to whole partnership data (Provan et al., 2007). Yet, it turned out that, as expected, the sample displays certain characteristics that may reflect upon partnership practice in international development today but at the same time limit the generalisability of the findings from a methodological standpoint. For example, Chapter 4 finds that a main difference between the partnerships is that some rest on financially relatively equally strong partners while others displayed stark resource differentials. While this finding may be reflective of and

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result from donor policies that increasingly utilise partnerships as tools to harness private capital for development, such attempts and resulting effects in the nature of constituent bases may also be rather specific to the areas of water, sanitation and energy, and less commonly found in other areas of development operation. Related, the sample cannot be considered balanced with regard to several variables, in particular the governance forms. This limits the generalisability of findings with respect to the effectiveness of governance, in particular of the brokered forms, since not each combination of structural properties and governance interventions could be tested in its effects on partnership effectiveness under different conditions. Further, the present study looks at certain relationships, in particular between the partnership-level conditions, governance forms and outcomes, but neglects others that may have an impact on the findings of this analysis but operate beneath its radar, due to a lack of counterfactual cases. This problem, commonly faced by small-sample research, also limits the generalisability of the present study.

Finally, a main limitation due to the cross-sectional design of the present study is its lack of causality. Several aspects, such as the adoption of governance forms or the effects of governance fit on partnership effectiveness could only be assessed in their parallel presence or absence but no conclusions with respect to causality could be drawn which leaves several points for discussion. For example, the parallel occurrence of brokered governance forms and enabling interventions aiming for goal and interest clarification and high levels of goal agreement cannot be brought into a causal sequence. Their parallel occurrence does not give information about whether brokered partnerships commence their operations with higher levels of goal agreement, since often partners are selected by the intermediary organisation, so that the overarching goals have to be clearly defined to attract participation and not least to apply for funding. Or alternatively, whether agreement about goals may result from interventions and efforts put into their clarification once partners agree to join a project and, if not applied, would lead to ineffective partnering processes. These are among the questions that remain unanswered by the present study, since cross-sectional data does not allow for an assessment of (temporal) causalities.

The main recommendations that can be made based on the research presented in this dissertation predominantly serve to address the limitations discussed in the above. One of the recommendations that directly follow from the above is for the more systematic collection of data with sampling criteria that increase generalisability. For instance, this could take the form of pre-sampling with regard to one of the utilised concepts. Such as selecting partnerships from larger initiatives on the basis of a balanced representation of different governance forms or by looking only at partnerships that display certain pre-conditions, i.e. the combination of certain partners or groups, a history of conflict between partners, or only partnerships operating in and across specific countries. This

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way, more directed sample selection may further help to filter out heterogeneity and allow for more systematic insights to be gained into the relationship between certain partnership phenomena, such as conditions and governance forms. One promising example is given by the indicated link between trust and shared governance arrangements, on the one hand, and goal agreement and guidance provided by brokered partnerships, on the other. In the present sample, a tendency of such different relationships was observed and it seems promising for future endeavours to look at and compare these relationships in a more a balanced sample, which to equal extents involves shared and brokered partnerships. On the basis of such a sample it would be interesting to examine whether trust and goal agreement serve similar purposes in shared and brokered partnerships, respectively. Such analysis could feed into the discussion about the substitutability and mutual dependency of trust versus control (e.g. Tomlinson, 2005).

Having established a systematic framework for cross-case analyses of such concepts, e.g. partnership-level conditions, governance modes and effectiveness, future research can proceed and further explore relevant influences and relations, incorporating different conditions or governance aspects which may be of relevance in different areas of partnership operation, as it has been done in the present study for international development cooperation. Such external validation of theoretical claims, in particular posited by the emerging field of partnership and network theory, is needed in face of the ever increasing number and spread of partnerships into all different kinds of operational areas. Taking the present study as an example, such multi-disciplinary research seems promising with regard to the added-value of conceptualising and examining multi-disciplinary models of partnership-level phenomena.

In this respect, it is furthermore important to stress that future endeavours should focus on not only structural properties or be based on merely cross-sectional data. To give an example of the first, the findings of the present study demonstrated that the combined presence of structural interventions aiming at relationship building and enabling effective participation is most successful in the face of power differentials. Although the present study can not reveal whether one of these interventions alone may have similar effects on partnership effectiveness. In the face of practical constraints on the application of such interventions, this interaction and the distinct effects of one form of intervention in comparison to another appear worthy of future exploration. Such a request for systematic inquiry then mainly relates, in addition to generalisability also to the second issue raised above: causality. Causality is of importance in any inquiry but in particular when looking at partnerships from an interventionist perspective. Governance interventions and structural designs are assumed to have an effect on partnerships when combined with different partner- and partnership-level conditions. Yet, longitudinal data is required in order to empirically substantiate such claims. Systematically, longitudinal analyses could further elaborate upon the approach applied in this study and examine the

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interaction between governance interventions and the emergence and changes in partnership-level conditions and governance structures at different points in time. For example, it has been previously suggested that partnership-level decision-making issues not only involve different qualitative dimensions (e.g. decisions about the design of a partnership are more constitutive in nature than those about their implementation) but also a temporal dimension (e.g. Hale & Mauzerall, 2004). Similarly, we frequently find in the quotes of the respondents the statement that it makes a difference when partners perceive the conditions for collaboration in partnerships as favourable from the beginning, e.g. they feel involved and recognised as equals. As such, these statements indicate that not only the aim and scope of an intervention but also the temporal dimension plays a role for its effectiveness. Related to the reception and effectiveness of governance interventions and structures, it can as well be assumed that governance forms change and become adjusted to changing conditions over time (Provan & Kenis, 2008). For example, enabling interventions may have a stronger effect in the beginning, when a partnership commences its operations, but if not at some point resulting in structural changes, show only a limited or no impact at all on later outcomes. It is further conceivable that enabling interventions that encompass training, learning and capacity building, only emerge and become effective when partners can trust each other based on a minimum of structural equity in terms of involvement and control. Further, in terms of a temporal dimension, it can be assumed that different interventions show different effects depending on the ongoing development of inter-organisational relational structures over time. For example, efforts of co-creation and partnership building may be more important in the beginning but to a lesser extent when partners start out under the condition of shared financing *and* ownership (e.g. Muthusamy & White, 2006).

The questions raised in the above are just some examples of the many interesting issues that are raised but remain unaddressed by the present study. Many of these issues touch upon a variety of different topics that have received different degrees of attention in different disciplines that relate to different actors involved in and areas of partnership operation, they have one important dimension in common. Yet, they are all related to the interplay between the micro- and macro-foundations of partnerships. Hence, the possible multi-level and multi-disciplinary applications are numerous and promising. The present research has shown that employing such a broader perspective can lead to more comprehensive explanations of scientifically and practically relevant phenomena. In this respect, there are numerous and promising opportunities for similar applications in the future.

Summary in Dutch – Samenvatting

Inleiding

In grote delen van de wereld moet de bevolking toegang ontberen tot veilig drinkwater, adequate sanitaire voorzieningen en electriciteit. De overgrote meerderheid van de bewoners in deze gebieden woont in een ontwikkelingsland. Bijna tien jaar geleden, op de “Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)” van 2002, hebben regeringsleiders hun eerder toegezegde steun bevestigd om de ‘Millenium Development Goals’, te behalen. Het behalen van deze doelstellingen zou betekenen dat in het jaar 2015 het aantal mensen dat geen toegang heeft tot schoon drinkwater, sanitaire voorzieningen en energie is gehalveerd.

In het verleden werden internationale inspanningen van dergelijke omvang doorgaans uitgevoerd door het opstellen van bi- en multilaterale verdragen tussen landen. Echter, sinds de opkomst van het moderne “ontwikkelingsmanagement” in de jaren ‘50 en ‘60, is het voor het uitvoeren van ontwikkelingswerk meer en meer gangbaar geworden om samenwerkingsverbanden op te starten tussen een breed palet van organisaties van het globale zuiden en noorden, zoals overheidsinstellingen, non-profit organisaties, en meer recentelijk ook for-profit organisaties. Tegenwoordig wordt bijna één derde van al het officiële ontwikkelingswerk toegekend aan, en uitgevoerd door, dit soort samenwerkingsverbanden. De doelstellingen worden weliswaar nog steeds bepaald in bilaterale en multilaterale verdragen, maar de implementatie wordt ter plekke begeleid en uitgevoerd door allerlei typen partners.

Terwijl samenwerkingsverbanden meer en meer de institutionele norm zijn geworden in het streven naar duurzame ontwikkeling, zijn er ook steeds meer zorgen dat samenwerking tussen onderling sterk verschillende organisaties uit diverse sectoren van de maatschappij, met uiteenlopende middelen, belangen, invalshoeken en mentaliteiten eerder leidt tot conflicten en machtsstrijd dan tot effectieve samenwerking. In eerder onderzoek is reeds aangetoond welke uitdagingen voortvloeien uit het starten en voortzetten van effectieve samenwerkingsverbanden. Er is echter weinig bekend over de wijze waarop machtsverhoudingen zich binnen een samenwerking ontwikkelen, en op wat voor manier samenwerkingen door betrokkenen kunnen worden ingericht, geïmplementeerd en aangestuurd om dit soort thema’s het hoofd te bieden. Deels komt dit vanwege het feit dat er, los van donorvoorschriften en financieringsbehoeften, nauwelijks een juridisch kader bestaat voor het besturen van samenwerkingsverbanden, en deels omdat macht doorgaans wordt behandeld als een factor die de vooruitzichten van samenwerking voor individuele organisaties beïnvloedt en maar zelden wordt gezien als een mogelijke bedreiging voor het uiteindelijke succes van het

samenwerkingsverband zelf. Echter, door toenemende druk om betere verantwoording, meer transparantie *en* op het verhogen van de effectiviteit, krijgen vragen over het besturen van samenwerkingsverbanden meer en meer aandacht. Machtsverhoudingen tussen partners, en hieraan gerelateerd de vragen of, en zoja hoe deze in samenwerkingsverbanden effectief beheerst kunnen worden, worden gezien als cruciaal voor het succes van samenwerkingsverbanden.

Zoals de titel van dit proefschrift “Same same, but different” aangeeft, bestaat er in de literatuur over samenwerkingen een gepolariseerde discussie over macht binnen samenwerkingsverbanden en over de vraag hoe deze kan worden gedefiniëerd en benaderd. Een deel van de literatuur beschouwt macht als onproblematisch, omdat verschillen tussen partners worden gezien als aanjager voor creativiteit, wederzijdse afhankelijkheid, innovatie en verandering. Anderen zien macht als de belangrijkste belemmering voor samenwerking, aangezien scheve machtsverhoudingen een onoverkomelijk obstakel zouden zijn en aldus enige vorm van “werkelijke samenwerking” op voorhand belemmeren. Dergelijke argumenten bouwen meestal voort op de gedachte dat macht inherent is aan bepaalde partners, en kan worden afgelezen aan de middelen waarover zij beschikken en waartoe zij exclusief toegang hebben buiten een specifieke samenwerking om. De context waarbinnen machtsverhoudingen zich ontwikkelen, namelijk het samenwerkingsverband, wordt zelden betrokken in dit denken. Tegelijkertijd wordt in studies waar het samenwerkingsverband zélf wordt bestudeerd, het feit dat er verschillen bestaan tussen partners in samenwerkingsverbanden buiten beschouwing gelaten. Kiest men een perspectief dat het midden houdt tussen het bezitten van bepaalde middelen als bron van macht in samenwerkingsverbanden en het bestuderen van het samenwerkingsverband zelf, dan kan men de overkoepelende vraag stellen waarom sommige samenwerkingen en partners effectief zijn in het licht van machtsverschillen en andere niet.

Wanneer men samenwerkingen beschouwt als een inter-organisationale context waarbinnen machtsverhoudingen zich op een eigen manier ontwikkelen, dan biedt de literatuur verschillende verklaringen. Aan de ene kant bouwen verklaringen voort op traditionele begrippen bij inter-organisationale coördinatie, zoals “markten” en “hierarchiën”. Vertaald naar de context van samenwerkingen wordt betoogd dat de macht van partners zich organisch ontwikkeld vanuit wederzijdse doelstellingen en de behoefte aan middelen. Toch kan er in ontwikkelingssamenwerkingen en andere samenwerkingen tussen partners die normaliter niet aan dit soort samenwerkingsverbanden zouden deelnemen (zoals bijvoorbeeld bedrijven) en in minder geïstitutionaliseerde contexten onenigheid ontstaan over doelstellingen, en kunnen partners niet de kennis en alertheid ontwikkelen die het herkennen van wederzijdse afhankelijkheid door de beschikbaarheid van middelen faciliteert. Worden macht en de ontwikkeling van wederzijdse afhankelijkheid en reciprociteit binnen deze context gezien, dan kunnen er twee interventionistische benaderingen worden onderscheiden. De

literatuur over publieke samenwerkingen is toegespitst op interventies die zich richten op beheersing, bijvoorbeeld door de strategische besluitvorming te scheiden van de operationele uitvoering, waardoor de belangen van de individuele partners met de doelstellingen van de samenwerking als geheel in balans worden gebracht. De literatuur over ontwikkelingssamenwerking daarentegen, concentreert zich voornamelijk op interventies die gericht zijn op het opbouwen van relaties door middel van uitwisseling, leren en het creëren van een perceptie van wederzijdse afhankelijkheid. Hoewel deze twee benaderingen vanuit het perspectief van de diverse actoren en daarmee samenhangende academische disciplines twee verschillende aspecten van macht binnen samenwerkingen behandelen, delen ze de veronderstelling dat macht *kan* worden gestuurd binnen samenwerkingen. Deze gedachte staat centraal binnen een recent gepresenteerd drievoudig argument, dat stelt dat een ‘governance fit’, dat wil zeggen een bestuursvorm die aansluit bij de omstandigheden en factoren van een samenwerking, invloed heeft op het succes van de gezamenlijke samenwerking. Hiermee lijken verschillende invalshoeken allemaal te wijzen in eenzelfde richting, maar zijn zij op dit moment nog niet theoretisch geïntegreerd en onderbouwd met een empirische analyse.

De conclusie die kan worden getrokken is dat er weliswaar veel aandacht is geweest van zowel academici als uitvoerenden voor macht en de beheersing ervan binnen samenwerkingsverbanden, maar dat er weinig pogingen zijn ondernomen om de diverse zienswijzen te integreren en dat er nog geen vergelijkende empirische onderbouwing bestaat. In dit proefschrift is een poging gedaan om dit hiaat op te vullen. De overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag luidt dan ook:

“Wat zijn de oorzaken en de consequenties van macht en machtsverschillen tussen partners in samenwerkingsverbanden op de effectieve deelname van partners aan, en de effectiviteit van de samenwerking? En wat is de rol van de ‘governance-fit’ in deze context?”

Dit proefschrift richt zich op a) de oorsprong en gevolgen van macht, en in het bijzonder de verschillen in macht tussen partners binnen samenwerkingsverbanden, en hoe deze verschillen doorwerken in effectieve deelname aan, en het succes van deze samenwerkingsverbanden, en b) de rol van een passende bestuursvorm in deze context. In overeenstemming met de titel van dit proefschrift zal het eerste deel van het onderzoek verkennen welke machtsverschillen en -overeenkomsten bestaan tussen partners, en verklaren hoe machtsverhoudingen zich binnen een samenwerking ontwikkelen. In het tweede deel worden deze inzichten gebracht op het analiseniveau van het samenwerkingsverband, en wordt bekeken wat de rol is van bestuursvormen die passen bij de aanwezigheid van machtsverschillen binnen samenwerkingsverbanden in relatie tot het succes van die samenwerkingsverbanden. Deze aannames worden onderzocht door middel van een vergelijkende analyse van samenwerkingsverbanden die

actief zijn op het gebied van internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Er is niet één specifiek theoretisch raamwerk voor interorganisationale macht binnen internationaal opererende samenwerkingen, maar er zijn twee stromingen in de literatuur voor een dergelijk onderzoek. De eerste betreft de algemene literatuur over interorganisationale samenwerking en de rol van bestuur in publieke samenwerkingen en netwerken, en de tweede richt zich op samenwerkingen binnen de specifieke context van het bestuur van internationaal ontwikkelingswerk. Om inzicht te krijgen in deze materie zijn deze twee benaderingswijzen gecombineerd in modellen. Deze multi-disciplinaire modellen zijn vervolgens geverifieerd en getoetst.

Dit onderzoek draagt op drie specifieke manieren bij aan de reeds bestaande literatuur. Ten eerste integreert dit onderzoek inzichten in macht en het besturen ervan binnen samenwerkingen uit twee gebieden, te weten het werk met betrekking tot de effectiviteit van publieke samenwerkingen, en het denken over macht binnen internationaal ontwikkelingswerk. Ten tweede wordt in dit onderzoek een multi-dimensionaal analysekader toegepast: macht wordt geanalyseerd op zowel het niveau van de individuele organisatie als dat van het samenwerkingsverband. Op het niveau van de organisatie wordt de ontwikkeling van machtsrelaties onderzocht door te kijken naar de effecten van machtsverhoudingen op succesvolle deelname. Op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband wordt de interactie tussen machtsverhoudingen en andere aspecten die zich afspelen op het niveau van samenwerking, namelijk de wijze waarop zij bestuurd worden, verkend. Voor dit deel van het onderzoek worden machtsverschillen geaggregeerd op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband, en de interactie met verschillende bestuursmaatregelen als het gaat om het voortbrengen van effectieve collectieve actie bestudeerd. Waar de bestaande literatuur over macht binnen samenwerkingen zich voornamelijk richt op ofwel de effecten van scheve machtsverhoudingen op individuele partners of groepen, of het vermogen om macht uit te oefenen binnen samenwerkingen zonder veel aandacht voor machtsverhoudingen die een bepaald bestuursmodel vereisen om een effectieve samenwerking te bewerkstelligen, biedt dit onderzoek tot slot inzichten in de verschillende effecten en interacties tussen macht en bestuursmaatregelen op de effectiviteit van samenwerkingsverbanden. Tegen de achtergrond van een toenemende inzet van samenwerkingsverbanden in allerlei dienstensectoren, probleemgebieden en contexten, met wetenschappelijk gezien een beperkte beschikbaarheid aan onderbouwend empirisch bewijs, is de beantwoording van de gestelde onderzoeksvraag daarom ook praktisch gezien bijzonder relevant. In het vervolg van deze samenvatting zal eerst een overzicht gegeven worden van de theoretische studie die uitgevoerd is om het bovengenoemde multidisciplinaire model te construeren. Vervolgens zal de toetsing van het model besproken worden en tot slot zullen de bevindingen teruggekoppeld worden naar de bovenstaande onderzoeksvraag.

Theoretisch onderzoek

Tot heden heeft de gepolariseerde discussie over macht binnen samenwerkingen, zoals uiteengezet in de introductie bij deze samenvatting, veel aandacht gekregen maar weinig theoretisch onderzoek en empirisch bewijs opgeleverd. In *hoofdstuk 2* wordt de algemene vraag “Wat zijn de theoretische conceptualiseringen en gerelateerde empirische operationaliseringen van macht die zijn voortgebracht in de literatuur over samenwerkingen?” beantwoord. Het belangrijkste doel van dit hoofdstuk is identificatie van de meest overtuigende benaderingen van macht in deze specifiek empirische context, hoe ze overlappen, welke hiaten er bestaan en de methodologische aandachtspunten die geadresseerd moeten worden bij pogingen tot synthese en integratie.

De meest basale uitkomst van het onderzoek is dat inzichten in macht binnen samenwerkingen tot heden rusten op een vrij gefragmenteerde en magere empirische basis, hetgeen leidt tot meerdere uitdagingen voor een integratieve conceptualisatie. Als meest belangrijke bron van fragmentatie worden twee relatief onafhankelijk ontwikkelende richtingen geïdentificeerd, afhankelijk van de wijze waarop academici de latentie van het concept ‘macht’ behandelen en macht begrijpen als een dispositioneel concept (“macht bezitten”) en/of episodisch concept (“macht aanwenden”).

Volgt men het dispositionele begrip, dan zijn machtsverschillen de *verklaring* voor verschillen in het resultaat van een samenwerkingsverband voor individuele partners. Alhoewel een dergelijk begrip een belangrijk argument voor of tegen een samenwerking betekent, aangezien haar impact geëvalueerd kan worden door middel van de daaraan ontleende voordelen, leidt deze benadering ertoe dat macht wordt behandeld als een eenrichtingsproces en de samenwerking als ‘zwarte doos’. Invloeden op samenwerkingsniveau worden onvoldoende gespecificeerd of zelfs genegeerd. De operationalisatie van organisationele machtsdisposities en uitkomsten blijven eenzijdig, toegespitst op individuele, danwel groepen van partners. Invloeden op samenwerkingsniveau, zoals de impact van diverse bestuursvormen, die de relatie tussen de voornoemde twee concepten kunnen verklaren, blijven onderbelicht.

Volgt men daarentegen de episodische benadering, dan is macht de *explorandum*, gedefinieerd door de interacties tussen de partners die voornamelijk worden bestudeerd door discourse- en netwerkanalyses. Deze benadering biedt rijke inzichten in hoe macht zich voordoet, bijvoorbeeld in discours, en zich manifesteert, bijvoorbeeld door gunstige posities in de relationele structuur van een samenwerking. Desalniettemin mist deze benadering de fundering van situatie-specifieke confrontaties en interacties tussen actoren in samenwerkingen binnen het bredere beeld van organisationele disposities en uitkomsten. Alhoewel bijvoorbeeld de analyse van discours vaak veronderstelt dat ‘machtige’ en ‘machteloze’ actoren gebruik maken van verschillende strategieën en raamwerken wordt zelden een verkaring geboden voor de totstandkoming van dit

onderscheid. Daarnaast blijft dit onderzoek vaag over andere uitkomsten dan discursieve winsten (zoals veranderende percepties en de afkadering van onderwerpen).

Deze nauwe focus is aanvechtbaar omdat deze winsten verdampen indien andere onevenwichtigheden blijven bestaan. Op vergelijkbare wijze rusten netwerkanalyses op bepaalde impliciete veronderstellingen omtrent kennis van middelen en/of gezamenlijke doelstellingen van partners. Deze veronderstellingen kunnen als vanzelfsprekend worden beschouwd door samenwerkingen die opereren in de geïnstitutionaliseerde dienstensectoren van Europese of Noord Amerikaanse gebieden, maar vereisen validatie in contexten waarin deze uitgangpunten niet vanzelfsprekend zijn. Uiteindelijk baseren beide analytische benaderingen zich op de analyse van het uitoefenen van macht, zonder de voorwaarden waaronder deze macht wordt uitgeoefend expliciet te maken. Onderzoekers die bijvoorbeeld de claim willen onderbouwen dat ‘machteloze’ actoren desalniettemin de gemeenschappelijke agenda kunnen bepalen omdat zij bepaalde discursieve strategieën hanteren, moeten de onderliggende factoren die het deze actoren mogelijk maakt dit te doen in ogenschouw nemen. Het mogelijk maken van bestuur dat zich richt op het incorporeren van besluitvormingsprocessen kan bijvoorbeeld de reden zijn waarom deze actoren deze mogelijkheid hebben. Het feit dat deze factoren nauwelijks aandacht hebben gekregen lijkt gegrond te zijn in de afwezigheid van gegevens over samenwerkingsverbanden die een vergelijking tussen meerdere casus mogelijk maken.

Het complementaire potentieel van beide benaderingen, en de daaraan verbonden analytische benaderingen is groot. Om dit potentieel te kunnen benutten is het echter noodzakelijk om dimensies van macht op zowel het niveau van de individuele partner als het samenwerkingsverband te integreren in één multidimensionaal kader. Een aantal issues dient te worden aangeroerd door zo een kader. Allereerst, dient in de analyse van de microgrondslagen van macht het dispositionele begrip verder te gaan dan louter een demarcatie van de machteloze en machthebbende partners, en uitleggen waarom deze effecten zich voordoen. Zijn bijvoorbeeld bepaalde middelen (viz, betrokkenheid in het samenwerkingsproces) een meer effectieve basis van macht binnen samenwerkingsverbanden dan anderen omdat deze middelen als meer waardevol worden gezien, of zich vertalen in meer gunstige posities en/of in meer effectieve deelname? Om deze en andere vragen te beantwoorden moeten machtsverhoudingen los van uitkomsten worden geoperationaliseerd, en beide concepten dienen breed genoeg te worden geconceptualiseerd om het potentieel en werkelijke winst voor alle partners te beslaan. Met andere woorden, de analyse van de relatie tussen dispositie-uitkomsten moet ruimte bieden voor invloeden op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband.

Een episodisch begrip van macht zou juist het totaal van het samenwerkingsverband als context moeten nemen voor episodes waarin macht wordt uitgeoefend. Bestaat er bijvoorbeeld interactie tussen machtsdifferentiëlen en bestuursvormen bij het realiseren van een effectief samenwerkingsproces? Kunnen verschillende bestuursmodellen de

(mogelijk negatieve) effecten van machtsdifferentiëlen opheffen? Zijn interventies in het ontwerp van een samenwerking meer of minder effectief dan inspanningen die gericht zijn op het bouwen van relaties en het vernieuwen van inzichten? Om deze en vergelijkbare vragen te beantwoorden dient een aantal methodologische issues te worden opgelost. In de eerste plaats dienen verschijnselen die zich afspelen op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband als zodanig te worden geoperationaliseerd. Verschillen in machtsverhoudingen dienen te worden geoperationaliseerd als *collectieve* voorwaarden voor samenwerking op een wijze die geschikt is voor vergelijkbare analyses, teneinde inzicht te krijgen in de interacties met andere verschijnselen die zich afspelen op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband, bijvoorbeeld de wijze van besturen. Tenslotte is het alleen mogelijk om zowel het niveau van de partner als dat van het samenwerkingsverband te integreren door het aggregeren van verschillen in machtsverhoudingen *en* uitkomsten op basis van de evaluaties van de individuele partners. Dit alles op zo een manier dat onderzoek informerend werkt voor het ontwikkelen van strategieën voor effectieve deelname van individuele organisaties *en* het ontwerp en de implementatie van effectieve samenwerkingsverbanden.

Het multi-dimensionale en –disciplinaire onderzoekskader dat is ontwikkeld voor deze study is een poging om deze onderzoeksrichtingen en methodologische issues te behandelen. Op het analyseniveau van de individuele partner worden de effecten van de bronnen van organisationele macht, middelen en posities (viz. betrokkenheid in processen aangaande samenwerkingsverbanden) op effectieve deelname verkend. De operationalisering van beide bronnen van macht incorporeren het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband: Middelen worden wederzijds beoordeeld op basis van hun utiliteitswaarde, en netwerkposities zijn afgeleid op basis van netwerkanalytische data met betrekking tot de betrokkenheid van partners en de interacties en beslissingen binnen samenwerkingsverbanden. Deze relatie verklaart de micro-origines van macht binnen samenwerkingsverbanden via het functioneren of disfunctioneren van bronnen van macht die effectieve deelname aan samenwerkingsverbanden zou moeten bewerkstelligen. Op het analyseniveau van het samenwerkingsverband wordt een drievoudig argument over het meest passende besturingsmodel, ofwel de interactie tussen machtsverschillen en de wijze van besturen en de manier waarop deze effectieve samenwerking creëren, onderzocht. Het hierboven voorgestelde analysekader om dit argument te onderzoeken is aangepast aan de context van internationale samenwerkingsverbanden op het gebied van ontwikkelingshulp. De onderliggende logica die een verklaring geeft voor de adoptie van verschillende besturingsvormen in het licht van bepaalde combinaties van voorwaarden op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband, ofwel machtsverschillen tussen partners, wordt in deze context onderzocht. Deze logica wordt gecontrasteerd met het huidig conceptueel denken over het effect van het best passende besturingsmodel op de effectiviteit van samenwerkingsverbanden in het onderzoek naar samenwerkingsverbanden tussen

publieke diensten. Het drievoudige argument met betrekking tot het effect van het meest passende besturingsmodel op een samenwerkingsverband als het gaat om effectieve samenwerking, wordt getest in de analyse in het laatste hoofdstuk van deze dissertatie.

Empirisch onderzoek

Om het doel van dit onderzoek te bereiken, namelijk het verklaren van de samenhang tussen de drie benaderingen van macht, bestuur en effectiviteit, zijn onderzoeksgegevens verzameld onder ontwikkelingssamenwerkingen, aangevuld met interviews en documentgegevens. Specifiekere informatie over deze enquête is te vinden in Appendices I and II. De enquête is uitgezet onder alle samenwerkingen die (mede) werden gesubsidieerd door twee initiatieven van de Europese Unie, namelijk het “European Union Energy” en “Water Facility” (EUEF and EUWF). Tegen 2004 werd, als onderdeel van de objectieve rol van de EU om haar bijdrage aan de Millennium Doelstellingen “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs), besloten over de lancering van twee financieringsinstrumenten gebaseerd op de voorwaardelijke toewijzing van €1 miljard uit het Negende Europese Ontwikkelingsfonds “Ninth European Development Fund (EDF)” aan samenwerkingsinitiatieven in het ACP (Afrikaans-Caraïbisch-Pacific) gebied. Via twee aanbestedingsaankondigingen werden 175 samenwerkingen voor duurzame watervoorzieningen en sanitatie in 2005 en 2006 voor de EUWF, en een totaal van 75 samenwerkingen voor de ontwikkeling en levering van duurzame energie voor de eerste oproep voor de EUEF, geselecteerd voor subsidiëring. Netwerkanalytische en attributionele gegevens werden verkregen van alle 175 partner organisaties die betrokken werden in 38 van de gesubsidieerde samenwerkingen. In overeenstemming met multi-dimensionale benadering van macht binnen samenwerkingen in het onderhavige onderzoek, zijn diverse analytische benaderingen gekozen om de resultaten op individueel partnerniveau en op samenwerkingsniveau te analyseren. Een statistische analyse bestudeert de effecten van de grondslagen van macht op uitkomsten binnen alle 175 partnerorganisaties (Hoofdstuk 3). De verhouding op samenwerkingsniveau tussen de begrippen macht, bestuur en effectiviteit zijn geanalyseerd middels een vergelijkende kwalitatieve analyse van de 38 samenwerkingen om de doelstelling van het onderzoek van Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 te behalen. Gezocht werd naar verklaringen op samenwerkingsniveau voor de verhouding tussen deze begrippen.

De micro-grondslagen van macht en effectieve deelname aan samenwerkingen

In *hoofdstuk 3* is de verwachting dat verschillen in de machtsdisposities van partners invloed hebben op de de effectiviteit van hun bijdragen aan samenwerkingen. De leidende onderzoeksvraag is: “Hoe zijn organisationele grondslagen van macht gerelateerd aan effectieve deelname aan samenwerkingen?” Machtsdisposities of

grondslagen van organisationele macht zijn middelen en posities (viz. netwerkanalytische gegevens inzake de betrokkenheid van partners in een samenwerkingsinteractie en besluitvorming). Het eerste deel van de analyse toont dat de vertaling van middelen naar gunstige posities en/of effectieve deelname in gradaties afhangt van hun veronderstelde nut. Sommige middelen, zoals arbeid en begunstigde vertegenwoordiging, hangen wat betreft hun functie als grondslag van macht sterk af van de perceptie van de overige partners van hun waarde voor hen of voor het doel van de samenwerking. Andere middelen, zoals financiële middelen of administratieve capaciteiten, worden relatief onafhankelijk van dergelijke percepties vertaald naar effectieve deelname. Het discriminerende effect van deze middelen die het sterkst afhangen van perceptie, werd enkel bevestigd in hun vertaling naar gunstige posities in de interacties tussen partners en de invloed op beslissingen op samenwerkingsniveau, maar niet met betrekking tot hun vertaling naar betrokkenheid bij het besluitvormingsproces. Een verklaring voor dit gegeven is dat de nutswaardering van middelen eenzijdig is. Deze verklaring wordt gesteund door de bevinding dat bemiddelende organisaties (zij die EU-fondsen aanvraagden) de middelen die partners aanbrachten veel hoger waardeerden dan hun eigen inbreng, terwijl deze partners hun eigen bijdragen aanmerkelijk lager inschatten.

Meer dan de enkele afbakening van machtige en machteloze groepen verklaren de resultaten van dit onderzoek waarom deze verschillen zich voordien en waarom een vertalingen van de grondslagen van macht naar effectieve samenwerking niet als vanzelfsprekend kan worden aanvaard, of geacht kan worden organisch te ontwikkelen binnen een ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Het tweede deel van de analyse onderzoekt de effecten van iedere grondslag van macht op effectieve deelname, en in relatie tot anderen. De bevindingen tonen aan de ene kant aan dat betrokkenheid in het besluitvormingsproces significant bijdraagt aan de kansen voor effectieve deelname door partners die minder machtig zijn qua middelen en dat, indien betrokken, het vooral de partners zijn die middelen bezitten die het sterkst afhankelijk zijn van nutswaardering profiteren van betrokkenheid. Zodoende, anticiperend op het bestuursargument, wordt de behoefte aan en de potentie van bestuursmaatregelen aangetoond als middel om de effectiviteit van machtsgrondslagen van partners te vergroten en daarmee de wijze waarop interorganisationele machtsverhoudingen zich binnen een samenwerking ontwikkelen.

De macro-grondslagen van macht en effectieve samenwerkingen

De hoofdstukken 4 en 5 onderzoeken de relatie tussen de 3 fenomenen van samenwerkingsdifferentiëlen en samenwerkingsbestuur, die worden samengevat door het concept van 'governance fit', en effectiviteit van de samenwerking. Vertrekpunt is het argument dat effectieve samenwerkingen afhankelijk zijn van aansluiting van de gekozen bestuursvorm op omstandigheden op partnerniveau. Dit argument en de

gerelateerde definitie van relevante indicatoren van de drie concepten daarentegen, vloeit voort uit hun bestudering binnen publieke samenwerkingen en tot heden zijn daar nog geen inzichten in betrokken van partners binnen een internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Inzichten uit beide werkterreinen worden geïntegreerd, hetgeen leidt tot de volgende indicatoren voor beide concepten. De gekozen selectie van vier eigenschappen (omvang van de samenwerking, de mate waarin doelstellingen en vertrouwen worden gedeeld door, en compatibel zijn met, de partners, en de onzekerheid die samenhangt met het sponsorklimaat) wordt aangevuld met twee eigenschappen (machtsdifferentiën tussen partners en de onzekerheid die samenhangt met uitvoeringscontext van de samenwerking) die, zo wordt betoogd door ontwikkelingsacademici, een adequaat antwoord vereisen op het gebied van bestuur.

Voor het evalueren van bestuursvormen combineren bestaande modellen de evaluatie van bestuursstructuren en interventies. Bestuursstructuren wijzen op de mate van bemiddeling door de mate waarin besluitvorming, interacties en controle worden gedeeld/ gedecentraliseerd en/of gecentraliseerd/ geconcentreerd tussen partners.

Bestuursinterventies zijn geacht controlegerelateerd te zijn: bijv. de formalisatie van overeenkomsten, of de samenwerking wordt bestuurd door de partners of dat een organisatie of samenwerkingstussenpersoon het bestuur krijgt opgedragen, en of externe betrekkingen centraal worden aangestuurd of door de meerderheid van partners individueel). Dit wordt aangevuld met ondersteunende bestuursinterventies, die worden geïdentificeerd als de primaire strategie om om te gaan met macht in ontwikkelingssamenwerkingen, namelijk maatregelen die dienen om doelen, overeenstemming, geschillenbeslechting en de inzet van assistentie en steun te verduidelijken. Dit aangepaste model wordt in twee stappen onderzocht. Hoofdstuk 4 verkent de onderliggende logica voor de keuze van een specifiek bestuursmodel bij bepaalde combinaties van omstandigheden op samenwerkingsniveau door ontwikkelingswerkers. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de werkelijke relatie tussen ‘governance fit’ en de effectiviteit van een samenwerking onderzocht en besproken in het licht van deze voorstellingen.

Hoofdstuk 4 betreft de vraag “wat zijn de omstandigheden op samenwerkingsniveau die de keuze door de partners van een bepaald bestuursmodel verklaren?” De eerste stap van de analyse leidt tot de identificatie van 4 bestuursvormen, gebaseerd op de combinatie van twee structurele bestuursdimensies. Gedeeld bestuur combineert decentrale interactie met gedeelde controle en invloed. Drie uitbestede bestuursvormen tonen ofwel centrale interacties of geconcentreerde invloed, of beiden. De vier structurele vormen worden geanalyseerd in relatie tot de aanwezigheid van controle-gerelateerde en mandaterende bestuursinterventies. Na identificatie van de vier bestuursvormen bestudeert een kwalitatieve vergelijkende analyse de parallele aanwezigheid of afwezigheid van omstandigheden op samenwerkingsniveau. Deze configuratie van

omstandigheden markeert een bijzonder onderscheid met betrekking tot de keuze voor gedeelde in plaats van uitbestede bestuursvormen. Dit onderzoeksgegeven wordt behandeld met betrekking tot divergenties van bestaande modellen van ‘governance fit’: De eerste algemene aanname, namelijk dat de keuze voor uitbesteding van bestuur sneller wordt genomen naarmate de context van een samenwerking complexer is, wordt slechts deels bevestigd door de resultaten van dit onderzoek. Samenwerkingen met gedeeld bestuur daarentegen vertonen aan de ene zijde omstandigheden die geacht worden te duiden op complexe bestuurstaken (bijv. dat zij relatief groot zijn and hoge mates van externe onzekerheid vertonen in hun uitvoeringsgebied), en aan de andere zijde interventies die vergelijkbaar zijn met die van uitbestede modellen (bijv. formalisatie). Beide zich voordoende omstandigheden en de bestuursreactie van uitbestede versus gedeelde bestuursvormen zijn niet meer of minder complex maar gelijken op verschillende complexiteiten of logiciteiten van ‘governance fit’. Drie onderscheiden omstandigheden worden geïdentificeerd om samenwerkingen te beschrijven met gedeeld bestuur: Een afwezigheid van machtsdifferentiëlen en een gelijktijdige aanwezigheid van vertrouwen en onzekerheid in het uitvoeringsgebied. De combinatie van gedeeld bestuur met deze twee interne omstandigheden brengt een beeld van intra-organisationale relaties op basis van gelijkheid en een bestuursstaak die bestaat uit de coördinatie van twee relatief autonome partners die controle eisen op de besluitvorming binnen de samenwerking.

Gelijkluidend worden onzekere uitvoeringsomstandigheden geregeld binnen samenwerkingen met gedeeld bestuur door de individuele partners. Dit onderzoeksgegeven suggereert dat partners hun individuele verantwoordelijkheden naar hun eigen klanten, zoals die van energie en waterlevenciers in dit onderzoek, voorrang geven boven wensen (van bijvoorbeeld donors) om deze over te hevelen naar de samenwerking. Dit kan in het bijzonder het geval zijn in een ontwikkelingscontext waarin zwakke publieke en/of private partijen door de partners niet geschikt worden bevonden om de potentiële risico’s van samenwerking te dragen.

Een methode om een samenwerking legitimiteit te geven in de ogen van haar achterban is het bieden van wederkerige controle en het geven van gelegenheid aan partners om invloed uit te oefenen op de besluitvorming binnen de samenwerking. Echter, in tegenspraak met bestaande voorstellingen, zijn er weinig uitbestede samenwerkingen waarbij de externe en/of interne relaties centraal worden geregeld, en de controle en/of invloed wordt gedeeld. Dit is verassend, aangezien gelijktijdig de uitbestede samenwerkingen het vaakst machtsdifferentiëlen vertoonden die gerelateerd waren aan middelen. Desalniettemin is de primaire strategie om deze omstandigheid te verwerken de toepassing van interventies die gericht zijn op het bieden van assistentie en hulp, en veel minder het delen van controle en/of invloed tussen partners. De conclusie is dat de meerderheid van samenwerkingen met uitbesteed bestuur nog steeds gelijken op het meer traditionele ‘implementatiemodel’ van ontwikkelingssamenwerking waarbij de

aard van de bijdragen afhankelijk is van de welwillendheid of het ontwikkelingsperspectief van machtige partners.

Hoofdstuk 5 laat alle stukken van de puzzel op hun plaats vallen door een antwoord te geven op de vraag: “Hoe verhoudt ‘governance fit’ zich tot de effectiviteit van een samenwerking?” Vootbouwend op de gedachte dat de effectiviteit van samenwerkingen afhangt van de keuze voor een bestuursvorm die past bij de specifieke omstandigheden specificeren bestaande modellen enkele veronderstellingen over de aard van deze relatie. De meest overtuigende stelt dat gunstige omstandigheden voor een samenwerking, zoals kleine omvang, vertrouwen, overeenstemming over de doelen, en stabiele verhoudingen met donoren, zich beter verhouden met gedeeld bestuur terwijl uitbesteed bestuur beter past bij samenwerkingen binnen uitdagende omstandigheden. Aanvullende specificaties vloeien voort uit de voorafgaande verkennende analyse van de geschiktheid van bestuursvormen bij machtsdifferentiëlen en onzekere uitvoeringsomstandigheden. Bij aanwezigheid van het laatstgenoemde wordt verwacht dat externe relaties worden verzorgd door de individuele partners als het risico bestaat dat bestaande banden worden bedreigd door de overdracht naar de samenwerking. Voor het besturen van machtsdifferentiëlen binnen samenwerkingen worden twee richtingen geïdentificeerd: Interventies die partners voorzien van assistentie en hulp en interventies die de onderliggende structuur van de samenwerking wijzigen, zoals bestuur door derden en het delen van controle.

De belangrijkste bevindingen van de vergelijkende onderzoek zijn drievoudig. Ten eerste is aangetoond dat de veronderstelde effecten van governance fit met betrekking tot externe omstandigheden worden bevestigd, in de zin dat effectieve samenwerking met onzekerheden rond financiering worden geleid met centrale externe vertegenwoordiging en dat samenwerkingen die worden geconfronteerd met onzekere uitvoeringsomstandigheden door individuele partners. Echter, het zijn niet de externe, maar de drie interne voorwaarden van afwezigheid van vertrouwen en overeenstemming over doelen en de aanwezigheid van machtsdifferentiëlen die worden geïdentificeerd als het meest precair, aangezien zij het meest worden geassocieerd met ineffectieve samenwerking. Gebaseerd op de daaropvolgende analyse van die samenwerkingen die geconfronteerd worden met een of meer van deze omstandigheden wordt beweerd dat van al deze omstandigheden de aanwezigheid van machtsdifferentiëlen het kan worden beïnvloed door de keuze voor een passende bestuursvorm. Ten tweede worden machtsdifferentiëlen, indien aanwezig, het meest effectief bestuurd door een uitbestede bestuursvorm die de volgende karakteristieken combineert: Gecentraliseerde interacties door een hoofdpartner *of* een entiteit die de bestuurstaak specifiek krijgt opgedragen, gedeelde invloed en wederzijdse controle, en ondersteunende interventies. Vergelijking van meerdere samenwerkingen die een of meer van deze bestuurskarakteristieken hebben, suggereert dat niet een enkele maar de combinatie het effect heeft van de juiste

bestuurskeuze op de effectiviteit van de samenwerking. Tenslotte: Aangezien effectiviteit wordt geëvalueerd door een gecombineerde inschatting van individueel organisationele én samenwerkingseffectiviteit toont de bevinding de interactie aan tussen micro- (machtsdifferentiëlen) en macrogrondslagen (bestuur) van effectieve samenwerkingen.

Conclusies

Het in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde onderzoek had als overkoepelend doel te achterhalen wat de oorzaken en gevolgen zijn van macht en verschillen in machtsposities tussen partners binnen samenwerkingsverbanden en wat de rol is van het bestuur van samenwerkingsverbanden binnen deze context. Om dit doel te bereiken is vanuit diverse theoretische perspectieven een interdisciplinair model ontwikkeld, waarvan de sub-relaties zijn behandeld op het niveau van de partner en het samenwerkingsverband in elk hoofdsuk, waarmee een zo compleet mogelijke verklaring kan worden gegeven. Uit de empirische toetsing van deze modellen blijkt dat macht en de manier waarop hiermee vanuit bestuursoogpunt wordt omgegaan een belangrijke rol spelen voor zowel effectieve deelname aan een samenwerkingsverband als het succes van zo'n collectieve onderneming. Met betrekking tot de micro-grondslagen van macht binnen samenwerkingsverbanden is aangetoond dat het functioneren van individuele organisaties als bron van macht niet als gegeven kan worden aangenomen in samenwerkingsverbanden met een hoge diversiteit leden en actief in minder geïnstitutionaliseerde gebieden, zoals ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsverbanden. Kort samengevat lijken bronnen van macht te mislukken op dat punt, wanneer waardevolle bronnen zouden moeten worden vertaald in betrokkenheid, terwijl wanneer van deze betrokkenheid sprake is de kansen op het inzetten van deze middelen worden vergroot, en daarmee de kansen op effectieve deelname door partners die toegang hebben tot deze middelen. Daarom kan de conclusie getrokken worden dat, ook al zijn het interventies die als doel hebben de perceptie van partners te veranderen en het verhogen van de betrokkenheid van partners binnen partneringsprocessen, beide interventies de effectieve deelname van partners stimuleren. Laatstgenoemde lijkt de voorwaarden te scheppen van waaruit veranderende percepties voortvloeien, misschien zelfs organisch en zonder de noodzaak tot het uitvoeren van verdere interventies. Met betrekking tot de macro-funderingen van macht en effectieve samenwerkingsverbanden laten de huidige bevindingen zien dat machtsverschillen tussen partners inderdaad een collectief fenomeen representeren wat een risico kan vormen voor het succes van de collectieve onderneming. Tegelijkertijd laten de bevindingen echter zien dat wanneer deze machtsverschillen adequaat worden opgevangen door bestuursmaatregelen, samenwerkingsverbanden desalniettemin effectief kunnen worden.

Terugkijkend op de doelstelling van dit onderzoek kan geconcludeerd worden dat de vooraf gespecificeerde (wetenschappelijke) bijdragen van het onderzoek gerealiseerd zijn. Dit onderzoek heeft laten zien dat een multi-disciplinaire benadering een meer genuanceerd en volledig plaatje geeft van het probleem van macht in samenwerkingsverbanden. Dit is van bijzonder belang in een veld waar de diversiteit van wetenschappelijke disciplines dat van de diversiteit binnen een gemiddeld samenwerkingsverband evenaart. Op deze wijze zijn interdisciplinaire grenzen geslecht die niet alleen theoretisch maar ook praktisch bestaan, gevoed door de actoren die dit onderzoek beoogt te informeren. De huidige studie combineert de belangstelling voor macht vanuit ontwikkelingswetenschappers om de praktijk van het samenwerken te informeren binnen het keurslijf van donor-ontvanger relaties, en de focus op effectiviteit door wetenschappers actief in het veld van management en publiek bestuur, aangepast aan de behoeften van hen die deze context bepalen. Ook heeft de studie bereikt dat inzichten zijn gegenereerd in de multi-dimensionele aard van macht binnen samenwerkingsverbanden. De bevindingen laten zien dat macht zich op verschillende manieren manifesteert op op het niveau van de partner en op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband. Door het linken van macht aan andere verschijnselen leggen de bevindingen het bestaan van een recursieve relatie bloot tussen beide dimensies, wat het meest duidelijk gedemonstreerd wordt door governance fit, in de vorm van interactie tussen governance maten op macroniveau en machtsverschillen als het gaat om het voortbrengen van effectieve samenwerkingsverbanden.

Zoals elk onderzoek, kent ook dit onderzoek enkele beperkingen. De meest belangrijke daarvan is het feit dat, vanwege de onsystematische selectie van cases met betrekking tot de concepten op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband en besturingsvormen, een situatie is ontstaan waarin niet alle theoretisch relevante combinaties met betrekking tot de meest ideale besturingsvorm zijn gerepresenteerd in de huidige data en aldus konden worden geanalyseerd met betrekking tot hun effectiviteit. Een andere limitatie is ontstaan vanuit het feit dat alleen cross-sectionele data is verzameld. Daardoor konden de gesuggereerde causale verbanden, bijvoorbeeld de adoptie van bestuursmaatregelen als gevolg van gestelde voorwaarden op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband, niet onomstotelijk worden vastgesteld. Tot slot kan, ook al is de non-response analyse uitgevoerd op basis van informatie over de betrokken samenwerkingsverbanden in de huidige studie, een selectiebias met betrekking tot redenen vóór en tegen de deelname van individuele organisaties aan dit onderzoek niet worden uitgesloten.

Het uitgevoerde onderzoek werpt, zoals gebruikelijk, net zoveel vragen op als het beantwoordt. Overtuigend is echter aangetoond dat het gebruik van multi-disciplinaire modellen waardevol is. Deze modellen zouden gebruikt kunnen worden (als basis) voor toekomstig (longitudinaal) onderzoek, in het bijzonder naar het effect van governance fit op de effectiviteit van samenwerkingsverbanden. Zoals deze studie heeft laten zien kunnen zulke modellen helpen in het begrijpen waarom verschillende vormen van

governance fit de effectiviteit van samenwerkingsverbanden kunnen verklaren in verschillende contexten waarbinnen deze samenwerkingsverbanden worden uitgevoerd. Voor de context van internationale ontwikkelingssamenwerking is door de literatuur gesuggereerd, en door de huidige bevindingen bevestigd, dat macht een doorslaggevende rol speelt in het definiëren van governance fit en de effectiviteit van samenwerkingsverbanden. Vervolgonderzoek kan inzoomen op deze en vergelijkbare relaties tussen verschijnselen op het niveau van het samenwerkingsverband, door het meenemen van additionele condities die doorslaggevend kunnen zijn in andere situaties waarin samenwerkingsverbanden worden uitgevoerd. Op deze manier kan opeenvolgende cumulatieve kennisopbouw het gat opvullen dat bestaat tussen enerzijds het gebrek aan empirische data over samenwerkingsverbanden, en de brede toepassing van samenwerkingsverbanden als een institutionele oplossing voor allerlei probleemgebieden en takken van dienstverlening.

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Appendix I: Survey development

Two concepts had to be operationalised by specifically developing measurements for the present study. These concepts are incorporated in the analyses of Chapters 3,4 and 5, as follows: In Chapter 3, the relationship between organisational bases of power and effective participation in partnerships is examined. For this purpose, two bases of power, resources and positions, and one dependent variable, effective participation, as the extent of individual organisational influence of partners on partnership-level decisions, are operationalised. From these two individual organisational measures, three concepts are aggregated and extrapolated to the partnership-level of analysis for the subsequent qualitative comparative analyses of Chapter 3 and 4: the partnership-level condition of power differentials between partners and the two governance aspects of the extent to which control and influence on partnership-level decision-making are shared or concentrated among partners. The latter step of aggregation of partner-level measures to partnership-level indicators is explained separately in the Chapters 4 and 5. The development of the scales that form the basis of the individual organisational measurements, which are utilised in Chapter 3, are explained below:

Perceived resource-related power

As noted in the literature review, power resources may be defined as anything, tangible or intangible, which partners can muster to their aid in partnership processes, or work implicitly without being enacted to their benefit. For the concept resources, it was required to arrive at a distinct measurement for their access and/or control by individual partners and a context-specific assessment of their value in a specific partnership (Jacobson & Cohen, 1986; Provan, 1980). Therefore, a list of potentially relevant resources for such a partnership-level specific assessment was developed. The selection of relevant resources for this exercise was tailored to the specific context of the partnerships studied here. From the precedent review of the literature (see Chapter 2) and an explorative interview study, several broader resource categories were developed.

For the explorative interview study, different organisations were asked, in addition to other issues, about the resources they themselves and their partners contribute to a partnership. For this, semi-structured interviews were conducted between October and November 2006. Respondents were selected on the basis of their organisations' sector affiliation and involvement in a partnership. Two hundred organisations were contacted that had either registered at a government-hosted partnership forum

(www.partnerships.nl)⁴⁶ or participated in the Dutch Social Forum⁴⁷. Of these, eighty respondents from seventy-five organisations⁴⁸ were interviewed. Although an equal share from all three sectors was intended, NGOs account for almost half (46%), while businesses represent 33% and government organisations 22% of the organisations involved in this study. This has come about due to the fact that few larger businessⁱ and government organisations were involved in several partnership projects. NGO participation was more widespreadⁱⁱ. Of the seventy-five respondent organisations, sixty-nine reported their involvement in a partnership at the time of study. The remaining six organisations were presently not involved in a partnership but either mentioned that they intend to partner with an already agreed upon organisation/s in the near future (the case of two organisations), or that they had only recently⁴⁹ terminated their involvement in a partnership (the case of four organisations). All respondent organisations are registered in the Netherlands. The partnerships they are involved in operate in developed (56%) and developing countries (44%)⁵⁰.

From this study and review of the literature, seven broader categories of potentially relevant resources were identified: i) financial means, ii) relational resources e.g. membership in associations (Brown & Ashman, 1996; Provan et al., 1980) iii) administrative resources (Huang & Provan, 2006) e.g. project management capacities and experience; iv) production means and technologies (Marfo, 2006); v) scientific, technological and local knowledge (Bontenbal, 2009; Brokenshaw, Warren, & Werner, 1980; Hardy et al., 2003; Johnson & Wilson, 2006), vi.) authority, such as coercive and/or licensing, regulative and price-setting authority (Birner & Wittmer, 2006; Derkzen et al., 2008; Dill, 2009), and vii.) legitimacy in representing third parties' interests (Ashman, 2001b; Phillips & Hardy, 1997; Phillips et al., 2000) (beneficiary communities, etc.).

According to these categories, a list of twenty-one resources was developed. In a second step, groups of partners potentially involved in the partnerships under study were identified on the basis of publicly available reports and funding statistics of the two financing initiatives, the EUWF and EUEF. Those were: IOs and foreign (non-ACP) national governments, national local (ACP) governments, regional local government, foreign NGOs, foreign energy/water operator, local operator, local NGO, research institutes. Subsequently, representatives of each group were asked to identify for themselves resources they would typically contribute to a partnership. The selection

⁴⁶ Dutch National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development , NCDO, <http://www.ncdo.nl/>)

⁴⁷ Held in the same year (2006) in Nijmegen, The Netherlands (Nederlands Social Forum, www.sociaalforum.nl)

⁴⁸ In 5 cases two interviewees were from the same organisation but involved in different partnerships.

⁴⁹ Within the last year.

⁵⁰ With a focus on partners from the Benelux and African countries, respectively.

criterion for the representatives was their experience with partnerships in international development cooperation. Since knowledge of the specific context of the funding initiatives was desired, pre-tests were conducted with organisations who knew the initiatives but were not directly involved in the partnerships under study. Such representatives were contacted and interviewed for each group in 2008, during a stakeholder meeting of one of the over-arching partnership initiatives⁵¹, the European Water Initiative (EUWI), at the Water Week in Stockholm. If no representative of one of the groups attended this meeting and/or were not available for interviews, then they were contacted via follow-up telephone interviews. The resources named by the representatives of the groups were compared with the list of twenty-one resources obtained from the pre-test and literature. Only those resources were kept that adequately represented the resources typically contributed by representative organisations of the groups. This way, a list of eighteen resources was arrived at which were included in the survey.

Positions and influence

Both positions and influence describe the capacity of partners to use their resources (Jacobson & Cohen, 1986) in order to successfully interact and effectively participate in partnerships. Positions were operationalised two ways: the structural position of partners in the ongoing interactions between partners, in reporting, resource exchange, advice and support; and through the involvement of partners in and influence on partnership-level decisions. Involvement and influence in the decision-making processes of partnerships were measured via a partner's involvement in the decisions about ten partnership-related issues. For the development of this issue-related influence measure, the same procedure, involving the same group of experts, was applied as described for the measurement of resources. From the literature a list of fifteen issues was extracted. A distinction was adapted between partnership-constitutive issues regarding the design, and issues about the implementation of partnerships, since previous research found differences in the level of participation between these stages and dimensions of the partnering process (e.g. Finsterbusch, 1987). The representatives of each group were asked in the interviews to assess for each of the fifteen issues on a five-Likert-scale (to "very important") how important the decision about this issue normally is to their organisation. Keeping an equal proportion of design and implementation related issues, a list of ten decision-making issues was arrived at.

⁵¹ Notably, the EUWI and EUEI describe the two over-arching, so-called Type-II partnering initiatives (Stewart & Gray, 2006) from which the EUWF and EUEF derived as financing instruments. The partnerships studied here are the field-level partnerships, which were (co-)financed by the two facilities.

Appendix I: Survey Development

The two measurements of resources and the partnership-related decision-making issues were combined with the other measures, explained in detail in each chapter, and compiled in a survey instrument. The survey instrument was programmed as an online-survey tool⁵², which was provided in English and French. Since the majority of the measurements were relational, each single survey was designed for the respective respondent and partnership individually, asking about the respondent's relations to and assessment of their own and their partners' involvement in the partnership. Pre-tests were conducted with a randomly selected sample of one survey for each partnership in order to check for the correct display of names and to ensure correct item coding and data transfer into SPSS. After the initial invitations for participation were sent, follow-up reminders were used in intervals of two weeks. Since the complexity and the time needed to complete the survey increased proportionally by the number of partners involved, it was decided to personally conduct interviews via telephone with the participants of the two partnerships that involved thirteen and sixteen participants, respectively. Furthermore, in five partnerships one or more of the participant organisations had no steady internet access and/or indicated language preferences other than English or French. These respondents participated via telephone interviews (which were conducted with in total eleven organisations). For all other partnerships that involved fewer participants and for which the participant organisations had internet access, data collection was conducted via the online-survey tool

⁵² cf. ESF survey design and administration tool: <http://www.unipark.info/30-1-products.htm>

Appendix II: Survey

Welcome to the Partnership Governance Survey !

Bienvenus à l'enquête Gestion de partenariat !

Please select your language.

Sélectionnez votre langue.

☐ Français

☐ English

Next

Cancel

To answer the following questions, please consider that:

All questions only refer to your organisation's involvement in this particular partnership and not to your organisation's involvement in any other partnership.

Next

Cancel

When did the partnership start and when it is expected to be completed?

If the partnership is expected to continue indefinitely, then leave the field for the year of completion empty.

Start (Year) :

Completion (Year) :

Please indicate the total budget of the partnership and estimate to what proportion it is financed directly by the partners and to what proportion through external funding sources (e.g., the European Commission).

Total Budget :

% Financed by partners :

% Financed by external sources :

Please indicate the number of new entrants and withdrawals of partners from the beginning of this partnership.

New entrants :

Withdrawals :

The following categories describe two possible functions of a partnership. Although they are not exclusive, please indicate which one best applies to this partnership.

If none of the functions applies to this partnership, please briefly describe its function in the space provided at the end.

☐ **Service Delivery** : This partnership primarily addresses the delivery of (public) services and infrastructure drawing on diverse partners to enable effective delivery and fulfill contractual obligations..

☐ **Rules and Standard Setting** : This partnership primarily addresses the generation, advocacy and stewardship of agreements and rules that govern the behaviour of targeted adopters (e.g. policies, best practices, standards, etc.)

☐ **Others** (Please specify!) :

Cancel

Next

The following statements describe the operational environment of a partnership.

Please indicate, which of the following statements best describe the operational environment of this partnership:

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither/nor	Agree	Strongly agree
The partnership's goals and efforts are well integrated in local development agendas and receive institutional support.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The partnership receives all resources and information needed for its successful implementation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The partnership's goals and efforts are well received and supported by beneficiary communities.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Cancel

Next

The following statements describe the operational environment of a partnership.

Please indicate, which of the following statements best describe the operational environment of this partnership:

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither/nor	Agree	Strongly agree
The partnership's goals and efforts are well integrated in local development agendas and receive institutional support.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The partnership receives all resources and information needed for its successful implementation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The partnership's goals and efforts are well received and supported by beneficiary communities.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Cancel

Next

When did your organisation join the partnership?

Year:

Was your organisation's decision to join the partnership voluntary or mandated (e.g., required by governmental or donor policies).

☐ Mandated

☐ Voluntary

Please indicate the total amount your organisation has invested in the partnership, until now.

If your organisation's contribution partly or entirely consists of non-financial assets (e.g., technology, labour, etc.), please estimate the financial equivalent in Euros.

☐ No own direct contribution

☐ Total contribution (EUR) :

Cancel

Next

The following organisational resources can be important for the success of a partnership.
Please indicate how important these resources are for the success of this particular partnership.
Please indicate the importance of each resource by clicking on one of checkboxes next to it and selecting its importance.

Please consider that multiple resources can be (equally) important for the success of this partnership whereas others may have no relevance whatsoever.

	Not at all	Slightly	Somewhat	Very	Extremely
Financial means	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Production means and technologies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Manpower	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Coercive power to enforce agreements/policies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Licensing, regulative and price-setting authority	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Reputation and a high level of recognition	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Representation of beneficiaries' interests	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Scientific/technical knowledge and expertise	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Administrative and coordinating capacities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Negotiation skills and experience	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Project management experience	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Relations with/influence on relevant decision-makers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Relations with relevant committees and associations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Relations with the public and the media	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Personal relations and trust among partners	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Political support	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regional/local knowledge and experience	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ownership of licenses/patents	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Cancel

Next

In the following, a list of collaborative activities is given.

Please indicate with whom of your present partner(s) your organisation was involved in the following partnership-related activities:

- **Reporting:** To which/from which of your partner(s) does your organisation give or receive reports about partnership-related issues (e.g., your own organisation's and/or the other organisation's decisions and/or progress made, etc.)?
- **Resources:** To which/from which of your partner(s) does your organisation provide or receive resources (e.g., funds, technologies, information, etc.) assigned to partnership-related tasks and issues?
- **Advice:** To which/from which of your partner(s) does your organisation give or receive important knowledge and advice about partnership-related issues?
- **Support:** To which/from which of your partner(s) does your organisation provide or receive valuable support in decisions about and negotiations of partnership-related issues? (In negotiations with external parties, as well as internally, in situations when conflicts arise among partners).

Do so by clicking the arrow-button in the respective field to the right of each partner's name and selecting the kind of activity.

If your organisation was not engaged in one of the above mentioned activities with one or more of your partner(s), please leave the arrow-button on "No activity".

	Reporting	Resources	Advice	Support
Name of partner	No activity ▼	No activity ▼	No activity ▼	No activity ▼
Name of partner	No activity ▼	No activity ▼	No activity ▼	No activity ▼
Name of partner	No activity ▼	No activity ▼	No activity ▼	No activity ▼

Cancel

Next

The following statements describe possible ways of governing a partnership.

Please indicate, which of the following statements best describe the governance of this partnership:

	Yes	No
An office was set-up or staff was solely assigned the task and responsibility of governing the partnership.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
All relevant external concerns and communication (e.g., with donors, beneficiaries) are centrally managed by only one or a few partners.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

The following statements describe possible governance interventions in a partnership.

Please indicate, which of the following statements best describe the governance of this partnership:

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither/nor	Agree	Strongly agree
Support and assistance are given to partners if they lack the capacity to fully participate in the partnering process (briefing, training, etc.).	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Efforts are put into the clarification of each partner's goals and expectations towards the partnership.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Efforts are made to solve disagreements between partners together.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Measures are taken (e.g. letter of agreements, contracts) to ensure that partners conform to prespecified conditions.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Cancel

Next

Please indicate who of the partners (including your own organisation) were involved in and/or influential on the decision-making processes about the following partnership-related issues:

Please do so by clicking on the arrow-button below each issue and selecting your own organisation's and each partner's level of involvement and/or influence.

Please consider that a partner can be involved but not influential, or influential without being directly involved in the decision about an issue.

If a partner was neither involved nor influential in the decision about an issue, please leave the arrow-button on "Not involved".

	Definition of the goal(s) of the partnership	Definition of intended beneficiaries	Selection of partners	Contributions made by each partner	Resource allocations to partners
Name of partner	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼
Name of partner	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼
Name of partner	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼

	Definition of the tasks and responsibilities of each partner	Internal monitoring among partners	External monitoring (e.g., to donors, beneficiaries)	Allocation of partnership outcomes	Terms and conditions of ownership and maintenance of partnership outcomes
Name of partner	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼
Name of partner	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼
Name of partner	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼	Not involved ▼

Cancel

Next

Please indicate in how far the following statements apply to your organisation's relation with your present partners.

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither/nor	Agree	Strongly agree
We are confident that our partners do their best to make this partnership a success.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We are confident that our partners are fully capable of keeping commitments.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We are confident that our partners negotiate honestly.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We are confident that our partners do not take excessive advantage.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please indicate in how far the following statements apply to your organisation's knowledge of and agreement with the goals and interests of your partners and the partnership:

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither/nor	Agree	Strongly agree
The goals and interests of our partners in this partnership clearly known to us.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We agree with our partners on the goal(s) of this partnership.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Cancel

Next

Please indicate to what extent, compared to your initial expectations, you perceive the present partnership as effective.

Please refer only to the present partnership.

If the partnership is still in its infancy and your own or partnership goals and expectations could not yet or only partly be met, please describe your perception until now.

	Far below expectations	Below expectations	As expected	Above expectations	Far above expectations
Our organisation's initial objectives and expectations towards the partnership have been met.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Please indicate your perception of the partnership's effectiveness, with respect to the following criteria.

If the partnership is still in its infancy and some of the criteria are difficult to assess, then please express your perception of the partnership's effectiveness up until now.

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither/nor	Agree	Strongly agree
The partnership's expenses are within budget.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The progress of the partnership is within schedule.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The goals of the partnership have been met.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Cancel

Next

Thank you very much for your cooperation!

Close window

Appendix III: Non-response analysis

	Respondents	Non-respondents		
	38 partnerships	212 partnerships	Difference	Significance
	Percentage	Percentage	Percentage	p-value
Variable				
<u>Initiative:</u>				
Energy	34,2	28,6	-5,60	0,454 ¹
Water	65,8	71,4	5,60	
<u>Region of operation:</u>				
ACP	0	1,9	1,90	0,682 ²
Africa	94,7	89,0	-5,70	
Caribbeans	5,3	5,2	-0,10	
Pacifics	0	3,8	3,80	
<u>Budget:</u>				
5 5.0-77 Mill.	15,8	17,1	1,30	0,433 ²
4 2.5-5.0 Mill.	28,9	22,4	-6,50	
3 1.8-2.5 Mill.	7,9	22,9	15	
2 1.0-1.8 Mill.	15,8	20,5	4,70	
1 0.2-1.0 Mill.	31,6	17,1	-14,50	
Mean	2,82	3,02	0,20	
<u>Percentage (%) of budget financed by partners:</u>				
5 80-100%	2,6	1,0	-1,60	0,172 ²
4 60-80%	15,8	4,3	-11,50	
3 40-60%	21,1	17,6	-3,50	
2 20-40%	50,0	76,7	26,70	
1 0-20%	10,5	0,5	-5,50	
Mean	2,50	2,29	-0,21	
<u>Intermediary organisation:</u>				
IOs and Foreign National governments	13,2	18,6	5,40	0,823 ²
National local governments	18,4	13,3	-5,10	
Regional local government	2,6	5,7	3,10	
Foreign NGO	47,4	40,5	-6,90	
Foreign operator	2,6	2,9	0,30	
Local operator	2,6	8,1	5,50	
Local NGO	2,6	4,3	1,70	
Research Institute	10,6	6,7	-3,90	
¹ Binomial Test				
² Mann-Whitney U-Test				

Appendix IV: Factor analyses

Table IV.I: Factor analysis of objective resource measures

	Factor				
Variable	Relational resources	Administrative resources	Authority	Production means and manpower	Local resources
Negotiation skills	0,731				
Relations to committees	0,674				
Reputation and reach	0,664				
Personal relations to partners	0,655				
Political support	0,643				
Relations to decision-makers	0,619				
Relations to public/media	0,507				
Technological/scientific knowledge		0,789			
Project management experience		0,753			
Administrative Capacities		0,659			
Financial means		0,632			
Licensing power			0,890		
Ownership of licenses/patents			0,794		
Coercive power			0,659		
Manpower ¹				0,787	
Production means ¹				0,754	
Representation of beneficiaries ¹					0,872
Local/regional knowledge ¹					0,764
Cronbach's Alpha	0,829	0,790	0,783	(0,731 ¹)	(0,646 ¹)
KMO measure	0,801				
Test of Sphericity	1588,332				
Significance	0,000				
% of variance explained	70,034				
¹ Items showed a negative covariance and were kept separate for further analyses.					

Appendix IV: Factor analyses

Table IV.II: Factor analysis of in/out-degree centralities (whole sample)

Variable	Factor	
	Control	Resources
Out-degree centrality "Resources"	0,876	
Out-degree centrality "Support"	0,832	
In-degree "Reporting"	0,746	
Out-degree "Advise"	0,716	
In-degree "Advise"		0,732
In-degree centrality "Support"		0,731
Out-degree "Reporting"		0,687
In-degree "Resources"		0,676
Cronbach's Alpha	0,825	0,687
KMO measure	0,701	
Test of Sphericity	546,851	
Significance	0,000	
% of variance explained	53,246	

Table IV.III Factor analysis of involvement in decision-making issues

Variable	Factor	
	Design	Implementation
Partner selection	0,789	
External Monitoring	0,752	
Goal definition	0,737	
Contributions to partnership	0,695	
Resource allocation to partners	0,645	
Task and responsibilities		0,767
Outcomes		0,676
Internal monitoring		0,674
Ownership		0,656
Governance		0,599
Beneficiaries		0,566
Cronbach's Alpha	0,817	0,712
KMO measure	0,818	
Test of Sphericity	351,459	
Significance	0,000	
% of variance explained	53,203	

Appendix IV: Factor Analyses

Table IV.IV: Factor analysis of trust

Variable	Factor
We are confident that our partners negotiate honestly. ¹	0,896
We are confident that our partners do not take excessive advantage. ¹	0,862
We are confident that our partners do their best to make this partnership a success. ¹	0,858
We are confident that our partners are fully capable of keeping commitments. ¹	0,841
Cronbach's Alpha	0,887
KMO measure	0,826
Test of Sphericity	345,530
Significance	0,000
% of variance explained	74,767
¹ All items are taken from the OTI (Organisational Trust Inventory, Cummings & Bromirley, 1996 in (Nyhan & Marlowe, 1997))	

Table IV.V: Factor analysis of external uncertainty

Variable	Factor
Resource supply	0,826
Institutional/political environment	0,812
Beneficiaries	0,788
Cronbach's Alpha	0,727
KMO measure	0,716
Test of Sphericity	241,330
Significance	0,000
% of variance explained	68,381

Appendix V: QCA Membership Values

Case N°	Size	Equity	Power	Trust	Goal	Envtl. uncertainty	Funding uncertainty	Governance form	Effectiveness
1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Shared	Not effective
2	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	Centralised/ Shared	Effective at both levels
3	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Centralised/ Concentrated	Effective at both levels
4	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Partnership-level
5	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	Shared	Effective at both levels
6	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	Centralised/ Shared	Effective at both levels
7	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Effective at both levels
8	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	Shared	Effective at both levels
9	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Centralised/ Shared	Effective at both levels
10	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	Shared	Not effective
11	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Effective at both levels
12	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	Shared	Partnership-level
13	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	Centralised/ Shared	Partner-level
14	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	Centralised/ Shared	Effective at both levels
15	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	Centralised/ Concentrated	Not effective
16	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	Shared	Effective at both levels
17	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	Shared	Effective at both levels
18	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	Shared	Effective at both levels
19	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Not effective

Case N°	Size	Equity	Power	Trust	Goal	Envtl. uncertainty	Funding uncertainty	Governance form	Effectiveness
20	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	Shared	Effective at both levels
21	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Not effective
22	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	Shared	Effective at both levels
23	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Shared	Partner-level
24	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	Shared	Effective at both levels
25	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Shared	Not effective
26	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	Centralised/ Concentrated	Not effective
27	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Not effective
28	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	Centralised/ Shared	Partner-level
29	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	Shared	Effective at both levels
30	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	Shared	Not effective
31	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Partnership
32	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Partnership
33	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	Centralised/ Shared	Effective at both levels
34	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	Centralised /Concentrated	Partnership-level
35	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Not effective
36	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	Shared	Not effective
37	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Not effective
38	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Decentralised/ Concentrated	Effective at both levels

Appendix VI: Truth tables

Table VI.I: Truth table: Governance forms

Partnership-level conditions								Shared	All brokered	Decentralised Concentrated	Centralised Shared	Centralised Concentrated
								N=16	N=22	N=11	N=7	N=4
size	eqy.	power	Trust	goal	envtl.	fund	N	consist	consist	Consist	Consist	Consist
1	1	0	1	1	1	0	7	1,00	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1,00	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1,00	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1,00	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	1,00	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	1	1	0	2	1,00	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	1,00	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0	1,00	1,00	0	0
1	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	1,00	1,00	0	0
0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1,00	1,00	0	0
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1,00	1,00	0	0
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1,00	1,00	0	0
0	0	1	1	1	0	1	2	0	1,00	0	1,00	0
0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	1,00	0	0	1,00
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1,00	0	0	1,00
0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1,00	0	1,00	0
1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1,00	0	0	1,00
1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1,00	0	1,00	0
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1,00	1,00	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1,00	0	1,00	0
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1,00	0	1,00	0
1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1,00	0	1,00	0
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	3	0	1,00	1,00	0	0

Table VI.II: Truth table: Effectiveness

Partnership-level conditions							Governance form					effective	~effective
size	equity	power	Trust	goal	environ	funding	shard	Decentralised Concentrated	Centralised Shared	Centralised Concentrated	N	Consist	consist
1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1,00	0
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	1,00	0
1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1,00	0
0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	1,00	0
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1,00	0
0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	1,00	0
0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1,00	0
1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	7	0,857	0,143
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0,500	0,500
0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	1,00
0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1,00
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	1,00
1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	1,00
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1,00
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1,00
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1,00
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1,00
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1,00
1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1,00
1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	1,00
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1,00
1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1,00
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1,00
